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AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE POWER OF MULTINATIONAL 
CORPORATIONS AND AN ANALYTICAL EVALUATION OF 
THE DETERMINANTS OF U.S. FOREIGN DIRECT 
INVESTMENT IN THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC 
COMMUNITY; A SPECIAL CASE OF 
MULTINATIONAL OIL COMPANIES
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
Purpose of the Study 
In recent years, increasing attention has been given to the 
importance of foreign direct investment by multinational enterprises 
and its contribution to home and host countries. Many economists have 
identified one or a few factors as the determinants of foreign direct 
investment in host nations. This study claims that there are many 
quantitative as well as non-quantitative factors of socio-economic and 
political nature that determine the flows of direct investment abroad. 
This study also examines the efficiency of multinational corporations 
and their role in the economic development of the home and host coun­
tries. The major areas concerning foreign direct investment and the 
role of multinational corporations that are examined in this study in­
clude: an analysis of the motivation, nature and philosophy of capital
movement; an evaluation of the efficiency of multinational corporations
from a pareto optimality point of view; an analysis of the role of in­
ternational corporations in the economic development of home and host 
nations; an examination of essential factors influencing and/or causing 
structural change in the flow of foreign direct investment; and a review 
of the development of U.S. multinational oil companies. Throughout this 
study, U.S. multinational oil companies are used as "special case" of 
multinational corporations. U.S. direct foreign investment in the pe­
troleum industry is the primary concern of the empirical chapter.
A Brief Historical Review of the Position 
of U.S. Direct Investment Abroad
During the period 1950-1979, the position^ of U.S. direct in­
vestment abroad expanded rapidly and changed considerably in composition
2
both by area and by industry. At year end 1950, the U.S. direct- 
investment position was $11.8 billion; this figure increased to $192.6 
billion in 1979, with an annual average growth rate of 10.1 percent.
In 1950, position shares were divided almost equally between developing 
and developed countries but by year end 1979, 72 percent of the total 
share was in developed countries (Table 1-1 and Chart 1-1).
^The position is the net book value of U.S. direct investors' 
equity in, and outstanding loans to, their foreign affiliates.
2
The U.S. Department of Commerce has defined direct investment 
to include U.S. equity in the following types of enterprise.
1) Foreign corporations in which individual persons or groups 
of affiliated persons who normally reside in the United States 
own 25 percent of the voting securities.
2) Foreign corporations in which U.S. citizens own 50 percent 
or more of the publicly held voting securities (if (1) above 
is not satisfied).
3) Proprietorships, partnerships, or real property (other than 
the personal use by the owner) held abroad by U.S. residents.
4) Foreign branches of U.S. corporations.
TABLE 1-1
U .S. D irect In v e stm e n t P o s itio n  A broad, 1950 a n d  1979
A m oun t
1050
M illio n s  o f dollars
D istribu tion
1050 1979
Average 
annual 
race o( 
grow th. 
1050-79
Ali mrema ___
Petroleum_____
M anufactu ring . 
Other...................
Developed coontries.
Petroleum.— . . . , .  
M anufactu ring . . . .  
O ther  ........
Canada..................
Petroleum..........
M anufactu ring. 
O ther..................
Europe................... .
Petroleum..........
M anufactu ring. 
O ther .
O ther.......................
Petroleum..........
M anufactu ring . 
O ther..................
Developing countries.
Petroleum..................
M anufactu ring.........
O ther..........................
L a t in  A m erica ....,
Petroleum .
M anufactu ring . 
O ther..................
O th e r . . . . ..............
Petroleum..........
M anufacturing.. 
O th e r . . . . . ........
International and unallocated..
P e tro leum ...  ................
M anufacturing.........................
O ther.........................................
1I.78S 192,618 100 100 10.1
3.300 41.553 29 22 9.0
3.831 83.561 32 43 11.2
4.567 67,531 39 35 9.7
5,696 117,927 48 72 11.6
981 31.821 8 17 12.7
2,984 67.366 25 35 11.3
1,731 38,741 15 20 1L3
3,679 41.033 30 21 8.8
418 9, ICS 4 5 1L2
1,897 19,237 16 10 8.3
1,264 12.628 11 7 8.3
1,733 81,463 15 42 14.2
426 18,555 4 10 13.9
932 41,246 8 21 14.0
374 21.662 3 11 15.0
384 15.431 3 8 13.6
137 4,098 1 2 12,4
156 6.882 1 4 13 9
92 4.451 I 2 14.3
5,736 47,841 49 25 7.6
2,160 7.231 18 4 4.2
347 16.108 7 8 10.7
2.720 24,412 23 13 7.9
4.577 36.834 39 19 7.5
1,303 4.568 11 2 4.4
781 13.220 7 7 10.2
2,493 19. (M6 21 10 7.3
1,159 11.007 10 6 8.1
866 2,662 7 I 3.9
66 2.978 1 2 14.0
228 5,366 3 11.5
356 6,880 3 4 10,8
240 2,50-2 2 1 8.4
116 1 4.378 1 I - 13.3
and 41.
SOURCE: Survey of Current Business, February 1981, pp. 40
At year end 1950, the position in the petroleum industry was 
$3.4 billion; at year end 1979 it was $41.6 billion with an average 
annual growth rate of 9.0 percent. The growth rate was 12.6 percent in 
developed countries and 4.2 percent in developing countries. Among all 
areas, Europe had the highest rate of growth— 13.9 percent. For all of 
1950-1979, a great portion of the growth in position was financed by
U.S. Direct Investment Position Abroad, 1950-79
By Area By Industry
Billion $ (Ratio scale) 
200 I--------------------------
Billion $ (Ratio scale) 
 7 1  200
100 too
80 80
60 60
TotalTotal
Manufacturing
40
Europe30
20 20
Canada
Latin America Petroleum
Other
'Brealt In series (see text tor discussion)
56 58 64 66 68 74 76
U S Dr(iA>im{*nioi Commeice. Buieau ol Economic Analysis
CHART 1-1
SOURCE: Survey of Current Business, February 1981, pp. 40 and 41.
equity and intercompany account outflows, with very low reinvested 
earnings (except during 1979).
According to Whichard (165, p. 45), the low rate of reinvested 
earnings was caused by intercompany pricing practices. Earnings were 
transferred from incorporated refining and marketing affiliates in 
oil-importing European countries to crude-oil producing affiliates in 
oil-exporting countries. The peak growth in the petroleum industry in 
Europe occurred in years 1950, 1957, 1960, 1961, 1973 and 1979, with a 
rate of 30, 27, 21, 22, 24 and 23 percent, respectively. The rapid 
growth during 1956 and 1957 may have been caused by the expectation of 
and actual formation of the European Economic Community. The rapid rise 
in the position during 1973 was due to a sharp increase in oil prices 
which resulted in the European affiliates' increased indebtedness to 
their U.S. parents. The sharp increase in the position during 1979 was 
due to a large increase in reinvested earnings, which, in turn, was 
caused by an increase in corporate earnings and the rate of reinvestment.
After World War II, U.S. economic aid to European countries 
paved the way for expanding U.S. direct investment in Europe. Both the 
U.S. and western Europe realized that they could not attain their objec­
tives without economic and political cooperation. European economic and 
political unity provided a secure market for U.S. companies and their 
affiliates, as well as a countervailing power against Communist penetra­
tion in Europe. Creation of the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC), (proposed in 1950 and set up in 1952), was Europe's first step 
towards this unity. In 1957, six European nations (Belgium, Germany, 
France, Italy, Luxembourg and Netherlands) signed a treaty which led to
the establishment of the European Economic Community (EEC). One of 
the greatest achievements of this community occurred in 1968 when the 
EEC Customs Union became fully operational. The six founding members 
(EEC(6)) had achieved free trade in industrial goods, had imposed a 
common external tariff on imports of manufactured goods from nonmember 
countries, and had begun to form a common foreign trade policy. In 
1973, the United Kingdom, Denmark, and Ireland joined the community. 
Enlargement of the community from six members to nine members (EEC(9)) 
made the community more comparable to the U.S. Chart 1-2 compared the 
enlarged community with the U.S. on 1974 population, gross domestic 
product, exports, imports, area, percentage of world exports, and per­
centage of world imports. Figure 1-1 shows the balance of payments 
positions of the EEC and the U.S. during 1958-1974.
The
Enlarged
Community
•  new
profile—
1874
CHART 1-2
Reproduced from: European Community Information Service, The
United States and the European Community: Their Common Interests in
1976, European Community Information Service, 2100 M Street, N.W., 
Washington, B.C. 20037, p. 12.
COMMUNITY OF NINE’S TRADE WITH
THE UNITED STATES (in biUions of units o f account)"
EC Im ports
12.300 Î2.149 11783
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Exports
2 622
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FIGURE 1-1
1973 1974
Reproduced from: European Community Information Service, The
United States and the European Community: Their Common Interests in
1976, European Community Information Service, 2100 M Street, N.W., 
Washington, D.C. 20037, p. 25.
Methodology of the Study 
The methodology used in determining the quantitative and non- 
quantitative factors that affect the flow of direct investment abroad 
and in investigating the role of multinational corporations in home and 
host nations cannot be limited to statistical techniques. An analysis 
of empirical data and of the history of MNCs, such as that presented in 
this study, is also necessary.
A careful examination of the history of the U.S. multinational 
corporations and an analysis of data on MNCs' activity provides: infor­
mation on the nature, motivation and extent of the power and effective­
ness of the U.S. MNCs; the extent of government involvement in persuading 
or discouraging private foreign direct investment; the effectiveness of
8the home or host's government restrictions on the direction and amount 
of foreign direct investment; and the influence of national or inter­
national political or economic events on the nature, structure and 
direction of foreign direct investment.
In the empirical part of this study, a statistical model for 
determining the flow of direct foreign investment is developed. A 
polynomial distributed lag model and a simple linear regression tech­
nique are used for estimation purposes. In the determination of factors 
affecting the flow of foreign direct investment, a search procedure was 
conducted, and, among many variables with different lag structure, only 
those which had the best explanatory power were chosen. The term "best"
is defined as the theoretically expected sign for coefficients, a high 
-2 2
R (adjusted R ), and t-statistics significantly different from zero.
In estimation of the equations for those equations which signify 
the presence of a positive first-order serial correlation, the Cochrane- 
Orcutt iterative process is applied to correct the autocorrelation.
The data for estimation purposes is limited to the 1950-1979 
period on an annual basis. The limitation of data was a prime constraint 
on the estimation of equations.
Summary tables for estimations of all equations and definitions 
of all variables are provided at the end of the empirical chapter.
The Organization of the Study
Chapter II presents historical background on and the philosophy, 
motivation and nature of capital movement. The role of multinational oil 
companies in European countries is emphasized in particular. Chapter II 
is divided into three main parts. The first part includes: a brief
review of the history of capital movement and the position of the United 
Kingdom and the United States in international capital transactions; an 
identification and brief discussion of the major sources of capital 
movement; and definitions of different types of capital transactions 
and the nature of each type. Part two discusses the motives for direct 
foreign investment. Part three examines: the emergence of the U.S.
multinational corporations after WWII; the history of multinational oil 
companies; and the impact of foreign direct investment on the economy 
of host nations.
Chapter III examines the performance and policies of multi­
national corporations in host nations and discusses host-nation response 
to multinational corporations. Chapter III is divided into two parts:
The first part contains an analysis of the efficiency of multinational 
enterprises; a discussion of the MNCs' tendency toward monopoly; dis­
cussions of the problems of transfer pricing and diffusion of technology 
to less developed countries; and a comparative analysis of foreign direct 
investment in developed and developing countries. Part two examines the 
developed nations' response to MNCs; the growth of European dependence 
on oil as a major source of energy; European countries' restrictive 
policies against the multinational oil companies; experiences of multi­
national oil companies in a few developing countries, and the response 
of oil producing countries to MNCs.
Chapter IV presents an overview of previously developed theories 
on foreign direct investment and a mathematical model developed for this 
study. Chapter IV is divided into four main sections. Section one pro­
vides background on issues and problems concerning the effect of foreign
10
direct investment. In section two, the Micro-Economic Approach to the 
theory of foreign direct investment is introduced. This section's dis­
cussion proceeds under the headings of "Business Administration," 
"Industrial Organization," and "Product Cycle" approaches. Section 
three examines the Macro-Economic Approach to the problem of foreign 
investment. In this section, the Hecksher-Ohlin theorem, Mundell's 
substitutability theorem, the MacDougall-Kemp theorem, the author's 
alternative model, the Batra and Ramachandra's model, and Batra's model 
for less developed countries are discussed. Section four provides an 
overview of trade barriers and optimum tariff and taxation policies.
Chapter V provides a substantial model for determining the 
factors affecting the flow of direct foreign investment and provides 
empirical results based on yearly data for the period 1950-1979.
Chapter V contains four sections. Section one presents a discussion of 
the development of the statistical model based on the neoclassical theory 
of profit maximization behavior and cost of adjustment. Section two dis­
cusses the problems, limitations and sources of the data. Section three 
offers the empirical results of the model for the period 1950-1979.
This section contains a discussion of: the statistical estimation of
equations related to U.S. foreign direct investment in the petroleum 
industry in the EEC(6); structural changes in the trend of U.S. foreign 
direct investment in the EEC(6); and a comparison of the statistical 
results of the petroleum industry with the manufacturing industry and 
with "all industries." Section four presents tables containing the 
statistical results and definitions of variables.
Chapter VI presents a survey of the findings and conclusions.
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TABLE 1-2
U.S. DIRECT INVESTMENT POSITION ABROAD, 
1950-1979
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SOURCE: Survey of Current Business, February 1981, Vol. 61,
No. 2, p. 50.
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CHAPTER II
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL 
CAPITAL MOVEMENTS
Introduction
As was mentioned above, in recent years, increasing attention 
has been focused on the importance and contribution of multinational 
corporations to their home countries as well as to the host nations.
The emergence of international corporations is not a new phenomenon, 
but their importance as a "global power" with centralized planning on a 
world scale is relatively new. Giant corporations control the means of 
production, distribution, communication, etc., all over the world, or, 
as George Ball says, giant corporations "do have the power to affect 
the lives of people and nations in a manner that necessarily challenges 
the prerogatives and responsibilities of political authority" (Barnet 
and Muller; 10, p. 21). An expression of this power can be shown by 
comparing the annual sales of corporations and the gross national prod­
ucts of countries in 1973; in this regard GM was bigger than Switzerland, 
Pakistan, and South Africa; Royal Dutch Shell was bigger than Iran, 
Venezuela, and Turkey; Goodyear Tire was bigger than Saudi Arabia.^
^Richard J. Barnet and Ronald E. Muller, Global Reach: The
Power of the Multinational Corporations (New York: Simon and Schuster,
1974), p. 21.
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The History and Nature of Capital Mobility 
Historical Background 
The structure of international capital movement changed substan­
tially after WWI. Before WWI, the flow was from developed countries to 
developing countries or from colonial powers to their overseas terri­
tories. There has been some controversy among economists about the 
nature and amount of and motivation for the flow of capital at that 
time. For example, P. N. Rosenstein-Rodan (127) believes that almost 
two-thirds or three-fourths of this capital flow was in bond form and 
the rest in equity form, while Frank and Baird (49) state that much of 
the capital that flowed into colonial territories was in the form of 
private capital for construction of new railroads and new projects en­
couraged by the governments of developed countries.^
The United Kingdom can be considered a prime exporter of long­
term capital in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Table 2-1 
demonstrates two important points: 1) by that time the world was almost
entirely divided into creditor and debtor nations; 2) the United Kingdom 
was the leading creditor of the time. Almost 70 percent of the British 
foreign portfolio investment was devoted to building social overhead 
capital in order to facilitate and develop the capability of primary 
producing nations to export marketable surpluses to Europe.
The controversy about the actual international transactions 
and capital movement is in part due to lack of appropriate organization 
and institution to collect and record the data. C. K. Hobson's book 
The Export of Capital (63) is the first attempt to give a record of the 
export of capital from the United Kingdom for the period of 1870-1912. 
Another report by Imlah (76) diverges seriously from Hobson's estimates.
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TABLE 2-1
MAIN CREDITOR AND DEBTOR COUNTRIES, 1913
Gross Credits Gross Debts
$
(OOOmn) %
$
(OOOmn) %
United Kingdom 13.0 40.9 Europe 12.0 27.3
France 9.0 20.4 Latin America 8.5 19.3
Germany 5.8 13.2 United States 6.8 15.5
Belgium, Netherlands, Canada 3.7 8.4
and Switzerland 5.5 12.5
Asia 6.0 13.6
United States 3.5 8.0
Africa 4.7 10.7
Other Countries 2.2 5.0
Oceania 2.3 5.2
44.0 100.0 44.0 100.0
SOURCE: United Nations, International Capital Movement in the
Inter-War Period, Lake Success, 1949.
The Great Depression changed the position of the United Kingdom 
in the international market. First, in relative terms, the scale of 
capital exports was reduced dramatically; second, the geographical 
pattern of lending was limited to the sterling area; and, finally, the 
composition of lending was changed from portfolio investment of official 
capital flow (including grants and loans) and private investment. In 
short, Britain lost her leadership in the world of capital flow and has 
been playing the role of middleman ever since.
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Identification and Major Sources 
of Capital Movement
Changes in the structure and composition of and motivation for 
capital were not limited to the United Kingdom. In fact, four differ­
ent sources of capital movement can be distinguished after WWII: multi­
lateral, bilateral, private, and from OPEC countries.
It can be argued that after WWII developed countries found 
themselves more concerned about that two-thirds of the world's popula­
tion living in misery and threatened by hunger, malnutrition, and dis­
ease. In light of this, developed nations began to form multilateral 
institutions^ which became a channel for the transfer of capital.
The second source of capital movement is bilateral, or govern­
ment to government. After WWII, the U.S. was committed to the recon­
struction of European countries. The initial commitment was 2 percent 
of the U.S. GNP. In 1949, with the announcement of the "Four-Point 
Program," economic aid became a U.S. national policy. During the late 
1950s U.S. aid to Europe and less developed countries was closely tied 
to issues of national security and the promotion of U.S. private inves­
tors in foreign countries.
The European recovery program of post WWII and the later sup­
port for private investors in less developed countries paved the way for 
expanding U.S. multinational corporations around the world. Multi­
national corporations now constitute a substantial part of the U.S. 
private capital movement.
The Conference of Bretton Wood resulted in the formation of 
the IBRD or World Bank as a companion organization for IMF, and in 1960 
the International Development Association was developed and so forth.
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Finally, formation of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) opened a promising source of capital movement to both 
developing and developed countries.
Types of Capital Transactions
According to Pazos, capital is transferred from a saver country
to an investor country to finance:
. . . (a) the purchase or construction of production facilities 
that is owned and operated by the savers themselves; (b) the 
purchase of shares in the property of production facilities that 
is operated by persons other than the savers; (c) the acquisition 
of money claims against persons that are engaged in construction 
or operation of production facilities; and (d) the acquisition of 
money claims against financial intermediaries that eventually 
purchase property shares or money claims from persons engaged 
in the construction or operation of production facilities.1
Capital transactions under (a) above are called direct foreign
2
investment specified as "an act of entrepreneurship" and are applied to 
construction and enlargement of a plant, operation of a mine, or culti­
vation of a new field. Capital movement under (b), (c), and (d) above 
is called "Indirect Foreign Investment," or portfolio investment, which
3
is purely a financial phenomenon. Tsurumi (155, p. 73) describes the 
motivation for foreign direct investment as the control and management
Felipe Pazos, "The Role of International Movements of Private 
Capital in Promoting Development," in John H. Adler and Paul W. Kuznets, 
Capital Movement and Economic Development, (New York: St. Martin's
Press, 1967), p. 186.
^Ibid.
3
Pazos differentiates between "portfolio investment" as claims 
negotiated through transferable documents and "contractual investment" 
where claims made through bilateral negotiation and without transferable 
documents.
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of a business operation and the motivation for portfolio investment as 
purely a financial gain.^
Data in Table 2-2 indicate that U.S. portfolio investment in 
underdeveloped countries increased until 1929. The total U.S. portfolio 
investment in Latin America, Africa, Asia, and Oceania rose from U.S.
$473 million in 1908 to U.S. $2,828 million in 1929. The Great Depres­
sion caused a suspension of U.S. portfolio investment in underdeveloped 
countries; book value of this investment in 1950 had dropped to U.S.
$960 million, which means that there was no new flow of portfolio in­
vestment from the U.S. to less developed countries during the 1930s and
1940s. Data in Table 2-2 also shows the amount and distribution of U.S.
direct investment between 1908 and 1959.
The Motive for Direct Foreign Investment 
Several explanations have been advanced concerning the motiva­
tion for direct foreign investment. Among them are market imperfection, 
risk diversification, as well as a number of other miscellaneous factors.
The Market Imperfection 
Theoretically a single factor such as the difference in cost of 
capital, cheap raw materials or the presence of a technological gap be­
tween the two countries may explain direct investment by a firm in a
With regard to difference between "Foreign Direct Investment" 
and "Foreign Portfolio Investment" (Tsurumi (155, p. 73) says "An in­
vestment in a foreign country with the intention of actively managing 
the physical assets and organization acquired or created as a result of 
the investment, the investment is commonly termed a foreign direct in­
vestment. If by contrast, the foreign investment is such that the inves­
tor intends only to hold the investment with the expectation of financial 
gain and does not intend to manage the investment it is termed a foreign 
portfolio investment or simple portfolio investment."
TABLE 2-2
U.S. D i r e c t  A N D  P o r t f o l i o  I n v e s t m e n t  b y  G e o g r a p h i c  A r e a s , 1908-19S9
(M illiuns of U .S . Jollars)
luutl 1014 1010 io i i 1000 loas . lost) 10.50
Direct
]*'iirope 369 573 693 921 1,353 1,259 1,720 5,300
Ciinatla and Newfoundland 405 618 814 1,080 2,010 ■ 1,952 3,579 10,171
Latin America 754 1,281 1,983 2,819 3,513 2,847 4,866 8,218
Africa 5 U 31 58 102 93 352 843
Asia 75 119 175 267 394 403 1,044 2,236
Oceania 10 17 53 117 149 91 226 876
Total direct 1.618 2,622 3,754 5,264 7,528 6,690 11,787 29,735
Long-Term  Loans and Portfolio
Uurope 120 119 1,294 1,732 3,247 1,767 1.650 2.336
Canada and Newfoundland 292 249 729 1,552 1,650 1,706 3,618 5,435
Latin America 314 368 413 853 1,911 1,704 517 1,151
Africa 0 0 0 0 17 33 — —
Asia 160 127 134 405 646 512 443 t 1.265 t
Oceania 0 0 1 24 254 322 — —
Total portfolio 837 862 2,576 4,565 7,725 5,999 6,228 10,710
•  D ata  fu r  10.1.’» loans and p o rtfo lio  investm ent was obtained b y  deducting 1030 d irect investm ent (Office o f Ilusiness Economics estimates) from  
103.Î to ta l investm ent (Lewis). 'D ie discrepancy between d irect investm ent items fo r 10:15 and 1030 is approx im ate ly  $45 m illion , 
t  Th is item  represents a to ta l o f A frica , Asia and Oceania.
SouKi i :  Cieona Lewis, America'i S ta ke  in International Investments, Brookings, 1938 ; U .S . Department of Commerce, Office of 
Business Economies, Jialance o j Payments Sta tistica l Supplement.
Reproduced from: John H. Adler and Paul W. Kuznets, Capital Movement and Economic Develop­
ment, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967, p. 190.
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foreign nation— but in the real world many forces cause the market to 
deviate from perfect competition. Therefore if the cost of capital is 
different in the two countries, capital can be transferred to the coun­
try with the higher cost of capital, but not necessarily in the form of 
foreign direct investment. With regard to a cheap raw material, an in­
vestor can buy the raw material from a firm in the host country and still 
produce at home. Finally, if there is a demand for special technology in 
the host country, the technology can be sold or be rented through licens­
ing and does not necessarily require foreign direct investment. There­
fore, a combination of economic and political factors could cause trans­
fer of capital in the form of direct investment in an imperfect market.
Hymer (73) believes that the oligopolistic market structure of 
certain industries is the basic motivation for foreign direct investment. 
Industries which fall somewhere between monopoly and perfect competition 
characterized by imperfect competition with numerous small firms tend to 
engage in foreign operations. Empirical evidence for U.S. multinational 
firms in Canada confirm that industries with many small firms dominate 
the market share in Canadian investment.^
The basic motivation of foreign direct investment may be clas­
sified under defensive motivation and aggressive motivation or a combi­
nation of both.
Defensive motivation may be caused when a firm perceives the 
fear of losing the present or future market in a foreign land because
More detail about the theoretical and empirical evidence on 
Hymer's view can be found in Stephen Hymer, The Multinational Corpora­
tion; A Radical Approach (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1979).
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of a high tariff, government restrictions, and expansion of industry by 
a rival firm in the host nation which blocks export to that country.
Aggressive motivation may result from the natural growth of a 
firm, for example, a manufacturing firm that exports its products 
through local distributors. It may proceed to establish a new sales 
subsidiary or purchase the local distributors and then, as the market 
expands, firm may invest in a manufacturing plant.
The presence of a cheap source of raw materials and a market 
for the final product may also motivate a firm to save transportation 
cost and invest in the host country.
Kindleberger (87) argues that market imperfection is a require­
ment for direct investment abroad and that foreign direct investments 
are mostly of a defensive nature.
Knickerbocker (90) describes foreign direct investment as the 
defensive strategy of oligopolistic rivals.
A monopolistic firm may enjoy one or more of the following ad­
vantages as the result of investing abroad: 1) product market imperfec­
tions such as the existence of product differentiation, marketing and 
organizational skill, and collusion or administered prices; 2) factor 
market imperfection such as the presence of wage differential, differen­
tial in the cost of capital, unique techniques in production, and access 
to cheap sources of raw material; 3) internal and external economies of 
scale generated through horizontal or vertical integration; and 4) other 
externalities caused by government interference such as regulation in 
favor of multinational enterprise or tax exemptions and other conces­
sions.
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The Risk Diversification 
International diversification of scales reduces the risk and 
creates a more stable stream of profits over time. The advantage of 
diversification can be obtained if the economic fluctuations of host 
countries are not perfectly correlated with the economic fluctuation of 
the investors' country. Rugman (134) empirically shows that the expan­
sion of foreign operation reduces the risk of the firm's profit. The 
basic reason for the risk reduction is that each country has its own 
unique parameters which affect direct investment, such as the presence 
of certain regulations or a strike which may not be present in other 
country. Therefore international diversification provides an opportu­
nity for investors to manage and control uncertain events with more con­
fidence and less risk. In this regard, a director of an important 
American petroleum company said that "we work on an insurance policy of 
spreading risks around . . . we're not smart enough to predict the 
future . . .  we can't figure out which area will go bad. Thus we diver­
sify and take a part in every area" (Wilkins; 168, p. 206).
Other Factors Influencing Investment Decisions 
A firm's objectives and motivation may change in time. A multi­
national corporation's objectives during the early stages of development 
may be based on the expansion of the firm at home or abroad, which is an 
"aggressive" act, while, after a certain degree of growth, the decision 
maker's motivation may change in order to maintain control over the ex­
isting operation. According to Wilkins (168) the basic motivation of 
multinational enterprises in the late 1950s and 1960s might have been 
to maintain the existing stake all over the world. Specifically, the
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survival of U.S. multinational affiliates relied essentially on three 
factors: 1) the availability of an adequate supply of raw material and
primary products; 2) the existence of a reliable market to sell their 
final products, and 3) a global organizational structure to coordinate 
and harmonize all processes of production, marketing, and distribution.
The U.S. multinational corporations were successful in obtain­
ing and controlling adequate sources of raw materials, energy, and 
mining. U.S. corporations intensified their search for basic sources 
of supply during and after Wl-JI and WWII because of the high demand for 
these sources during the Wars. Also, the government increased its sup­
port for industries involved in exploration and production of basic raw 
materials.^
With regard to the new market, U.S. enterprises followed a 
market-oriented strategy to expand their market in LDCs. Investments 
were mostly in "light industries," such as assembly plants, distribu­
tion, and marketing, with short term duration and presumably less risk.
In summary, post-war motivation for foreign direct investment 
seems to be market oriented, aimed at maintaining control over the vast 
activities of the globax corporation. Although a great portion of U.S. 
multinational corporations' foreign direct investment was devoted to 
heavy and sophisticated industries in developed nations. Tables 2-3 and 
2-4 indicate that by the 1960s investment had spread to less developed 
areas at least in light industries.
^A more detailed discussion is given in "Historical Analysis 
of Multinational Oil Companies."
TABLE 2-3
U.S. DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENTS, 1950, 1960, AND 1970 
(Book Value in Billion U.S. Dollars)
C o u n try
o r
reg ion
(1 )  
l  o la l >
( ï )
M a n u l'a c iu rin g
(3)
P e tro leu m
( I )
T ra d e
(5 )
M il l in g  *
(6 )
P u b lic  u tilit ie s  ^
1950 I9 6 0 1970 1950 1960 1970 1950 1960 1970 1950 1960 < 1970 1950 1960 1970 1950 1 9 6 0 *  1970
E u ro p e 1.73 6 .69 24.52 .93 3.80 13.71 .43 1.76 5.47 .19 .74 2 .79 .03 .05 .08 .03 .04 .11
C anada 3.58 11.18 22.79 1.90 4.83 10.06 .42 2.66 4.81 .24 .63 1.32 .33 1.32 2.99 .28 .64 .68
l .a t in
A m e ric a  * 4.59 8.32 14.76 .78 1.52 4.62 1.31 3.12 3.91 .24 .78 1.54 .67 1.27 2.07 .91 1.18 .61
Asia 1.00 2.48 5.56 .06 .29  1.52 .78 1.66 < 3.02 .05 .14 .46 .02 .02 < .09 . 0 5 ' .10 .14
A fric a .29 1.07 3.48 .06 .1 2 -' .54 .12 .41 * 2.09 02 .05 .21 .06 .2 5 * .45 7 01 .01
O cean ia .26 I.O I 3.49 .01 .49 < 1.81 .11 .37 * .71 .02 .06 .23 .01 .0 3 * .49 8 » .01
TO TA L » 11.79 31.82 78.18 3.83 11.05 32.26 3.39 10.81 21.71 .76 2.40 6.55 1.13 2.95 6.17 1.42 2.55 2.87
Soure r: See source fo r T ab le  XXII.I
* T o ia l is Ux sum o f columns 2 6 plus miscellaneous investments.
* Includ ing  smelling.
^ Includes transportation
* Pre lim inary figures (th is author cannot locate revised figures)
5 Inclutles European and form er European dependencies.
*  Practically all in  the Philippines.
^ Less than m illion .
^ $1 m illio n  o r less.
* Inc lu tlts  unallocated international.
Reproduced from: Mira Wilkins, The Maturity of Multinational Enterprise: American Busi­
ness Abroad from 1914-1970, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1974, p. 330.
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TABLE 2-4
U.S. DIRECT INVESTMENT IN MANUFACTURING, 
1950, 1955-1970 
(Book Value in Million Dollars)
Y e a r T o t a l
E u ro p e
U .K . E E C » C a n a d a
L a t in  
.A m e ric a  ■ .Asia A f r ic a  » O c e a n ia  » T o t a l  *
1950 9 32 542 317 1 .897 781 6 0 55 107 3.831
1955 1 .6 4 0 946 5 63 2 .8 4 1 1 .372 9 4 » 8 6 ' 2 5 8 6 .3 4 9
1956 1 .8 1 6 1.052 6 59 3 .1 9 6 1.543 1 1 3 » 9 4  ' 2 8 5 7 .152
1957 2 .1 9 5 1.238 831 3 .9 2 4 1 .2 8 0 » 190 106 3 14 8 .0 0 9
1958 2 .4 7 5 1.361 9 7 0 4 .1 6 4 1 .334 217 117 3 65 8 .673
1959 2 .9 2 7 1.607 1 .135 4 .5 5 8 1 .425 248 120 4 1 2 9 .6 9 2
I9 6 0 3 .8 0 4 2 .164  » 1 .4 3 6 » 4 .8 2 7 1.521 2 8 6 » 1 1 8 » 4 9 4  » 11.051
1961 4 .2 5 5 2 .305  » 1 .6 5 9 » 5 .0 7 6 1.707 321 » 113 » 4 2 3  » 11.997
1962 4 .8 8 3 2 .5 1 2 » 2 .0 6 3  » 5 .3 1 2 1.944 3 48  » 141 » 6 1 8 » 13.250
1963 5 .6 3 4 2 .7 3 9 2 .5 2 8 5 .7 6 1 2 .2 1 3 430 177 7 23 14.937
1964 6 .5 8 7 3 .010 3 .1 3 9 6 .1 9 7 2 .5 0 7 556 2 2 7 8 6 0 16.935
1965 7 .6 0 6 3 .305 3 .7 2 5 6 .8 7 2 2 .9 4 5 676 2 9 2 9 48 19.339
1966 8 .8 7 6 3 .716 4.401 7 .6 7 5 3 .317 796 3 3 3 1.061 22 .0 5 8
1967 9 .7 9 8 3 .878 4 .9 7 6 8 .0 9 5 3 .5 8 6 988 3 7 0 1 .336 2 4 .1 7 2
1968 1 0 .7 9 6 4 .243 5 ,3 9 9 8 .5 6 8 4 .0 0 5 1.144 4 03 1 .497 2 6 .4 1 4
1969 1 2 .2 8 0 4 .567 6 .3 8 2 9 .4 0 6 4 .347 1.378 4 5 3 1.651 29 .5 27
1970 1 3 .7 0 6 4 .977 7 .1 7 7 1 0 .0 5 9 4.621 1.524 5 3 8 1 .814 32.261
Sourfi*; See source for Tabic X M I.I .
' Includes European and former European dependencies (except 1953-1956).
* T h e  largest part o f this is in South Africa.
 ^T h e  greatest part o f this is in  Australia.
* Includes some unallocated international investments.
* G erm any, France, Italy, Belgium. Netherlands. Luxembourg—countries that joined in the European 
Economic C om m unity in 1957. Data before 1957 excludes Luxembourg, b u t investment there in man­
ufacturing was small (exclusion is because figures are not available.)
* Includes only India. Indonesia. Japan, and the Philippines.
'S o u th  A frica only.
* D rop m ay be because of change in series.
* Pre lim inary figures (this author cannot locate published revised figures).
Reproduced from: Mira Wilkins, The Maturity of Multinational
Enterprise: American Business Abroad from 1914-1970, Cambridge:
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1974, p. 331.
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Historical Analysis of Multinational Corporations 
and Their Dominant Role on the Economy 
of the Host Nations
The Emergence of the U.S. Multinational 
Corporations (Pre-World War II)
The status of American multinational corporations before World 
War II is briefly reviewed in this section. The reasons for lack of 
emphasis on the pre-WWII situation of U.S. corporations are: 1) the
empirical part of this study is based on data after WWII and 2) limita­
tions of this study do not allow a more comprehensive elaboration on the 
early development of multinational corporations.
Before WWI, the U.S.' stake in foreign countries was small 
relative to European countries (Britain, France, and Germany). Table 
2-5 shows the distribution of U.S. and European foreign investment in 
1914. Of the $3.5 billion U.S. investment abroad, only $2.65 billion 
is estimated as direct foreign investment. Also, Table 2-1 indicates 
that U.S. was a debtor in international account.
In the early stages of the development of multinational corpora­
tions, the availability of transportation and communication facilities 
were a major determinant in foreign activities of U.S. enterprises.
U.S. investments were mostly concentrated in the neighboring countries 
Canada and Mexico.
The state of the economic development of host countries was 
another factor affécting the nature of investment. For example, in 
Mexico, investments were made mostly in mining and railroads, while in 
Europe, U.S. direct investments were focused in selling, assembling, 
processing, and manufacturing. The higher per-capita income of the
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TABLE 2-5
U.S. AND EUROPEAN FOREIGN INVESTMENTS IN 1914 
(Book Value in Billions of Dollars)
Country Total
United States $ 3.5*
Great Britain 18.3
France 8.7
Germany 5.6
Belgium, Netherlands 
and Switzerland 5.5
SOURCE: W. S. Woytinsky and E. S. Woytinsky,
World Commerce and Governments, New York: The Twentieth
Century Fund, 1955, p. 191.
^Figures on direct and portfolio investments 
available only for the United States: $2.6 billion
direct investment and $.9 billion portfolio investment.
Reproduced from: Anant R. Negandhi and S. B.
Prasad, The Frightening Angels: A Study of U.S. Multi­
nationals in Developing Nations, The Kent State Univer­
sity Press, 1975, p. 201.
European countries intensified the expansion of market-oriented opera­
tions rather than resource-oriented activities. Investments in less 
developed Asian countries totaled $40 million, which was minor compared 
to the $573 million investment in European countries.
In 1914, the ranking of major sectors of U.S. direct investment 
was: 1) mining concentrated in Mexico and Latin America; 2) manufactur­
ing concentrated in Canada and Europe; 3) agriculture in the Carribean 
and Canada; and 4) petroleum concentrated for the most part in Europe.
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The activities of U.S. multinational corporations in the 1920s 
were different from those of the pre-WWI period, multinational enter­
prises were: 1) involved in more countries; 2) establishing more sub­
sidiaries; 3) transferring more technology to the host nations through 
the establishment of manufacturing plants; and 4) operating in more 
diversified activities.
Production of U.S. affiliates was not limited to host-country 
consumption. This was generally true for market-oriented subsidiaries 
as well as resource-oriented subsidiaries. For example, the market- 
oriented subsidiaries of DuPont Company were producing in France and 
exporting some products to Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco. Products of 
supply oriented investments in Central America, such as bananas, mineral 
products, and petroleum, were exported to European countries and the 
United States.
During the 1920s, joint ventures of U.S. companies and com­
panies of other nations or agencies of foreign governments became a 
common strategy for further world-wide expansion. U.S. corporation 
joint ventures with companies in less developed countries were very rare 
due to the lack of capital and inadequate technology on the part of the 
LDC's corporation. The joint ventures of U.S. corporations were basi­
cally for sharing the cost, risk, and required technology to undertake 
national or international projects.
Mira Wilkins (168) suggests five motives for joint ventures:
1) to adjust to the market conditions, environment, and products most 
appropriate for the host nations; 2) to acquire more capital; 3) to 
share technology, marketing skill, and the risk involved in foreign
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operations; 4) to cope with rivals and competitors; and 5) to obtain a 
new market or explore natural resources and share the cost.
Two important events, the 1911 anti-trust law and the destruc­
tion caused by WWI, reduced or even stopped the world-wide activities 
of some industries. A major reduction and disaggregation in the tobacco 
industry, the "drop-out" of Washington Electric and Western Electric, 
and the reduction in the activities of the U.S. steel industry are a few 
examples of the effect of these events.
During the 1920s American corporations had their failures along 
with their successes in dealing with investment abroad. In Europe, they 
endured expropriation of their properties (Russia), nationalization of 
oil companies (Spain), and increased regulation by a number of other 
European nations. In Canada, by contrast, they were only verbally criti­
cized by the trade commission (note that the U.S. had most at stake in 
Canada). American business challenged European investors not only in 
European countries, but also in Canada, Latin America, and Middle East, 
which were once dominated by the European investors.
In 1922, for the first time in history, U.S. foreign investment 
in Canada surpassed the British investment there.^ In 1929, the U.S.
share of total foreign investment in Latin America exceeded that of the 
2
British. Despite the fear of U.S. domination in the world market, the 
reaction of European competitors was not hostile toward U.S. corporation;
Frank A. Knox, "Excursus, Canadian Capital Movements and the 
Canadian Balance of International Payments, 1900-1934," in Herbert 
Marshall, Frank A. Southard, Jr., and Kenneth W. Taylor, Canadian- 
American Industry, New Haven, 1936, p. 299.
2J. Fred Rippy, British Investment in Latin America, Minneapolis, 
Minn., 1959.
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in most cases, they were cooperative in business expansion both in 
European countries and in other nations.
From 1929 throughout the 1930s there was a period of discour­
agement and failure for U.S. businesses investing abroad. The weakening 
economic conditions at home forced the U.S. Congress to impose high 
tariffs on imports in order to protect the domestic industries. In re­
action to the U.S. imposition of trade barriers, Canada and European 
countries retaliated by applying different forms of trade restrictions 
to save their own industries. The economic conditions of the U.S. con­
tinued to deteriorate. The situation in foreign nations was even worse, 
but, very high tariffs in European countries, especially in Britain, 
made U.S. export impossible, and U.S. corporations were compelled to 
invest in those returns in order to maintain their market. The situa­
tion in Germany was different; in the early 1930s, U.S. business in 
Germany was under attack, but by the mid-1930s, the growing market in 
Germany plus the treaty of friendship between the U.S. and Germany re­
assured the U.S. companies.
According to Wilkins (168, p. 187) most U.S. companies were 
making unusually high profits, but they were not allowed to take profits 
out of the country. It is believed that foreign investment in Germany 
was used for WWII war preparation.
During 1933 and 1934, the Roosevelt administration devaluated 
the dollar to improve the economic crisis at home, which also benefited 
U.S. enterprises in foreign countries. This benefit did not last long 
because of the considerable reduction in the value of other currencies 
which had its negative impact on the earnings of U.S. investors abroad.
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The State Department's support of private enterprises in for­
eign countries at that time was cool and sometimes discouraging, accord­
ing to some reports.^
In sum, during the 1930s U.S. enterprises in foreign countries 
faced many political and economic problems: devaluation of foreign cur­
rencies; depression of the international economy; forced investment in 
host nations, and an economic crisis at home. This left U.S. multi­
national corporations discouraged and uncertain about the future market.
The Post-World-War-II U.S. Multinational 
Corporations Perspective
World War II was a turning point in the history of U.S. global 
corporations. The Bretton Woods Conference of July 1-12, 1944, resulted 
in the formation of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Inter­
national Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) which was fol­
lowed by the establishment of the United Nations in 1945. These were 
all indications of a greater role of the U.S. in world affairs. The 
post war economic recovery and reconstruction program for Japan and 
Europe by the U.S. was a reaction to the Soviet expansion and also it 
was aimed to fulfill the U.S. future economic objectives. Soviet vic­
tory in Eastern Europe and new waves of communist expansion around the 
world persuaded the U.S. to get far more involved in the political and 
economic affairs of the noncommunist block than it had in the past.
During the war, U.S. multinational corporations that were 
involved in the production of raw material got more attention than
^National Foreign Convention, Official Report 1940, p. 280.
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manufacturing enterprises. Consequently, after 1945 Americans were 
more interested in investing in raw materials than in manufacturing.
The U.S. was committed to aid European countries that were most 
damaged by the war. Economic aid alone was not sufficient to contain 
Soviet expansion and to attain other economic and political objectives. 
Therefore, the U.S. started supplying military as well as economic 
assistance to Greece and Turkey in 1947. In 1948, the European recovery 
program, the Marshall Plan, was started which was the beginning of in­
creased U.S. influence in European countries. Only one year after the 
Marshall Plan, during 1949, U.S., Canada, and the ten Western European 
countries formed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and 
during the same year, the U.S. Congress passed a Mutual Defense Assis­
tance Act to provide military aid to members of NATO. Within five years 
after the war, U.S. foreign aid to friendly countries had increased to 
$24 billion.
In 1949, the "Point Four" program was proposed by President 
Truman, allowing transfer of technology and economic aid to less devel­
oped countries.
The United States along with other members of the United 
Nations, tried to facilitate international trade. One attempt was the 
formation of the International Trade Organization in 1948, which aimed 
to promote lower trade barriers, help less developed countries, and 
control cartels. In 1948, the U.S. also accepted the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
After WWII, the U.S. government strongly supported private in­
vestors in foreign countries who respected national security and who
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dealt with friendly countries (in government terminology, the "demo­
cratic societies"). Since U.S. investors, especially in the manufac­
turing sector, were hesitant to reinvest in European countries, U.S. 
Congress through the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, for the first 
time guaranteed foreign investment in western European countries. Also, 
the tax policy on foreign earning was revised in order to prevent double 
taxation.
Other U.S. institutions and international organizations backed 
by the U.S.— such as the Economic Cooperation Administration (formed in 
1948), the Export-Import Bank (1934), and the World Bank— provided 
financial support for U.S. private investors abroad.
During the immediate post-war years, the U.S. government pro­
moted private investment in Europe, and during the early 1950s this 
policy was extended to less developed friendly countries with a limited 
restriction on the transfer of U.S. technology and know-how to those 
countries. In contrast, after WWI, U.S. policy was supportive of only 
those investments which served the following purposes: 1) to increase
U.S. export, 2) to expand control over raw materials; 3) to stand against 
foreign monopolies; and 4) to improve the strategic position of the U.S. 
in foreign countries.
Another significant factor during the post-WWII period which 
necessitated expansion of foreign direct investment was the U.S. surplus 
position on the balance of payments, and the remedies recommended to 
reach equilibrium on the balance of payment. Some of the recommended 
policies were: 1) increasing private foreign direct investment; 2)
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providing economic aid to friendly countries; and 3) decreasing exports 
while increasing imports.
The 1950 Korean War intensified the need for greater involve­
ment by U.S. enterprises in the extraction of raw materials around the 
world.
The political situation of that time required changes in U.S. 
foreign policy. First, under the Defense Production Act, the Petroleum 
Administration for Defense (P.A.D.) was formed which established exemp­
tions from antitrust laws for U.S. oil companies. Second, private in­
vestors in mining and petroleum were given first priority in receiving 
assistance from the U.S. government. Third, the Mutual Assistance 
Control Act was passed in 1951, under which all shipments of commodities 
or services to non-friendly (communist bloc) countries were enbargoed. 
Finally, U.S. foreign aid was exclusively devoted to defense and security 
objectives. Table 2-6 indicates the affect of U.S. post-war policy on 
the distribution of direct investment in manufacturing, petroleum and 
mining.
During the mid-1950s the attention of the U.S. government 
turned from developed to underdeveloped countries. The U.S. government 
guaranty program for new investment (initiated for development in Europe) 
was exclusively used for less developed countries.
In 1961, the Agency for International Development (A.I.D.) was 
established to encourage private investment in less developed nations 
(however, U.S. aid was still tied to ensuring national security and the 
well-being of investors in foreign countries).
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TABLE 2-6
U.S. DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENTS, 1946, 1950, AND 1954, BY SECTORS 
(Book Value in Billion U.S. Dollars and Percentage Increase)
1946 1950 1954
Increase
1946-1950
Increase
1950-1954
Petroleum 1.4 3.4 5.3 143% 56%
Manufacturing 2.4 3.8 5.7 58% 50%
Mining .8 1.1 2.1 38% 91%
Utilities 1.3 1.4 1.5 8% 7%
SOURCE: Adapted from the revised figures given in U.S. Depart­
ment of Commerce Office of Business Economics, U.S. Business Investments 
in Foreign Countries, Washington, D.C.,,1960, p. 1, and Survey of Current 
Business, August 1956, p. 19.
During the 1950s and early 1960s the U.S. balance of payments 
turned from surplus to continuous deficit, and the U.S. was forced to 
change its policy in order to reach equilibrium on the balance of 
payments.
The 1965 "Voluntary balance of payments" program announced by 
Lyndon B. Johnson seemed to be ineffective; therefore, on January 1,
1968, President Johnson imposed for the first time a "Mandatory Control 
Program"^ on the outflow of direct foreign investment. Other measures 
which in part served balance-of-payments objectives were reduction in 
control over the export of some commodities to Eastern Europe in 1970 
and lifting the ban on nonstrategic materials to Communist China in 1969.
^The effectiveness of these programs is tested in the empirical
part.
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Imposition of a tariff on the import of commodities presumably 
encourages the production of substitute goods and provides a suitable 
environment for foreign direct investment in areas where import is sus­
pended. The formation of the European Economic Community^ (elimination 
of trade barriers within the members of the community and imposition of 
a tariff wall against nonmember countries) created expectation for a
greater flow of foreign direct investment and a reduction in the export
2
of commodities to the community.
During 1959, only one year after the Common Market had come
into being, seven European countries set up the European Free Trade 
3
Area.
During the late 1950s and early 1960s, there was talk about 
having Britain join the EEC. Such expectation generated new stimulus 
for more direct investment by U.S. investors in the United Kingdom, but 
when, in 1963, Britain failed to join EEC, according to Wilkins (168), 
many investors shifted their new investment from United Kingdom to the 
Common Market.
Six European countries (Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
West Germany, Italy and France) signed the Room Treaty, on March 25, 
1957, forming the European Economic Community (EEC) - the Common Market. 
By July, 1958, free trade on goods, services and men had been reached.
2
The effectiveness of the formation of EEC on the flow of U.S. 
foreign direct investment in EEC is tested in the empirical part.
3
Countries included are Great Britain, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, 
Switzerland, Austria, and Portugal.
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The Historical Perspective of 
Multinational Oil Companies
The history of multinational oil companies can be divided into 
three periods: 1) before 1914, 2) 1914-1945, 3) 1945 and after.
The period before 1914
A decade after the first oil well was drilled in 1859 in 
Pennsylvania, Standard Oil started refining and distributing oil in the 
U.S. and in foreign countries and took leadership of the oil industry.
Only 20 years after the first oil drilling, in 1879, Standard 
Oil of Ohio made its first direct investment abroad by establishing a 
refinery in Galicia. Prior to 1879, the export of refined oil from the 
U.S. at times equaled up to 77 percent of American output.
Although there was collaboration among the Standard Oil com­
panies all along, it was formalized in 1882 with the formation of the 
Standard Oil Trust, which included 40 member companies. During the 
mid-1880s, duties on export of refined oil forced Standard Oil affili­
ates to import crude oil from the U.S. and refine it in Mexico and Vera 
Cruz.
Expansion of export of cheap Russian oil into Europe brought a 
new surge of competition for U.S. oil exporters, resulting in the so- 
called "oil war." The U.S. oil companies needed to take counteraction 
to stop Russian expansion in the European market or at least to retain 
their own position. The first tactic applied by Standard Oil was a re­
duction in oil prices, but soon they realized its ineffectiveness. The 
second policy was to merge with foreign companies in order to watch the 
market; the establishment of the Anglo-American oil company in 1888 and
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and the joint ventures with German oil merchants in 1890 are two exam­
ples of consolidation with foreign companies. The U.S. oil companies 
were given the chance to explore for oil in Russia, but despite many 
attempts this never happened.
Oil export was one of the most important items in the U.S. 
export business equaling almost half of the U.S. oil production during 
the period of 1882 to 1914 (Table 2-7). Standard Oil had the greatest 
share in the U.S. oil industry and in 1900 was considered to be a giant 
multinational corporation. When foreign tariffs for refined oil were 
high, the U.S. oil companies established refineries abroad; by the turn 
of the century they had started to buy foreign companies, and, in some 
cases, had even started buying oil from markets where prices were 
cheaper than the U.S. oil market.
The oil companies acted more oligopolistically during 1880 to
1910 than during any other period, due to the international agreements
between U.S. oil companies and their foreign rivals. The formation of
the Standard Oil Trust in 1882, the merger of U.S. oil companies with 
British and German companies in the "oil war" period, and the 1907 agree­
ment between Standard Oil affiliates, the Deutsche Bank-Shell group, 
and Nobel-Rothschild provide evidence showing how a few multinational 
oil companies controlled the oil industry nationally and internationally.
By 1907 Standard Oil had acquired 55 foreign enterprises with a 
capital of U.S. $37 million; the number of enterprises reached 67 by 
1911. Standard Oil tried to penetrate the far east market, but it faced 
strong opposition by the Dutch and British governments at the end of the 
19th century and the beginning of the 20th century.
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TABLE 2-7
INDICATED TOTAL DOMESTIC CRUDE AND PRODUCT DEMAND* 
IN ALL FOREIGN COUNTRIES (INCLUDING RUSSIA) AND 
QUANTITIES SUPPLIED BY EXPORTS 
FROM UNITED STATES,
YEARS 1865-1942
Ind ica ted
tota l
foreign
domestic
demand
(barrels)
To ta l exports from 
U n i t e d  S ta te s  
crude and prod* 
ucts
Year
Ind ica ted
total
forcicn
domestic
demand
(barrels)
To ta l exports from 
U n it e d  S ta te s  
crude and prod* 
ucts
Barrels
Percent
to ta l dc- Barrels
Percent 
total de­
mand
825 607 73.6 1904......................... 125,203 24,336 19.4
1,515 1,214 80.1 1905......................... 110.460 30.080 27.2
2,035 1,673 82.2 1906........................ 118,218 31,449 26.6
2.230 1.H92 84.6 1907......................... i :h).168 32,306 24.8
2. S77 2.396 KJ.3 1998......................... 145.393 38,6.33 20.6
3.216 2.70.3 83.4 1909........................ 154.4.35 39,042 25.3
4.149 3.624 87.3 1910......................... 15.5.5.50 37,958 21.4
4.020 3.430 85.5 1911......................... 166.608 43.851 20.4
6.607 5.723 8.5.8 1912......................... 165,106 45.019 27.1
6.604 5.598 84.8 1913........................ 175.372 52,251 29.8
0,844 5.655 82.6 1914................ . 177.570 M,3.59 39.6
8.191 0.273 76.6 1915......................... 190,290 56,419 29.7
11,020 8.618 7S.2 1910........................ 201,0.% 02,4.59 31.1
11.3:18 8.318 73.4 201,120 61.503 32.1
13.723 10,041 73.1 1918......................... 170,055 69,012 38.5
11.989 8.257 6M.9 1919......................... 194.079 63,848 32.9
16.533 12.251 73.9 226.329 79,570 3.5.2
17.342 11,959 69.1 245.856 71,652 29.1
19.499 12.094 65.1 1922......................... 24.5.951 74.344 30.2
24,715 12.964 52.5 290.813 101,981 35.1
28.253 13,3.52 47.3 1924......................... 329,158 117,144 35.6
33.270 14.092 42.4 1925......................... 342,221 113.834 33.3
33.3.W 13.834 41.5 1026......................... 393,149 131,050 33.6
33,072 13.519 35.5 1927......................... 428.276 141,649 33.1
42.443 16.100 37.9 1928......................... 486.644 1.54.957 31.8
47.215 16.400 34.7 1929......................... 538.660 163,120 30.3
52,695 15.8.88 30.2 1930......................... 573.248 150,499 27.3
55.865 17.641 31.6 1931......................... 562,099 124,394 22.1
04,363 20,756 32.2 1932......................... 570,739 103.275 18.1
61.299 21,306 34.8 1933......................... 610.381 106.727 17.5
70.913 20.313 28.0 1934......................... 675,840 114,507 16.9
75.424 22.185 29.4 1935......................... 722,949 128,987 17.8
85,191 23.074 27.8 1936......................... 795.848 131,994 16.6
93.103 23.488 25.2 1937......................... RS3.486 172.834 19.6
96.719 22.043 23.4 1938......................... 918,6.50 193,728 21.1
IDS.733 23.217 21.4 1939......................... 9.1.5.774 189.9.59 19.8
123,743 25.692 20.8 1940......................... 907.076 130.466 14.4
118.381 25.339 21.4 1941......................... 932.337 108.830 11.7
116,720 22,302 19.1 1942......................... 871,126 116,907 13.4
Year
1865................
18C6................
1S67................ISM....
1870.............. .
1S7I................
JS72..............
187 3................
187 4................
187 5................
187 6................
187 7................
187 8................
187 9................IKiO... .
1881 .
1882................
18S3................
1884................
1885...............
188 0................
188 7................
188 8................
188 9.............. .
189 0 ................
189 1.............. .
189 2................
189 3.............. .
189 4................
189 5................
189 6................
189 7................
189 8................
1890.............. .
190 0................
190 1................
190 2................
190 3................
Source: Total exports from United States (1805-1942), U. S. Geological Survey and Bureau of Mines.
Indicated total foreign domestic demand (1805-1942).
Private information and estimates.
*In thousands of 42-gallon barrels.
Reproduced from: American Petroleum Interests in Foreign
Countries. Hearings Before a Special Committee Investigating Petroleum 
Resources, U.S. Senate, Seventy-Ninth Congress, June 27 and 28, 1945, 
p. 165.
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In 1911 the U.S. Supreme Court judged Standard Oil to be a 
monopoly and ordered its dissolution; as a result. Standard Oil was 
divided into 34 companies, among which Jersey Standard (EXXON) and New 
York Standard have become the largest. The decision by the court to 
split Standard Oil weakened the U.S. position in the international oil 
market, but each company expanded its activities in foreign countries 
independently. The fear of the continuing application of anti-trust 
law at home persuaded U.S. oil companies to speed up their expansion 
into foreign countries rather than to concentrate on the U.S. market.
In 1914, with the aid of the U.S. State Department, an agree­
ment was reached between Standard Oil of New York and the Chinese gov­
ernment for oil exploration in China, Also Standard Oil of New York 
was able to invest in oil exploration in Palestine, Syria, and Asia 
Minor.
The Supreme Court dissolution decision did not create competi­
tion among the Standard Oil companies in the short-run as it was ex­
pected, but rather each company operated in cooperation with the others 
by concentrating on a special area or on certain activities.
The total amount of U.S. investment in the petroleum industry 
reached U.S. $356 million by 1914. This amount was primarily invested 
in distribution and refining. Almost one-third of the foreign invest­
ment was concentrated in European countries.
1914-1945 period
One of the distinguishing features of this era was that U.S. 
investment abroad dramatically challenged European enterprises all over 
the world. Also the world-wide U.S. search for oil intensified as a
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result of a very high demand for oil during war time. The great neces­
sity for oil, along with immediate and high profits, encouraged U.S. 
companies to invest even in areas such as Mexico, despite the political 
hazards in that country. Table 2-8 presents a historical record of U.S. 
direct investment by American oil companies in foreign countries for 
period of 1918-1944.
In 1916, the formation of the Tropical Oil Company, which came 
about through a monopolistic concession from a French-held company in 
Columbia, indicated a shift in the State Department policy. It now 
accepted the "monopolistic concession" by U.S. business in Columbia, 
which had not been allowed during previous administrations. During 
1914-1917 there was constant effort by Standard Oil of New York to 
explore for oil in China. In 1915 the joint Standard Oil of New York/ 
China was established, but all attempts to find oil failed due to 
political and economic reasons (168, pp. 15-16).
Jersey Standard, the largest oil company in the world, during 
the 1920s regained some of the areas which were lost due to the Supreme 
Court dissolution decision in 1911. In 1926 Jersey Standard directly 
re-entered the British market, although it continued relations with the 
Anglo-American oil company during 1914-1926. In Germany, Jersey Standard 
renewed its marketing and refining facilities. In Spain, U.S. oil com­
panies had control over the largest oil company in that country from 
1922-1927; the company was expropriated by the Spanish government in 
1927. In France, the Government asked Jersey Standard for aid to estab­
lish a national cartel in France. This request was rejected by Jersey 
Standard in 1927; however, political factors such as Russian domination
TABLE 2-8
INVESTMENT BY AMERICAN OIL COMPANIES IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES, 1918-1944 
(Amounts in Thousands of United States Dollars)
PART I. TOTAL ASSETS EMPLOYED
E nd of year
W estcro Hemisphere Eastern Ucm lspticro
To ta l
foreignN o rth
Am erica
South
America To ta l Europe Africa
Europe 
and Africa
Near and 
M idd le  
East
South and 
East Asia Oceania
T o ta l Near 
and M id * 
die, and 
Far East
T o ta l
1018............................................. 85,301 50,004 142,295 107,032 8,772 115,804 277 60,211 20,013 80,501 196,305 338.600
1019............................................. 112,007 . 60.692 170,689 91,369 10,871 .  102,210 6,585 01,276 10.611 117,502 210,742 399.431
1020............................................. 122.789 137,611 260,400 119,019 10.733 129.752 3,164 110,610 22.670 136,480 266,232 526,632
1021............................................ 188,774 130,044 324,818 127,603 12,394 140.057 4.670 104,590 38.683 147,943 288,000 612,818
1922............................................ 200.274 151,113 360.387 127,711 11,303 139.019 5,826 95,950 39,962 141,744 280,763 641,150
1023............................................. 210,240 ICO. 437 385,680 126,706 11. 102 137,898 6,110 06,821 40,899 143,830 281,728 667,414
1024............................................. 210,027 188.094 435,021 165,571 12.928 178.499 5,429 110,402 44,603 160,434 338,933 773.954
1025............................................ 247,541 233,070 481,520 181,406 10.336 200,742 6,300 110,073 51.120 168,399 360,141 850,661
1920............................................ 205.784 291,435 557,219 221.343 21.901 246.244 5.681 111,225 62.831 179.737 425,981 983,200
200,275 335,372 595.647 252.88:1 23. 267 276,150 6,071 01,851 75.656 173,578 440,728 1,045,375
277,8»a 430,088 703.856 2J0.402 29,177 319.579 8 880 102,040 DO. 765 207.705 527,284 1,236,140
302,407 470,208 778,615 337.761 39.161 370,928 10,311 115,512 124.618 250.471 027,399 1.406.014
1030............................................ 315,522 515,430 830.961 480.574 48.337 628.911 10.4«18 110,4X)2 142.638 263,703 702,619 1.623,580
1931............................................. 200.522 541,333 8:11.855 419.003 48. 345 467.313 ID. 636 09,121 129,783 239.540 700,868 1,538.743
1032............................................. 310,435 711,265 1,021,700 457,2".i5 47.133 501.433 12.377 79.729 131,608 223,714 728,147 . 1.749,847
1033............................................. 316.103 745,223 1,001.380 650.303 50.873 701.176 29.792 75,112 139.239 244.143 945,319 2,006,705
333, ai2 716.211 1,019.473 049,179 50.109 609,288 39,021 85,132 140,592 265.615 964,033 2,014,406
325,034 728.251 1,053,235 678.36,4) 54.105 732.171 46.973 81,927 147.357 276.257 1,008,728 2,062,013
321,744 703.432 1,085.176 635.611 53,685 694,296 51.302 81,372 148.563 287,212 981,538 2.066,714
1937............................................. 321,855 987,959 1,309.814 701,608 61.661 769.469 60,434 01.753 166.017 319,134 1,088,603 2,398.417
1938............................................. m . m 084.413 1,287,473 679.091 67.070 716.161 73. SW 77,377 109.263 319,203 1,065,304 2,352.837
1939............................................. 207,006 1,058,250 1,355,370 714.911 72.41,5 787.376 93.100 83,361 180.014 356.505 1,143,881 2.499,257
310.071 1,090.133 1,409.504 497,087 78.575 575. iWi 103.897 92.090 190.056 386.043 961.705 2,371.209
1941............................................. 351,307 1,107.289 1,518,680 331,382 85.074 417,050 117,713 78.347 197.465 393,560 810,616 2,329,302
1042............................................. 303.459 1,147.100 1,510.565 335.764 91.262 427,0*1 120.443 40.630 108,775 284,848 711.874 2,222,439
1013............................................. 362,500 1,200,765 1,569,355 353.691 93.983 452.679 147,507 56.669 115,077 320,153 772,832 2,342,187
1944............................................. 373,714 1,312,180 1,685,894 200,682 90.7«iO 291,442 202.018 74,205 115,53! 392,654 684,096 2.369.990
45»to
See footaotes atcnU of port I I  of table, p. 160.
TABLE 2-8 (Continued)
PART II. NET ASSETS EMPLOYED
End Of year
Westcru Uointsplicro Eiistcni Hemisphere
Total
toreiisaMorlh
America
South
America Total Europe Africa
EuroiM) 
and Africa
Near and 
Middle 
East
South and 
East Asia Oceania
Total Near 
and A(id« 
die. and 
Far East
Totol
IQIS................................ 81.431 5.3.727 135.158 98.822 8.280 107. ins 277 00,088 19,025 79.990 187,093 322.250
IDIU........ 101.429 02.834 107.2»« 80,881 10.410 97.297 0.585 91,193 19.143 110.921 214.218 381.478
19^ *0........ 108.713, 133.5Ik5 212.278 111,872 10.125 121.997 3 .100 110,042 22. 107 135,969 157.960 600.214
I'jy i........ 105.578 131.278 290.8.50 110.210 11.048 127. hSS 4.529 98,817 37.9.S4 111.31X1 269.218 560.104
1922................................... 170.252 144.875 321.127 111.400 10.439 121.899 5.003 89.907 39.079 131.049 259.548 560.675
1923.................................... 182. IIG 158.110 310.202 114. 2S1 10.171 121.455 5.7.W 90.319 39.353 135,425 2.59. aso 600.142
1921................................... 202.9.50 170.080 379.0.30 149.205 11.811 101.UlO 4.987 103.088 42,478 150.5.73 311,599 691,235
1925.................................... 195. 189 215.777 411.2,w; 101.419 15.148 179.507 5.781 m o s s 48.544 157.410 330,977 748.243
1929................................... 211.570 207,059 479.229 195,793 20.475 210.263 4,880 102,558 59.409 100,853 383.121 802.350
1927.................................... 205.757 301.470 507.227 216.3:19 21,330 237,075 5.2.50 83.033 09.722 158,005 395.080 002,907
1928................................... 217,872 383,002 000.871 213. 790 20.751 270.514 7,902 92.587 89.0S3 ISO, m2 460.170 1,001,0.50
1929................................... 230,025 410.018 010.013 270. DIM 35.701 311.821 9,325 101.119 111. 192 227.630 539.457 1. ISO,100
1930................................... 212.551 431.427 070. US I 309.502 43. 770 413.332 9.501 99.227 128.02.Î 2W.8I3 650,175 1,327. 156
1931................................... 217.022 418,419 00.5.441 a iu  741 42. '98 352. 239 9,053 86.582 107.128 203.368 555.007 1,221.049
1932................................... 222.025 533.70.3 701.3S3 335. 471 39. 737 37.5.208 11.418 00.301 102,500 IS'). 2S8 5.55.490 1.310.881
1933................................... 221.840 531.981 750.821 470.204 41,711 511.975 28.540 00.821 101.303 190.670 702.045 1,459,409
210.010 491,030 728. 210 407.007 40. S23 .507. 890 .38.153 09.993 9,1.369 201.520 712.110 1,440.656
228.219 491.052 709. 901 4S I. 770 43. 102 527.878 43.910 05.914 07.529 207.3.53 735.231 1.445.132
19.16..I....................... . . . 221.710 491.729 710.475 430,500 40.798 477,301 50,313 67,438 93,070 211.127 GS8.791 1,403. 266
1937.................................... 222.023 080.801 903.887 49S. 705 52.0.13 550.758 64.317 74.290 107.110 Z15.723 786,4SI 1,69.5.3m
1938.................................... 200.037 002.518 808.585 401.124 53.195 514.319 01.981 59,450 103.152 227.583 741.902 1.010.4S7
195,141 708.098 903.812 4SI. 9.52 57, 2" 13 512.215 79.807 64.035 109.003 272.905 795,1.50 1.698.992
lo io !........ 205.013 710.707 921.785 340. 528 02.137 408. U A 88.070 71.021 113.0J1 273.317 6.81.982 1.603,767
1911............................... 232. K.S9 751.037 981.52»! 241.050 07.889 30S.U13 98. 542 58.975 11H.293 275.810 581.755 1,569.281
1912............................ . 215.000 708.808 953.808 211,051 72.407 314.121 103,309 43,472 80.281 227,122 541,213 1.495,111
1913 .................................. 230.018 742.090 978.708 230.728 79.432 3.30.100 121,230 50.094 80,580 2.57,904 594,004 1,572.772
J9«................................ 24a l  ie 813,051 1,053, 797 147,907 73,770 221,077 173,658 67,218 85,093 325,974 547,651 1,601,448
•c-
w
I For brook-down by nmjor octivitics 10.1S-U see toble I I .  Hrook-dowii not ovnllablc prior to 1335.
1 Covcis all assets anil liivoslmonts liu h iilin i; current assets anil gross llic il capital ass ts.
I  Covers all assets and investtnents, incliidini; curretit assets and fixed capital assets at depreciated values.
Boiirco nl data: Tabnlalinn of data from 11 American oil companies and tlic ir subsidiaries and alTiliatis. I t  Is not complete for Ktiropc, Africa, South and East Asia, Oceania In 
IDIO^I (inclusive) as information submitted svas Incomplete due to war conditions.
Reproduced from: American Petroleum Interests in Foreign Countries. Hearings Before a
Special Committee Investigating Petroleum Resources, U.S. Senate, Seventy-Ninth Congress, June 27 
and 28, 1945, pp. 165-166.
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in the French oil market forced Jersey Standard to invest jointly in a 
refining company in 1929. Other large U.S. multinational oil companies 
which invested in European countries during the 1920s were Vacuum Oil, 
Texaco, Cities Service, Atlantic Refining, Tide Water, Sun Oil, Standard 
Oil of New York and Gulf.
The three largest oil companies at that time were Jersey 
Standard, Royal Dutch-Shell and Anglo-Persian. In 1927, these three 
giant multinational oil companies provided more than 50 percent of the 
total refined oil consumed outside U.S. boundaries. During the early 
1920s there was some competition among the three giants, but in 1928 
they agreed to eliminate any competition and to stabilize the world oil 
market (Jersey Standard was explicitly excluded because of the U.S. 
anti-trust law).
A profound strategy taken by U.S. multinational oil companies 
is called "self-sufficiency" within the enterprise, or vertical integra­
tion. This strategy is to have control over all stages of production, 
processing, transportation and marketing of petroleum. The strategy of 
self-sufficiency incorporates the advantages of economies of scale due 
to the high fixed cost involved in petroleum industry.
Few huge oil companies that incorporated vertical integration 
were able to reduce competition and eliminate non-vertically integrated 
refining companies by raising the price of crude oil so high that little 
or no profit was left for refiners and marketers. Another step taken to 
stop competition was the division of the world oil market among the giant 
oil producers in a 1928 agreement which maintained the status quo ("as- 
is" basis) and provided commitment for the exploration of new reserves 
on a partnership basis.
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Another strategy used by the multinationals was to hold a 
well-diversified source of oil supply to combat any real or threatened 
shortages in the oil market. The effectiveness of this strategy is 
discussed later.
The search for oil after WWI in foreign markets was geared to 
supply consumers at home and U.S. refining affiliates abroad, while 
before WWI multinational oil company operations in foreign countries 
were mostly motivated by marketing considerations.
High taxes, the threat of nationalization and many other prob­
lems with the Mexican government shifted the attention of oil companies 
from Mexico to Venezuela. ^ Their experience in Mexico made the oil com­
panies extremely cautious about investing in Venezuela and other Latin 
America countries.
During the late 1920s, U.S. multinational oil companies realized 
that U.S. oil could not compete with the cheap Russian oil in the Euro­
pean market. Therefore companies such as Vacuum Oil and Standard Oil 
of New York purchased Russian oil to sell in Europe; this was the only 
effective way for the U.S. companies to gain access to Russian oil.
The 1920s can be called the era of penetration in Middle Eastern 
Countries. The U.S. oil companies were able to explore rich sources of 
oil in Iraq, Turkey, Kuwait, and Bahrain. The problem for the U.S. com­
panies in Middle Eastern Countries did not come from the host govern­
ments of those nations but from Britain and other European countries who
For example, Mexican oil output peaked at 193 million barrels 
and Venezuelan output at 1.4 million barrels in 1921, while by 1928 
Venezuela was producing 106 million barrels and Mexico oil production 
had dropped to 50 million barrels.
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imposed restrictions or otherwise blocked the involvement of the U.S. 
oil companies. The British government requested that foreign companies 
get approval from the colonial office in London for any concession in 
Bahrain. With the help of the U.S. state department, concession was 
obtained in 1929 to form the Bahrain Petroleum Company, but the British 
government did not allow the U.S. oil companies any concession in Iran.
Following the change in the U.S. state department policy on 
antitrust law, in July, 1931, with the permission of the U.S. Justice 
Department, Standard Oil of New York and Vacuum oil company merged and 
formed Socony-Vacuum Oil Company— the second largest oil company after 
Standard Oil of New Jersey. During the 1930s, mergers within U.S. oil 
companies and U.S. oil companies and foreign oil companies became a new 
strategy for multinational oil companies to strengthen their positions 
at home and abroad. Some of the U.S. oil company mergers with foreign 
companies are listed in Table 2-9. The two U.S. joint ventures in 
foreign countries most important for this study are described below.
The first of these is the joint venture in 1930 between three 
giant American oil companies— Jersey Standard, Gulf Oil and Atlantic 
Refining— and the French government to build a large refinery in France. 
The French objectives were to save the scarce exchange rate by importing 
cheap crude oil and refining it domestically and to reap other benefits 
such as increasing employment and incorporating the technology embodied 
in the refining process. The second important joint venture is the 
50-50 joint venture between Associated Oil and Mitsubishi Oil Company 
to establish a refinery in Japan. The two partners in this undertaking 
agreed that the U.S. company would contribute technology and crude oil.
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TABLE 2-9
PRINCIPAL NEW JOINT VENTURES BY AMERICAN OIL
COMPANIES ABROAD IN THE 1920s
Date Ilf
lot Illation Purpose
\; i i i ic  (il )iiiiit jo in t Cimipaiiies of jo int Area ol
(oiiipuiiy venture involveil venturc- operation
Soi icic l’ ian to - 19:10 jersey .Staiidaitl R eliiiing l ia n te
Anici icaiiic de G ti lfO il
Kalfiiiaj'c A tlantic Relin-
ing
Mitsul)islii O il 1931 Associated O il Refining Japan— and
Co. Co.' .Marketing parts of East
Mitsubishi Asia
Siaïuhvd-V'atium i 19:33 Socony-Vacuum Producing Asian and .-African
O il Co. (Stanvac) Jersey Standard Refining countries cast
.Marketing and southwest
o f the Persian
G u lf  and Oceania
Kuwait O il Co.. 1931 G u lf Product ioti Kuwait
Ltd. -Anglo Iranian
B alirtin  I’etrolciim I93C Calif.-Standard Production Bahrain
Co.. Ltd. Texaco
California 'I cxas O il I93fi Calif-S tandard •Marketing Asia. Oceania.
Co. (Caltcx) Texaco South and East
Africa
California .\rab ian 1930 Calif.-Standard Production Saudi .Arabia
.Standard O il Co. Texaco
(later. 194-1. .Ara­
bian .American O il
Com pa ny. or
AR.A.MCO)
.W  .Nederlandsclie 1936 Calif.-Standard Exploration Sumatra. Java
Pacific Petroleum Texaco
.Maatsclinppij
Colum bian Petroleum 19 36 - Texaco Production Colom bia
Co. (Barco Conces­ 1937 Socony-A'.icuum
sion)
.\letie G rande O il Co. 1937 G ulf. In terna­ Protlitction Venezuela
(physical assets tional Petro­ R efining
only) leum Company
(a Jersey
Standard affili­
ate): Royal
Dutcli-Sheil
.Smorr; .Sec- notes 12-29.
' I iile Water Associated Oil Co. in 1936 took over the propcrtic-s of its subsidiary Associated
Oil Co.
Reproduced from: Mira Wilkins, The Maturity of Multinat
Enterprise: American Business Abroad from 1914-1970, Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1974, p. 212.
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but that the merger company remain fully in control of the Japanese 
company; members of the Japanese firm held positions as the three top 
officers of the merger company.
In the early 1930s the depression and the declining price of 
oil put the oil companies in a defensive position. As a result, the 
leading international enterprises (Standard Oil of New Jersey, Royal 
Dutch-Shell, and Anglo-Persian) prepared a "Memorandum for European 
Markets" setting conditions for stabilizing prices. Later other oil 
companies joined this agreement.
During the 1930s, direct foreign investment abroad by U.S. oil 
companies expanded rapidly. By 1939, for instance, the total number of 
U.S. refineries in foreign countries had reached 58, of which 39 oper­
ated in consuming countries and 19 operated in producing countries. The 
oil refineries in consuming countries were mostly concentrated in Euro­
pean countries; the oil companies were forced to build refineries as a 
part of the European "Self-Sufficiency" program.
The distribution of foreign oil refineries among U.S. oil com­
panies and the distribution by country of oil refineries abroad is given 
in Table 2-10.
A comparison between the position of oil companies in 1929 and 
their position in 1939 indicates a significant development in U.S. multi­
national companies. In 1939 ten American oil companies— Jersey Standard, 
Socony-Vacuum, Gulf, Standard of California, Texaco, Atlantic Refining 
Company, Cities Service, Sinclair Oil, Sun Oil and Water Associated 
Oil— had made over 90 percent of the U.S. oil investment abroad. The 
first five American oil companies plus the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company
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TABLE 2-10
DISTRIBUTION OF U.S. OIL REFINERIES ABROAD IN 1939 
(By Industry)
Industry Number of Refineries
Standard Oil of New Jersey 28
Socony-Vacuum 15
Texaco 7
Others 8
Total 58
SOURCE: Derived from Mira Wilkins, The Maturity of Multi­
national Enterprise: American Business Abroad from 1914-1970, Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1974, p. 239.
and British-Dutch Royal Dutch Shell constituted the seven major multi­
national oil companies in 1939, while in 1929 only Jersey Standard and 
the two English companies were considered to be giant multinational oil 
companies.
During the war period 1940-1945, the overall amount of foreign 
direct investment did not change significantly. In some areas, such as 
Europe, foreign direct investment declined substantially, due to the war 
destruction of manufacturing facilities. Table 2-11.
The high demand for raw materials and primary products during 
WWII encouraged U.S. enterprises to concentrate more on production of 
raw materials and less on manufacturing abroad. Of course, crude oil was 
vitally important, and the U.S. oil companies expanded their search for 
new oil in Latin America and the Middle East during and after the War.
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TABLE 2-11
GEOGRAPHICAL DISPERSION OF 
REFINERIES IN 1939
AMERICAN
Area N o. o f refineries
Canada I I
T h e  C arihbeaii (C uba, I; A ruba. I; Trinidad. 2) 4
l atin .America (C olum bia . 2: Peru. 2; Venezuela.
1: .Ar(jeiuina. 5) 13
T u l i i l  W ' fs l f i i i 28
Europe (A ustria . 1; Hel^ium . 2: Btilgaria. 1; 
Czechoslovakia. 1; France.-I: Germany. 7: 
Great B rita in . 1; H ungary. 1; Italy. 3; 
Norway. 1: Polantl. 2: Rum ania. 2;
Yugoslavia. 1) 27
.Middle East (B ah ra in . I | 1
Asia (D utch  East Indies. 1; (a|)an. 1)
To ta l  East Cl II H c in is p h c i  v 30
TOTAL 58
Soiirr#*: Based on U.S. Senate. Special (!oniinittee Investigaiing re iro le iiin  
Resources, . i m rrùu u  /*etr<deui» /nterests in f-oreigu Oom ifru *inng\ (W ash­
ington. D C . iy-*6). pp. 205-i;07 .
* I he small jo in t ventu ie lefineiies of Socony-Vacuiitn and Texaco  in Colombia  
and .Argentina are also counted twice in the attributions.
Reproduced from: Mira Wilkins, The Maturity of Multinational
Enterprise: American Business Abroad from 1914-1970, Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1974, p. 239.
The period, 1945 and after
World War II created a drastic change in U.S. foreign policy in 
general and in its policy on foreign direct investment in particular.
The formation of international organizations for the reconstruction of 
European countries and the development of less developed countries on 
the one hand and the extension of the Soviet power in Eastern Europe on 
the other forced the U.S. to play a great role in maintaining the status- 
quo situation.
51
The U.S. oil companies received tremendous attention and en­
couragement from the U.S. government during and after the war, but they 
encountered a great number of problems abroad. They faced expropriation 
(in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Rumania, Hungary, East Germany, 
and China), political instability, labor difficulties, restriction on 
repatriation of profit and discriminating regulations by the governments 
of the host countries. Despite these difficulties they expanded their 
operations in foreign countries. Table 2-12. After WWiI, many small oil 
industries entered the international oil market. This reduced the pro­
duction share of the seven oil companies, which had been producing 90 
percent of the world oil outside of North America and Communist coun­
tries, to 75 percent in 1968.
TABLE 2-12
U.S. DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENTS BY AREA 1940-1946 
(Book Value in Billion U.S. Dollars)
Area 1940 1946
Canada 2.1 2.5
Latin America 2.8 3.1
Europe 1.4 1.0
Middle East and Africa 0.2 0.2
Other Areas 0.5 0.4
Total 7.0 7.2
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign and Do­
mestic Commerce, American Direct Investment in Foreign Countries— 1940 
(Washington, D.C., 1942), pp. 4-5 (1940 figures). U.S. Department of 
Commerce, Office of Business Economics, U.S. Business Investments in 
Foreign Countries (Washington, D.C., 1960), p. 1 (revised 1946 figures).
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In Europe the U.S. oil companies started to rebuild or repair 
their refineries. The policy of the European governments was still 
based on saving the scarce foreign exchange; therefore the refineries 
expanded faster than during the prewar time. Unlike the prewar situa­
tion when oil companies were reluctant to build refineries in Europe, 
the vast increase in the production of cheap Middle Eastern oil provided 
a mutually beneficial situation for the European countries and U.S. oil 
companies; crude oil was imported and refined in European countries.
The establishment of the Petroleum Administration for Defense 
(P.A.D.) by President Truman in 1951, which exempted oil companies from 
antitrust prosecution, encouraged multinational oil companies to expand 
their operations at home and abroad. In 1952, the U.S. agreed to reduce 
duties on oil imports from Venezuela. In 1953, the U.S. became a net 
importer of petroleum and petroleum products. Table 2-6 (p. 35) indi­
cates that the U.S. policy to promote the petroleum industry was very 
successful. During 1946-1950 foreign direct investment, by the petroleum 
industry increased 143 percent, and during 1950-54 its rate of growth 
was greater than that of the manufacturing sector.
High profit in the Middle East attracted many American companies 
to that area. However until 1953 the U.S. companies were not able to 
penetrate the Iranian oil industry because of strong opposition by the 
United Kingdom. In 1951, the Iranian Congress voted for the nationaliza­
tion of the oil industry, which had been controlled by the British-owned 
Anglo-Iranian Company. A successful embargo by oil companies for two 
years cut Iran's major financial source and, finally, by an arranged 
coup, the government of Mohammed Mossadegh collapsed. Soon afterwards.
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the American companies formed a consortium with the Anglo-Iranian com­
pany, and the French, British and Dutch companies. U.S. oil company 
involvement in Iran might have been because of the pressure exerted by 
the U.S. government. As a Jersey Standard director stated, "We would 
have made more money if we had done added drilling in Saudi Arabia; we 
had plenty of oil there. We were pushed into the consortium by the 
United States government" (168, p. 322).
In September, 1960, the four major oil-producing countries in 
the Middle East (Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia) joined Venezuela 
to establish the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).  ^
The objective of OPEC was to stabilize the price of oil and prevent 
fluctuation in oil revenue. The organization successfully raised the 
price of oil during the late 1960s.
Following the Arab-Israeli war in 1967, U.S. marketing and re­
fining interests were nationalized by the Algerian government. In 1970, 
the government of Libya nationalized the four distributing companies, 
but not the producing oil companies.
Despite nationalization in these Middle Eastern countries the 
American oil companies still held a dominant position in the Middle East. 
A more important event in the 1970s was the OPEC oil embargo, which made 
the industrial nations, especially the European countries, realize the 
importance of oil to their economy. A gradual reduction in the consump­
tion of oil was expected as the European Countries substituted other 
alternative sources of energy.
^Later, some other oil producing countries joined the organi­
zation.
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The Economic Impact of Foreign 
Direct Investment
The flow of direct investment from the U.S. to European and 
less developed nations increased after WWII. The government contributed 
to the transfer of capital directly or through International Organiza­
tions, but the private sectors— mostly multinational corporations— were 
the primary source of direct investment to the host countries. Multi­
national corporations are equipped with advanced techniques in produc­
tion, marketing and distributions, they have better access to financial 
sources and are better informed about international market conditions. 
Therefore, theoretically, foreign direct investment should be an effi­
cient and fast channel of development. In this regard, Pazos (116, 
p. 196) says ". . . if it comes in adequate volume to the proper fields 
and is accompanied by the necessary amounts of loans to finance overhead 
capital facilities, direct investment is a short-cut to development."
The full economic impact of foreign direct investment is hard 
to measure; there are many economic externalities, as well as diseconomic 
externalities, related to the flow of direct investment which cannot be 
quantified, either because of the complex interrelation among variables 
or because of the lack of adequate information. Accordingly, only 
limited aspects of the importance of the contribution of capital import 
are analyzed here.
Under the proper conditions capital import of any kind can con­
tribute to the growth and development of the recipient country. Some of 
the issues related to the available effect of capital import on the de­
velopment of host nations discussed in this section are as follows:
1) Absorption problem; 2) Effect of capital transfer on employment;
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3) Effect of capital movement on local investment, and 4) Import sub­
stitution and export development.
Absorption problem
The question raised by many economists concerns "proper" use 
of capital: Whether imported capital motivates the idle capacity present
in host nations; whether it is allocated in the proper places to match 
the need of a balanced growth in a host country; or, by contrast, whether 
capital is misplaced, wasted or moved back to the donor or investors' 
country.
Capital may move from a less developed country (recipient) to 
a more industrialized nation (donor) under certain conditions, such as 
lack of organized banking system, the presence of a corrupt government, 
or the lack of adequate knowledge and human resources. The situation in 
some of the oil exporting countries and in several Latin American coun­
tries provides examples of this type of outflow of capital. Moreover, 
an overvalued exchange rate may cause capital to flow from a host country 
to an advanced country with a more stable exchange rate. Finally, if 
imported capital is not applied for productive purposes, the inflow of 
capital may induce inflationary pressures and may lead to its transfer 
from the recipient country.
Effect of capital transfer on employment
The impact of imported capital on employment depends on the 
nature of the capital and the labor condition of the host countries. A 
"capital-intensive" foreign direct investment in a developed country 
that is characterized by a scarce labor force creates employment in the
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foreign sector where capital is applied and probably unemployment in 
domestic sectors involved in the same line of production. However, the 
overall employment effect depends on the competitiveness of domestic 
industries with the foreign rivals and other economic and political 
constraints prevailing in the host country. Transfer of a "capital 
intensive" technology to a less developed nation usually generates some 
employment in the sector or industry where foreign capital is applied, 
but the overall employment effect may be small or negative. This is 
because of the following reasoning.
A great portion of the population in less developed countries 
is employed in the agricultural sector, with a very low productivity and 
in the industrial sector mostly in traditional forms. Both sectors apply 
"labor-intensive" technique in production. The emergence of advanced 
techniques embodied in foreign investment takes jobs away from the local 
producers in both sectors of the economy, creating a great deal of un­
employment. A report from Indonesia in The Wall Street Journal, October 
27, 1979, shows an example of this relationship between employment and 
MNCs in less developed countries:
. . . Multinationals' third-world investments are exceeding $70 
billion, but the United Nations says these firms have created 
fewer than four million jobs for the 680 million third-world 
people who need that. Indonesia's planning agency has discov­
ered that exports which have multiplied eight-fold with the aid 
of foreign oil and minerals companies, support 60,000 fewer jobs 
today than they did back in 1971.
Effect of capital movement 
on local investment
According to Kafka (84, p. 217), foreign capital constitutes 
25 percent of the gross domestic investment in developing countries as
57
a group. The question is what effect this foreign capital has on 
domestic investment.
Foreign entrepreneurs generally have better access to capital 
with a lower rate of interest than the local entrepreneurs, assuming all 
other factors remain the same. Thus, the local producers who rely on 
local capital with a higher interest rate may lose their competitive 
edge.
The effect of foreign direct investment on local savings de­
pends also on the type of goods produced by foreign corporations. If 
foreign investors undertake projects which provide capital goods and 
develop infrastructure and basic necessities for industrialization they 
will tend to stimulate local saving and cause expansion of domestic pro­
duction through the so-called backward and forward linkage. On the 
other hand, production of consumptive goods by foreign corporations 
drain local savings and make the local people accustomed to foreign 
products, which may lead to a reduction in domestic investment.
Import substitution and 
export development
The effect on the overall economic growth of a host country 
differs according to whether foreign corporations operate in import sub­
stitution industries or whether they invest in export development. 
Multinational corporations invest, or are compelled to invest (as in 
the case of establishment of refineries in Europe by oil industries as 
discussed in section 4 of this chapter), in import substitution indus­
tries in developed countries where advanced technology and high capital 
are required. The "spread effect" of this sector to the economic
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development: is substantially high. By contrast, multinational corpora­
tions' activities in LDCs historically have mostly concentrated in ex­
ploration for raw materials, natural resources or the development of 
plantations. The results of these activities have been the development 
of limited areas and industries in which corporations have invested, 
lessened technology advantage to the domestic industries and local human 
resources, a higher gap between the rich and the poor, and greater eco­
nomic and social dualism.
CHAPTER III
PERFORMANCE AND POLICIES OF MULTINATIONAL 
CORPORATIONS AND HOST 
COUNTRIES' RESPONSES
Introduction
Some optimists regard multinational corporations as an effi­
cient and powerful tool for progress; others believe the presence of 
multinational corporations hinders the socio-economic development and 
political sovereignty of host countries. Multinational companies have 
faced many problems and restrictions throughout their existence in host 
countries. The extent of these problems has varied from country to 
country and according to the time and nature of the industries.
The first objective of this chapter is to examine MNC perfor­
mance, efficiency, competitiveness and approaches (as reflected in their 
major policies). These items are addressed in part one of the chapter. 
The second objective is to explore the responses of a few developed and 
less developed host countries to the operations of MNCs. This is the 
main concern of part two of this chapter.
MNCs' Performance and Policies
MNCs' oligopolistic nature, well organized management and 
highly trained professionals provide them with great opportunity not 
only to be competitive but also to be able to eliminate competitors.
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when necessary. The first section of this part presents an analysis of 
the efficiency of the multinational enterprises from a different point 
of view. In the second section, the monopoly/competition issue, as it 
pertains to multinational oil companies, is examined. In the third 
section, one of the most controversial policies of multinational cor­
porations, the so-called transfer pricing, is discussed. In the fourth 
section, diffusion of technology through direct foreign investment to 
less-developed host nations is examined. And, finally, section five 
contains a comparative analysis of foreign direct investment in a few 
developed and developing nations.
Efficiency of Multinational Corporations
Multinational Corporations are typically large firms operat­
ing in imperfect markets and the question of their efficiency is 
a question of the efficiency of oligopolistic decision making, 
an area where much of welfare economics breaks down, especially 
the proposition that competition allocates resources efficiently 
and that there is a harmony between private profit maximization 
and the general interest (Stephen Hymer, 70, p. 441).
Most often the response to complaints about the domination of 
few giant companies over one industry, or even over the economy of a 
country, is that big companies are more efficient in optimal allocation 
of resources relative to smaller companies, because of the advantages 
of economies of scale. There is no doubt that the size and international 
scope of a firm are important factors in its effectiveness and strength, 
but a firm can benefit from the economies of scale only up to a certain 
minimum size. Therefore, a large firm does not necessarily represent 
the most efficient one.
The emergence of multinational corporations in today's world 
economy has been a positive factor for transferring technology and
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and capital and organizational skills from one nation to another. At 
the same time, MNCs have had a negative effect on the free trade market. 
Improvement in communication and transportation allows more connection 
among different markets around the globe thus reducing trade barriers 
while monopolizing a product— leaving few choices for the consumer.
Two tendencies are observed in this process: one leads the economy to
perfect competition and one forces the economy away from perfect compe­
tition.
Hymer (70, 71) believes that the principles of free trade and 
perfect competition are not applicable to direct foreign investment be­
cause of the "anticompetitive" structure "inherently" embodied in for­
eign direct investment. A country trying to sell commodities to and buy 
capital and technology from a multinational corporation must use skill 
and bargaining power. Less developed countries are typically character­
ized by a weak administration and very little knowledge about the inter­
national market. They usually lack the negotiation power necessary for 
dealing with the large companies, who are extremely knowledgable about 
the market and have excellent negotiation skill. Typically, an LDC gov­
ernment provides protection and some services for foreign corporations 
and in return expects to receive taxes and contributions to the develop­
ment of infrastructures. The host government tries to structure taxes 
to minimize the profit gained by the corporations. The corporations, 
in turn, maximize their profits after taxes. Even if the government is 
strong and imposes a high tax rate, multinational corporations in many 
cases are able to minimize their tax payments through transfer pricing 
and other methods.
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The economic policies of countries that are highly dominated 
by multinational corporations can be affected by the decisions of the 
corporations, regardless of the individual country's stage of economic 
development. Therefore, host countries can expect to gain economic 
development at the cost of economic independence.
Competition Versus Monopoly; Special 
Case of Oil Companies
In the previous section, mention was made that non-competitive­
ness is embodied in foreign direct investment. This concept, as it per­
tains to direct investment in the petroleum industry, is analyzed in 
more detail in this section.
While testifying before the U.S. Senate's Special Subcommittee 
on Integrated Oil Operations in January of 1974, Walter Adams and Joel 
Dirlam, two leading authorities on monopoly and antitrust, stated that, 
"The petroleum industry is a government-sanctioned, government-supported, 
government-subsidized cartel . . . reinforced by a honeycomb of private 
restraints which systematically stifle and suppress competition"
(Wilson, 172, p. 35).
An industry is competitive if an adequate number of firms which 
are self-motivated and independent constitute that industry. This has 
not been the case for the petroleum industry; in fact, interdependence 
among petroleum companies is much more evident that independence.
Throughout the history of the oil industry, oil companies have 
encountered many problems and been subject to many regulations ; conse­
quently, they have learned through experience how to deal with the prob­
lems and how to unify their actions to further their best interests.
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Some of the strategies applied by oil companies to avoid risk and to 
exercise their oligopolistic power are as follows:
Diversification in alternative 
sources of energy
A few major oil companies through the history have been able 
to dominate the international oil industry and control a substantial 
share of the production of other sources of energy, such as gas, coal, 
uranium and tar sands. Control over diversified sources of energy by 
one or by a few companies makes the substitution of one source of energy 
for another difficult for the consumer when a shortage or an increase in 
price occurs. It allows the company to exercise monopolistic power over 
prices and productions. Table 3-1 shows the diversification in the 
energy industry for the twenty-five largest petroleum companies, ranked 
by their assets as of early 1970.
Vertical integration
Vertical integration is another common strategy used by indus­
try to increase the companies' power and lower the risk offered by 
present or future rivals. The seven major oil companies have control 
over all stages of operations from ownership of oil reserves through 
production, transportation, refining, and marketing.
Vertical integration is considered to be a means for attaining 
self-sufficiency within the enterprise in production, processing, trans­
portation and marketing of petroleum. The strategy of self-sufficiency, 
in part, creates an enormous advantage of economies of scale for the oil 
companies. The worldwide development of and control over refining and 
marketing facilities, as a part of a self-sufficiency strategy, has been
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TABLE 3-1
DIVERSIFICATION IN THE ENERGY INDUSTRIES BY THE 
TWENTY-FIVE LARGEST PETROLEUM COMPANIES, 
RANKED BY ASSETS AS OF EARLY 1970
Rank
Enerzv Industry
OU Tar
PetroleuT. Conoanv 1959 Assets in Assets Gas Shale Coal Uranium Sand:
(S Thousand)
(1) (2) (3) (9) (5) (5) (7) (8)
Standard Oil (M.J.) 17,537,951 1 X X X X X
Texaco '9,231,573 2 X X X X
Gulf 8,l:h,32u 3 X X X X X
Mobil 7,162,93U 9 X X X
Standard Oil (Calif.) 6,195,675 5 X X
Standard Oil (Ind.) 5,150,677 6 X X X X
Shell 9,355,222 7 X X X X X
Atlantic Richfield 9,235,925 8 X X X X X
Phillips Petroleum 3,102,200 9 X X X
Continental Oil 2,395,516 10 X X X X
Sun Oil 2,523,211 11 X X X X X
Union Oil of California 2,976,919 12 X X X
Occidental 2,213,506 13 X X
Cities Service 2,065,500 19 X X X X
Getty 1,653,029 15 X X X
Standard Oil (Ohio) 1,553,591 16 X X X X
Penncoil United, Inc. 1,355,532 17 X X
Signal 1,250,511 16 X
Marathon 1,221,233 19 X X
Amerada-Hess 932,157 20 X X
Ashland 395,912 21 X X X X
Kerr-McGee 657,990 22 X X X
Superior Oil 999,025 23 X X
Coastal States Gas Producing 990,190 29 X
Murphy Oil 393,919 25 X
SOURCE: John W. Wilson, "Competitive Market Structure and
Performance in the Petroleum Industry," in Energy Impacts on Public 
Policy and Administration, Edited by Walter F. Scheffer (Norman, 
Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1974), p. 60.
the major focus of multinational oil companies. Through this policy, 
multinational oil companies have been able to prevent the lowering of 
prices of petroleum products by sellers who have access to cheaper 
sources of supply.
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Mergers and acquisitions
Another oil industry policy is to foster coordination and 
cooperation among different companies through mergers and acquisitions. 
Despite U.S. antitrust laws, there have been numerous mergers and acqui­
sitions in the petroleum industry. After WWII, many small firms entered 
the national and international oil industry, but were absorbed or elimi­
nated by the big multinational companies. Table 3-2 shows some of the 
mergers within the oil industry during 1949-1970.
Interrelation and partnership
In order to coordinate domestic and international activities of 
different companies in the oil industry, one executive or a group of 
them often directs the operation of several companies. For example, the 
directors of EXXON, Mobil, Texaco, Chevron, Shell, Gulf and British 
Petroleum are the same men who determined the policies of Arabian 
American Oil Company, the Iraq Petroleum Company, the Kuwait Oil Com­
pany, and the Iranian Consortium (Wilson, 172). Since one person cannot 
be appointed as director of several firms, therefore, employees of one 
big company or financial institution may formally be appointed as ex­
ecutives of several other companies. According to a 1968 Congressional 
survey, employees of Morgan Guaranty and Trust Co. of New York were 
serving as directors on the board of Continental Oil, Cities Service, 
Atlantic Richfield, Belco Petroleum, Colombia Gas, Louisiana Land and 
Exploration Company, and Texas Gulf Sulphur.^ Alternatively a few oil
House of Representatives, Committee on Banking and Currency, 
Staff Report for the Subcommittee on Domestic Finance, Commercial Banks 
and Their Trust Activities, 90th Congress, 2nd. Sess. (July 9, 1968).
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TABLE 3-2
RECENT MAJOR PETROLEUM INDUSTRY MERGERS
À##eC8 Aaaccs
D«t» Acquiring Corrqanv (5 Mil.) Acnulred Comoanv fS Mil.)
1949 Union Oil Co. 298.4 Los Nietos Co. ]J 13.3
1950 Sunray Oil Co. 131.4 Bamsdall Oil Co. 87.2
1954 Chicago Corp. 4S.9 Champlin Refining
1954 Cenexal American Oil 1/ 36.0 Deep Bock Oil 1/ */
1954 Monterey Oil Co. 1,/ 33.1 Fullerton Oil 1/ 23.7
1955 Sinclair Oil 1.186.8 Am. Republics Corp. 41.2
1955 Tesneasee Cas Trans. 2^/ 742.5 Bay Fecroletm Corp. 29.6
1955 Kerr KcCee Oil 43.3 Deep Rock Oil Corp. */ 12.0
1955 Monsanto Chemical **/ 376.5 Lion Oil Co. 147.6
1955 Sunray Oil Co. 300.0 Mid-Continent Fetr. 186.3
1955 Delhi Oil Corp. 1/ 21.8 Taylor Oil & Cas 36.5
1956 Atlantic Refining 611.6 Houston Oil of Tex. 77.5
1956 American Fecroflna 57.1 Panhandle Oil 15.7
1956 Sinclair Oil 1,250.1 So. Production Co. 77.4
1956 Standard Oil of Ind. 2,332.4 Utah Oil Ref. 54.6
1956 Culf Oil Corp. 2,160.8 Warren Fetr. 163.9
1958 Mobil Oil 3,105.3 Freeport Sulphur */ 100.0
1958 Signal Oil & Cas 1,/ 128.0 Hancock Oil Co. -  62.7
1958 Tennessee Cas Trans. J/ 1,096.8 Middle States Fetr. 29.4
1958 Texaco 2,729.1 —  Seaboard Oil 1/ 93.1
1959 Signal Oil and Cas 1,/ 210.0 Bankline Oil Co. 13.2
1959 Continental Oil 619.7 Intl. Refineries 12.1
1959 Continental Oil 619.7 Kevanee Oil 1./ */
1959 Continental Oil 619.7 San Jacinto Petrol. \J 35.6
1959 Sunray Mid-Continent 540.8 Suntide Refinery 41.9
1960 W. R. Crace Co. W 529.6 Cosdcn Petroleum 67.0
1960 Standard of M, J. 9,894.7 Monterey Oil W 102.2
1960 Union Oil 4 Cas \J 63.3 Tex. Nat. Gasoline 1/ 52.3
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TABLE 3-2
(Continued)
Dace Aenulrlnc Car.onnv
Assets
fS Mll.l Acquired Comoanv
Assets
(S Mil.)
1965 r.nhandle Eastern 2/ 407.9 Ambassador Oil Corp. 1/ 28.8
196i Union Oil of Cal‘. 916.5 Pure Oil 766.1
1966 Husky Oil 112.2 Intl. Oil & Cas y 11.8
1966 Wlcco Chemical ” / 93.1 Kendall Refining 21.9
1966 Sinclair Oil 1,694.5 Barber Oil y  ♦/
1966 Atlantic Refining 960.4 Richfield Oil 499.6
1966 Phillips Petrol. 2,029.1 Tidewater Oil y 372.8
1967 Cetty Oil Co. Tidewater Oil Co.
1967 Husky Oil 141.5 Frontier Ref. 41.2
1967 Tenneco Corp. 1,252.3 Kem County Land y 706.4
1967 Diamond Alkalai ” / 275.6 Shamrock Oil & Cas 173.7
1968 Panoil Co. W 21.3 Dorchester Cas Prod, y 14.7
1968 Sun Oil Co. 1,598.5 Sunray DX Oil Co. 749.0
1968 Intex Oil Co. 1/ 5.8 Tesoro Petrol. (Tex.) y 12.3
1965 Swift 6 Co. « / 757.8 Bell Oil & Cas 18.6
1969 Amerada Petrol. 471.1 Hess Oil 491.5
1969 Mesa Petrol. 14.5 Hugoton Prod. 1/ 14.3
1969 Ashland Oil 846.4 Mldhurst Oil 1/ 14.7
1969 Atlantic-Richfield 2,450.9 Sinclair Oil 1,851.3
1970 Standard of Ohio 772.7 British petrol. Corp. ♦/ 627.3
1970 French Petrol. Can. y Leonard Refineries 56.1
1970 Ashland Oil 846.4 Northwestern Ref. 60.1
1970 Viser Oil 1/ 6.4 Petroleun Explor. y 21.4
1970 Swift & Co. W 744.1 Transocean Oil W 47.3
1/ Priiaarlly a Producer, Fims wlchouc fo<'tnoces are integrated refiners, 
y  Interstate gas pipeline Co.
2/ Partial acquisition involving less than 100% of acquired firrfs total assets. 
*♦/ Flm classified as being primarily in another Industry (i.e., major business 
is not petrolcizn production or refining).
Source: Federal Trade Commission, Large Mt uers in Manufacturing and Mining 
19^ >8-1971.
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TABLE 3-2
(Continued)
Date Acoulrlra Comoanv
Assets
($ M H O Acquired Comonnv
Assets
($ Mil.)
1960 Pure Oil Co. 552.9 Woodley Fetroleiaa U 30.1
1960 Continental Oil 832.5 Douglas Oil Co. 18.2
1961 Cities Service 1,342.6 Felmont Petroleum \J */
1961 Standard of Indiana 2,925.7 Honolulu Oil y 99.2
1961 Murphy Corp. \J 120.6 Ingram Oil & Ref. 14.8
1961 Standard of Cal. 2,782.3 Standard of Ky. 141.9
1961 Delhi Taylor Oil 71.5 Three States Nat. y 18.9
1962 Cities Service 1,405.7 Columbian Carbon **/ 88.9
1962 Standard of N. J. 10,494.4 Olln Oil & Gas 57.0
1952 Marathon Oil 469.9 Plymouth Oil Co. 80.8
1962 Texaco 3,646.7 T.X.L. Oil 1/ "*36.7
1962 Consolidated Oil & Gas W 4.9 Tekoll Corp. 1/ 12.4
1962 Union Oil of Cal. 761.5 Tex. Nat. PetroL Co. y 37.0
1962 Sinclair Oil 1,507.2 Texas Butadiene 42.7
1962 Allied Chemical **/ 800.8 Union Texas Nat. Gas y 165.2
1963 Continental Oil 1,241.1 Cities Service Gas y  */
1963 American Petroflna 89.8 Cosden Petr./Grace */ 73.9
1963 Sinclair Oil 1,515.3 DrllL & Explor. Co. y 19.5
1963 Sunset International y 47.7 Sunoc Petrol, y 12.3
1963 Sinclair Oil 1,515.3 West Nat. Gas 1/ 76.4
1964 Livingston Oil \J 19.1 Crescent Oil 1/
1964 Continental Oil 1,462.8 Delhi Taylor Oil 1/ i/ 52.4
1964 Tennessee Gas Trans. 2/ 2,234.2 Delhi Taylor Oil 1/ 1/ 52.4
1964 Shell Oil Co. 2,138.8 El Paso Natural Gas */
1964 Standard of Indiana 3,206.6 Midwest Oil Corp. y 62.7
1964 Mobil 4,659." Northern Nat. Gas Prod. y  y
1964 Sinclair 1,618.9 Texas Gulf Prod. Co. y 69.7
1964 Tennessee Gas Trans. 2_/ 2,234.: Wilcox Oil Co. 13.7
Reproduced from: John W. Wilson, "Competitive Market Structure
and Performance in the Petroleum Industry," in Energy Impacts on Public 
Policy and Administration, Edited by Walter F. Scheffer (Norman, 
Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1974), pp. 61-63.
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companies may hold the partnership of several other companies. For 
example, Aramco is owned by Texaco, EXXON, Chevron, and Mobil; Iraq 
Petroleum by British Petroleum (B.P.), Shell, EXXON, and Mobil; Kuwait 
Oil by Gulf and B.P. Also, the Abu Dhabi Petroleum Co. is controlled 
by B.P., Shell, EXXON, and Mobil, and Iranian Oil Participants, Inc., 
in 1974, was owned by Mobil, EXXON, Chevron, Texaco, Gulf, B.P., Shell 
and others (Wilson, 172). Furthermore, the type of interrelation and 
coordination between major oil companies varies from crude oil exchange 
agreements to trading technical information.
Geographical diversification
The oil companies' experience with nationalization and expro­
priation in South America, Europe and the Middle East have led companies 
to diversify their sources of production to avoid threatened or real 
shortages in production. Table 3-3 presents the geographical distribu­
tion of U.S. foreign direct investment for a few selected years.
The market share approach
The 1928 agreements among major oil companies led to a series 
of commitments by the oil companies to divide up the world oil market, 
on an "as is" basis to prevent unnecessary competition. According to 
an "as is" agreement, the exploration for new oil reserves should be 
done on a partnership basis.
The above observations clearly demonstrate that the structure 
and performance of the petroleum industry have been far from competi­
tive, but regulations and anti-trust laws at home, and regulations, 
nationalization, and expropriation abroad have limited their monopolis­
tic power to some extent.
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TABLE 3-3
AMERICAN DIRECT INVESTMENTS IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES, 
BY GEOGRAPHIC AREAS, 1929, 1936, 1940,
1960, 1970, AND 1980
Area and country
In thousands of dollars— PerccntHCc of grand toinl—
lOW 1930 1940 1029 1930 1940
1.930,193 2. m o i l 26.70 28.93 29.98
(«) 15,448 3.753 (•) .24 .00
Total.................................................. 2.010,3211 1.051.041 2.102,094 20.70 29.17 30.04
Europe; ^
14.337 5,738 (:) .19 .09 (■)
04.240 34,890 17,004 .85 .52 .24
Czechoslovakia.....................................
DanMC, Estonia, Latvia, ami L ilhu-
4.875 
10,124
4,725
1.701
7,730
1,297
.07
.13
.07
.03
.11
.01
15.824 13. 778 10,091 .21 .21 .29
F in la m l............................................... 'jsr,
II.1.U0Ü
1.043 
145. 0S3
5.502 
117. IW
.01 
1.93
.03 
2.17
.09
1.67
210.514 227.817 349.31)9 2. HS 3.41 14.99
5. 130 S. .508 6.Ü12 .07 .13 .09
7.870 9. :m 1.3.009 .11 .13 .10
2.1211 315 2.0S5 .03 .001 .03
113.210 70,181 75.49.1 1.50 1.05 1.09
43. 224 i8.8:io IS .107 .57 .28 .26
22.1170 20. OS I 
:w. 500
5,719
31). 945 
29.019
7.050
.31
.08
.40
.51
.44
Poriiical. including Azores and .Ma*
11.540
14.048
. 10 .09 . 10
43.9.52 51. Z43 .20 .00 .73
Spain, including Canary Islands........ 72. 230 
11). 231)
xn, 532 
25.493
73. 31M1 
20.301
. 90 
.25
1.21
.37
1.0)
.37
10. M>t K. 034 23.K52 .21 .13 .34
I micd Kingdom *...............................
^ uguslax la . . - .
4S5. 2:15 
0. '.':i2
474.130
3.190
540.094 
5.107
0.44 
.09
7.08
.04
7.73
.07
Total, Europe. 1,344.2)8 1,241.952 1.420.305 17.85 13.61 20.29
Larin America: 
West Indies:
S»18.957 000.254 5.59,797 12.21 9.95 8.00
69,322 4U. 705 41.895 .92 .61 .60
Haiti ........................................... 14.191 9,071 12.479 .19 .15 .17
51,281 30,501 59.702 .08 .54 .86
Total, West Indies..................... 1,0.53,751 753,131 073.933 14.00 11.25 9.63
Central America and Mexico:
22.100 13.2S0 21.726 .29 .19 .30
09.979 50.3S7 08.221 .93 .76 .97
Honduras and British Honduras.. 71,4X5 
i:i, 002
30.425 
4.400
3S.207
8.S.18
.95
.17
.55
.07
.54
.13
2H.459 20.088 30.815 .38 .40 .53
29. 400 17.104 11.204 .39 .25 . 10
9.07 7.17 S. It
Total, Central America and
917.093 027. X81 540.021 12.18 0.39 7. .80
Seo t'ootnotcs At <>nd o f table.
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TABLE 3-3
(Continued)
Area and country
In  thousands of dollars— Percentage of grand to ta l-
1929 1036 1040 1929 19.36 1940
.''outh America:
Argentina............................................. 331,819 348.208 387,91.5 4.41 5.20 .5.54Bolivia................................................. 01,019 18.337 26,829 .82 .27 .:19B ra z il................................................. 193.006 194,345 210.109 2. .56 2.90 3 43Chile..................................................... 423.593 183.73»! 4I3.ÜS3 5.62 7.23 5.91Colombia............................ ............... 123,994 107,519 111,016 1.65 1.62 1.60
Ecuador............................................... 11,777 4,041 5,107 .16 .07 .07
Guianos (British, French, sod Suri>
nam).................................................. 5,588 7.501 5.065 .08 .12 .1*9
Parucuay.............................................. 12,015 5,077 .5,037 .17 .07 .07
Peru.......... ........................................... 123.712 96,052 81,597 1.65 1.44 1.16
Uruguay............................................... 27,904 13.917 10.018 .37 .21
Venezuela............................................. 232.538 180,200 262.370 3.08 2.73 3.74
Total, South America....................... 1,517,S95 1,405,939 1,551,482 20.57 21.91 22.16
Total, Latin America....................... 3,518,739 2.847.001 2.771.430 46 7.5 42. .45 39 .49
Africa, Asia, and Oceania:
Africa:
76.810 1.02
British South Africa...................... 65.127 72. oni
{)) 5.014 0)
Egypt............................................ 6.534 8,305 22. 753 .09 .13 .33
Portucuese .Mrica.......................... 9.000 10, 4.51 1.745 .12 .16 .03
Other Africa.................................. 9.819 18.811 28.660 .13 .28 .40
Total, .Africa............................... 102.229 92,091 131.073 1.36 1.39 1.87
Asia:
Arabia. Bahrein Islands and Iran. 1.002 17,780 57,321 .01 .27 .81
British Malaya, French Iniio»
china, and Tha ila n d ............... 27,103 27,026 • 20, S0.5 .36 .40 ‘.39
China............................................. 113.751 90,503 46.1:16 1.51 1.35 .66
India.............................................. 32.676 29,680 48. 775 .44 .45 .70
Iraq, Palestine, Syria, and Cy­
prus r.......................................... 13,208 29.605 31,274 .17 .43 .44
60.700 46.691 37,t>.l .81 .70 .51
Netherlands Indies....................... 60,012 69.759 71,27.5 .M 1.05 1.02
Philippine Islands......................... 70,935 92,ISO 90,695 1.06 1.37 1.30
Turkey........................................... 8,505 13,706 11,990 . 12 .21 .17
Total, Asia................................. 403.046 416,993 421,945 5.36 6.23 6.03
Oceania:
Australia........................................ 149,154 89,028 97,670 1.93 1.33 1.40
New Zealand................................. (*) 21,999 22,502 (') .33 .31
Total, Oceania............................ 149,154 111.027 120,232 1.98 1.C6 1.71
26,100 32,597 .47
Total, Africa, Asia, Oceania, and
International................................. 6M.428 646.004 705,847 8.70 9.67 10.08
Grand to ta l... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7,527,735 6,690.498 7,000,342 100.00 100.00 100.00
» Incliideil In Canada.
) Included in Oermaoy.
: Includes Austria.
• Includes Gibraltar and Malta in 1029 and 1036; and in 1940 also Cyprus. 
» Included In Other Africa.
• Includes New Caledonia.
' Excludes Cyprus in 1040.
» Included in Australia.
SOURCE: American Direct Investment in Foreign Countrj^es, U.S.
Department of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce. U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1930.
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TABLE 3-3
(Continued)
L U .
T u M e l
1
T a M e l !
Arr# asd eouoirr
1930 1937*
I960» !
1 1
1959* 1
i
Net a p i u i  oucflows 
1960 »
1
1
1
1950*
.M ia. 1
1 me 1 
T o u l 1 and .
1
Petr<V' toe-** ! 
Irum 1 tu r- ,
I
*Uhllcl 
Utlll- 1
! i
Trade i Otber i
1 1
Total 1
MlO- 1
m e 1
smell-
lee
Pttro-i (a e -1 
Iru a  1 turiae | Other i
1 1 '
1 1 AH arvaa. lAial. . ••••««•. 11. ÎM  ] 3 .3 )4 r ,3 w 3,809 (33,744 3,015 1 0.)84 i l l ,  153 2.546 1 3,397 ( ! • « . 1.372 ; 1.884 158 451 on r t  i
% Cammdai............ ... ...................................................... 3,i7> 1 ,7 » 9.476 10.310 I I .  IM 1 .3 »  1 1667 4.837 •45 (30 1,100 417, 471 302 ISO 31 90
1 U H a  Ammhma BrpoMka. W W ............................ 4 .**» 7.434 7,73* 1 I.O M 8. US 1.155 2.883 1.810 1.131 718 171 2U 98 -7 3 - 7 125 56
i 3(«neo. C iB in l A iu n e a  aad W m  ladles. 1.4SI 1334 1333 : 1516 16 3) 345 306 530 586 a s 691 81 66 a 3 8
M Mfl •79 958 (•) 147 111 313 44 341 63
104 W 93 97 59 «•) C) (•) 2 M
too 131 (•) a (•) 66 5 34 C ) C l - 4
109 lOO (•) c> C ) 3 1 a -1 1 C l n C l
739 130 s a i 119 85 1
100 143 140 146 145 15 a 11 37 10 50
X937 3.3U0 3.396 3.5A3 5.745 910 2, 578 1.079 545 • a 137 - 9 9 99
Vé 333 330 369 473 (•) (•) 313 Cl 31 50 C) C )
10 78 515 a n 34
n 340 (M 517 C l 3 C l 13 in -1 0 C l C 'l 12
390 (•) S 3 «3 49 C l - 2
303 21 79 S 19 43
W 17 31 (•) C l a Cl C 'l C) C ' C 'l C 'l
14 0 ) 1619 (') 1.995 la l 3 165 w ; -150 C l 11
30 04 97 3 49 1 - 1 ( " I ( " I C 'l
5! t W MW ra H am iM tH rvdao tadaiK iM .................. •  19 CM 7 U 814 171 283 31 •4 54 13 31 ( " I 10
2 Europe, le u l ............................................................ I.ÎJ J 4.(31 4.573 3. I S •,845 4) 1 .7a 3.797 738 M3 { " ) 273 •07 11
1.690 1.909 IS O 1944 827 1.4M 254 ( " I 73 182 77
193 aw 311 21 146 W ll> I " )
43 43
391 (•> 248 638 95 a 133 C* «
333 !•) 16Ü 1 3 a Zi 21 C ) 32
191 207 143 80 56 51 19
3.471 1696 8W9 1361 1: 300 4S
43 49 C*l 9 19 C 'l I
63 n 31 C 'l 18 C l C 'l
n 44 (•) V 3 C ) ("1
11 109 107 I S 116 64 18 11 - a
69 U 164 24 ‘V ’ 7 91 C 'l 101 S3 68 r - 2 12 1763 34 <U C l C 'l 19 c> ("1
1.974 1477 3.194 (-1 1164 3 8 l a  1 4 3
r 1 Otnercouatries........................................... u 119 143 183 3 C 'l
a 1 Afriee. U U l....... ............................- .......................... 3 7 641 6 U 925 217 407 118 5 53 *4 01 14 •3 - 5 8
30 106 145 195 2 l a T '6 4 51 49 1 C ' l 1
M 46 43 (•• ) C 'l C 'l C 'l
42 1 C ro ira i and ooutn .\b ira . totai..................... 177 1 at 407 416 119 114 110 24 16 - 1 3 - 1 3 - 5 1 2
3  i 39 65 C) C) C 'l C l
1401 a t 331 356 C l 108 C 'l IQO C ' - 5
43 1 O tb rrC O U B tfM ..... . . . . ........ .................. 13 31 72 3* » 3 n (•) C 'l C ) C) 2
1 A » U . t M t...... .................... 1.001 X O l) 1176 1237 1315 31 i.iss 3C 103 *37 no 2 2 -5 7 14
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Intra-company Transfer Pricing 
A popular method used by MNCs to underprice exports or over­
price imports is called intra-company transfer pricing or, simply, 
"transfer pricing." If the corporate tax for an exporting subsidiary 
is higher than the corporate tax for an importing subsidiary, the ex­
porting subsidiary underprices its commodity in order to pay less over­
all corporate tax to both the exporting and importing countries.
Empirical research in six Latin American countries indicates 
that almost 75 percent of MNCs' transactions have taken place within 
subsidiaries of the same parents and those transactions have involved 
underpricing, ranging from 40 to 50 percent lower than the prices 
received by the local firms. Overpricing imports is used for the same 
purpose as underpricing exports, especially if the parent company desires 
to transfer extra-legal funds from one subsidiary to another. The over­
pricing in Latin America ranges from 30 to 700 percent (Muller, 108). 
According to Vaitsos (158), transfer pricing in the pharmaceutical, 
rubber, chemical, and electrical industries in Colombia was drastically 
high. In order to lower the profit margin, the reported imported prices 
for some products in Colombia were ten times higher than the quotation 
in the U.S. In another study on 257 foreign manufacturing firms in 
Latin American countries, Muller and Morgenstern (109) found that wholly 
owned subsidiaries underprice their exports to other affiliates in Latin 
American countries in relation to non-affiliate firms in those countries.
The possibilities for manipulating transaction prices are much 
greater for multinational oil companies than for manufacturing industries, 
because multinational oil enterprises are more vertically integrated.
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Therefore, there are more intrafirm transactions among oil companies.
In recent decades, oil producing countries have been able to reduce the 
loss of their oil revenue as the result of transfer pricing by using 
the posted price of oil as a basis for calculation of income taxes. By 
contrast, the oil consuming countries have not yet been able to execute 
an enforceable policy to restrict transfer pricing by multinational oil 
companies. Jenkins and Wright (77) found that the reported rate of 
return for U.S. foreign petroleum investment in consuming countries 
(Canada, Europe, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa) was 
very low compared to the return on U.S. petroleum investment in produc­
ing countries (Venezuela, Africa, and Middle East). At the same time, 
investment in consuming countries was expanding at a higher rate than 
investment in producing countries. The same report concludes that the 
U.S. petroleum corporations were able to pay less corporate income tax 
to the consuming countries than the U.S. manufacturing companies in 
these same countries.
In 1966 the U.S. petroleum industry would have paid an additional 
255 million dollars in income taxes to the consuming countries if 
the income generated by petroleum assets had been taxed in each 
country at the same rate as U.S. manufacturing affiliates. In 
1970 the additional tax liability would have been in excess of 
325 million dollars (Jenkins and Wright, 77, pp. 8-9).
It is not clear whether the home or host country benefits from 
transfer pricing. If multinational corporations establish their head­
quarters or financial subsidiaries in "tax haven" nations (the Bahamas, 
Panama, Leichtenstein or Luxembourg), where financial regulations are 
limited, the countries that benefit more are usually the tax haven coun­
tries. Through tax havens or "triangular trade" MNCs pay less tax to 
both parent and host countries. For example, if a U.S. or an European
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MNC wants to export goods to Colombia, they first invoice the goods 
(underpriced) to Panama and their subsidiaries in Panama reinvoice the 
goods (normally priced or overpriced) to Colombia.
Two solutions to the problem of transfer pricing have been 
recommended :
1) The first is to impose taxes and tariffs on a lump sum 
rather than on an ad valorem basis, the objective being to eliminate the 
incentive to manipulate prices by separating taxes and tariff payments 
from prices. The U.S. House of Representatives, in 1962, considered 
this method and proposed tying tax payment to the geographical disperse­
ment of multinational sales, assets or capital. For example, if three- 
fourths of the assets of a multinational company is outside of the U.S., 
the U.S. income tax of that company should be based on one-fourth of the 
global income of that company.
2) The second is "arm's length standard" or a checking system 
to monitor the prices on every intrafirm transaction. Under Section 482 
of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code, any intrafirm transfer price which 
does not conform with the arm's length standard can be challenged by 
law. However, in reality intrafirm transactions are too complex and 
ambiguous to be controlled. Bergsten, Horst, and Moran (19, p. 491) 
suggest that the enforcement of the arm's length by all countries is the 
only solution to the problem of transfer pricing, and also that multi­
national enterprises must be forced by all nations to disclose the 
details of their financial data and activities to the public, to facili­
tate enforcement of this policy.
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There are two methods to check the intrafirm transactions
prices:
A) The reported prices should not be less than the average 
variable cost.
B) The ceiling prices should not be significantly lower than 
average price of similar products and services. However, both of these 
methods present problems. The major problems with the first method are 
that, in general, the fixed cost has not been considered in this method; 
allocation of costs between the parent company and its affiliates is 
generally unclear; and there is no simple way to measure the variable 
cost for a company producing many products. In the second method, 
besides the problem of measuring the average variable cost for some 
products, finding a similar product to use as a basis for measurement 
presents many difficulties.
Foreign Direct Investment and Diffusion 
of Technology in LDCs
Beyond any doubt, diffusion of "appropriate" and "sufficient" 
technology is a major determinant of economic growth and development. 
Many economists argue that multinational corporations, which possess the 
most sophisticated technologies in the free world do not transfer ade­
quate and appropriate technology to less developed nations. With the 
exception of oil producing countries, LDCs are characterized by high 
unemployment and little capital. Therefore, labor-intensive technology 
— rather than capital intensive technology— must be transferred to third 
world nations if they are to utilize their most plentiful resource—  
labor.
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Another problem with transmitting technology to less developed 
countries through direct investment is the "insufficiency" of transferred 
capital. Most economic development theories— balanced or unbalanced 
growth— refer to capital as the most important factor for initiating 
sustained growth and development in underdeveloped countries. However, 
foreign capital transferred to LDCs is not enough to carry out develop­
ment projects.
Despite the encouragement since 1955 of the U.S. government for 
investment by multinational enterprises in less developed countries, in 
1970 U.S. foreign direct investment in developed countries was two and 
a half times that of investment in less developed nations. Dr. Adler 
(2, p. 204) states that expansion of the U.S. private direct investment 
has been in developed countries such as Canada and Europe, not in under­
developed countries. Dr. Kamark (2, p. 204) believes that the recent 
setback in the expansion of U.S. direct investment in less developed 
countries may be due in part to a slower rate of growth in the demand 
in advanced nations for primary products than for income. And Wilkins 
(168) presents a general view on the "insufficiency" and inappropriate­
ness of the flow of foreign investment to third world countries relative 
to developed nations. His view can be summarized as follows: 1) LDCs
are generally poor, or, in the language of business enterprise, their 
market size is small. 2) Political instability in LDCs creates the like­
lihood of nationalization and expropriation of foreign properties, as 
happened in Cuba, Venezuela and other LDCs. 3) Currency depreciation, 
a common phenomenon in LDCs, reduces the dollar value of the U.S. com­
panies' gain in those countries. 4) Existence of a strong anti-American
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feeling in the third world countries, which is usually transformed into 
violence and results in damages to the U.S. enterprises' property.
5) Nationalization for the sake of economic and political independence 
by LDC governments is usually self-defeating and creates constraints on 
the operation of multinational corporations. 6) The fear of take-over 
of the essential industries by foreign companies present in LDCs creates 
problems for foreign investors (some LDC governments believe that domi­
nation of key industries by foreign firms leads to a continuous economic 
and political dependency). 7) Government participation in the economic
development (especially public ownership) of the basic industries in 
LDCs creates obstacles for foreign operation in these industries.
A Comparative Analysis of Foreign Direct 
Investment in Australia,
France, and Mexico
In 1974, the Business International Corporation (BIC) began a 
study on the role of foreign investment in host countries^ (24). This 
study compares the performance of foreign owned companies with the per­
formance of local companies and the effect of foreign investment on the 
overall economy of the host nations, for the 1957-1973 period. BIC’s 
study concentrated on the performance of MNCs in three countries—  
Australia, France, and Mexico— each representing a different level of 
industrial development. However, the results obtained for these
The Business International finding is based on: 1) the U.S.
official census of foreign corporate investment for the years 1957 and 
1966, and 2) the sample of U.S.-owned and European-owned companies taken 
by BIC. BIC's questionnaire was sent to a large number of American and 
European companies requesting information on their complete operations 
in ten developed and developing countries, but lack of sufficient and 
appropriate response compelled BIC to limit its research to France, 
Australia, and Mexico.
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countries— although they answer many questions concerning the role of 
MNCs in host countries— do not provide a sufficient basis for extrapo­
lating generalizations about all MNCs in all host countries. Some of 
the findings of the BIC are as follows.
During the 1957-1966 period, the value added of the U.S. owned 
affiliates in all three countries grew faster than the GDP for those 
countries. The average growth of value added for manufacturing affili­
ates was substantially higher than the GDP in total. The percentage 
growth for France was more than 100 percent; that of Australia was 66 
percent; and that of Mexico was 38 percent. The export of U.S. affili­
ates for the 1957-1966 period increased by 205 percent, 835 percent, and 
390 percent in Australia, France, and Mexico, respectively, while during 
the same period, the overall growth of export for these three countries 
was 24 percent, 187 percent, and 60 percent, respectively. These fig­
ures indicate the outperformance of foreign corporations relative to 
the local enterprises. Also, the performance of the MNCs in France was 
significantly greater than MNC performance in Australia and Mexico.
During the 1966-1973 period, MNC export increased by 295 per­
cent, 297 percent, and 508 percent, for Australia, France, and Mexico, 
respectively. The respective import figures were 110 percent, 227 per­
cent, and 89 percent. Foreign direct investment in France is market 
oriented, with a high concentration of manufacturing industries while 
Australia and Mexico are considered to be resource oriented: Export
of primary products and raw materials is the major focus of foreign 
investors in Mexico. The import of semi-manufactured and finished goods 
in Mexico is substantially higher than that in the other two countries.
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which, again, points out the differences in the stages of industrial 
development of the three countries.
During 1973, the amount of Research and Development (R&D) rela­
tive to total income was I percent for Australia, 0.6 percent for France, 
and 0.3 percent for Mexico. These figures are still very high relative 
to average figures for MNCs' R&D in host countries.
The average cost per employee in U.S. dollars for 1966 and 1973 
were as follows:
TABLE 3-4
THE AVERAGE COST PER EMPLOYEE IN U.S. DOLLARS 
IN AUSTRALIA, FRANCE, AND MEXICO
1966 1973 %Change
Australia 3,961 8,688 119
France 4,936 12,267 149
Mexico 4,078 6,828 68
SOURCE: Business International Corporation, The Effect of For­
eign Investment on Selected Host Countries (New York: Business Inter­
national Corporation, July 1979), p. 12.
The average cost per employee in Australia and Mexico was lower 
than in France. Therefore, the supposed advantages of using cheap labor 
in less developed countries are not reflected in the above figures. 
However, the changes in cost per employee in France and Mexico reveal 
the fact that the presence of MNCs in host countries widens the gap 
between the standard of living of the employees in developed and less
83
developed countries. The BIC report indicates that the number oE em­
ployees in Australia and Mexico grew almost four times as fast as in 
France, but that salaries increased much more slowly in the former than 
the latter.
Changes in the total assets of the MNCs in host countries may 
be used as a criterion for measuring profitability and political and 
economic stability. Over the 1966-1973 period, France's total assets 
increased 189 percent, Australia's total assets increased 79 percent, 
and Mexico's total assets increased 59 percent.
Net fixed assets per employee can be regarded as representative 
of factor intensity: the greater the change in this ratio the greater
will be the change in capital intensity. This ratio rose (116%) in 
France and (13.1%) in Australia, and fell (5.7%) in Mexico during the 
1966-1973 period. This certainly reflects a trend toward labor-intensive 
investment in Mexico and towards a capital-intensive technology in 
France. The tendency toward a more labor-intensive technology in Mexico 
than in France can be explained by the existence of cheaper labor and 
less restrictive labor union policies in Mexico.
Another criterion for judging the economic and political sta­
bility of the host countries is the change in long-term debt of the 
multinational corporations. Foreign investors may have a long horizon 
for their investment and carry long-run projects in countries where the 
economy is healthy and the political system is stable. The following 
figures show the changes in the long-term debt for France and Mexico 
for the 1966-1973 period.
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TABLE 3-5
PERCENTAGE CHANGES IN LIABILITIES OF FOREIGN-OWNED 
COMPANIES IN AUSTRALIA, FRANCE, AND MEXICO 
1966-1973
France
%
Mexico
%
Long-term Debt 228.1 8.0
To local banks 345.4 4.6
To parent and affiliates 195.0 40.7
To other foreigners 188.6 63.2
SOURCE: Derived from Business International Corporation, The
Effect of Foreign Investment on Selected Host Countries (New York: 
Business International Corporation, July 1979), p. 15.
It is generally believed that a country can receive economic 
benefits through the inflow of foreign direct investment. However, 
there may be trade-off between the possible economic contributions of 
foreign direct investment and the influences on political independence. 
Thus, quite often joint ventures are recommended by many economists as 
a way for the host country to reduce the possible loss of political and 
national dependency and still enjoy the likely economic benefits of for­
eign direct investment. The BIC study found that for some activities in 
some countries joint ventures were more beneficial to the economy of the 
host countries than wholly-owned foreign companies, but, in the balance, 
wholly-owned companies outperformed the joint ventures.
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The BIC study compares the performance of foreign owned com­
panies with that of locally owned companies. Some of the major results 
of this comparision are as follows:
1) U.S. owned companies increase exports faster.
TABLE 3-6
INCREASE IN EXPORTS OF FOREIGN-OWNED COMPANIES
IN AUSTRALIA, FRANCE, AND MEXICO
1966 AND 1973
Australia
%
France
%
Mexico
%
Increase of Exports of 
BIC Samples Over 
1966-1973 Period 295 297 508
Increase of Total Export 128 187 89
SOURCE: Derived from Business International Corporation, The
Effect of Foreign Investment on Selected Host Countries (New York: 
Business International Corporation, July 1979), Table 104, p. 8.
Among the three countries, U.S.-owned companies in Mexico had 
the highest rate of increase in exports relative to the export of local 
companies.
2) U.S.-owned companies pay higher wages.
In 1973 the wage differential was 66 percent for France and 
100 percent for Mexico (no comparison is available for Australia).
3) U.S.-owned companies create more jobs than the local com­
panies. During the 1966-1973 period, the number of jobs created by
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foreign companies in Australia increased 5.6 percent, as compared to a 
1.2 percent increase by the local companies. This rate was 6 percent 
against 7.4 percent for Mexico and 1.64 percent against 0.74 percent 
for France.
4) U.S.-owned companies make higher profits than locally owned 
companies.
TABLE 3-7
NET PROFIT AFTER TAX AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL INCOME 
FOR AUSTRALIA, FRANCE, AND MEXICO IN 1966 AND 1973
1966
%
1973
%
Australia
Foreign-owned companies 3.9 4.8
Locally-owned companies n.a. n.a.
France
Foreign-owned companies 2.7 3.3
Locally-owned companies 1.2 1.5
Mexico
Foreign-owned companies 4.1 6.0
Locally-owned companies 7.6 8.1
SOURCE: Reproduced from Business International Corporation,
The Effect of Foreign Investment on Selected Host Countries (New York: 
Business International Corporation, July 1979), p. 25.
The reported profit/income ratio of foreign-owned companies is 
higher than the one for locally-owned companies in France, but not in 
Mexico. The higher profit/income ratio for Mexico's locally-owned
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companies relative to foreign-owned companies was due to the lower in­
come of the locally-owned companies. The foreign-owned reported profit 
alone is higher than the one for locally owned companies for all three 
countries.
TABLE 3-8
GROWTH OF PROFITS AND COMPANY TAXES PAID
Australia
1966-1973
France
1966-1973
Mexico
1966-1973
Foreign
Owned
Firms
Locally
Owned
Firms
Foreign
Owned
Firms
Locally
Owned
Firms
Foreign
Owned
Firms
Locally
Owned
Firms
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Net Profit 
Before Taxes 184.0 132.0 217.0 102.0 204.0 121.0
Company Taxes 
Paid 236.0 153.0 207.0 91.0 225.0 121.0
Net Profit 
After Taxes 174.0 118.0 223.0 115.0 190.0 121.0
SOURCE: Derived from Business International Corporation, The
Effect of Foreign Investment on Selected Host Countries (New York: 
Business International Corporation, July 1979), Table 1-12, p. 26.
U. S.-owned companies constitute only a small portion of the 
host country's economy. The following figures indicate the U.S.-owned 
companies' production relative to the host countries' GDP (see Table 3-9).
The figures indicate an increase in the rate of growth of for­
eign direct investment relative to the host countries' GDP. The share 
of foreign investment still remains less than 6 percent of the GDP of
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TABLE 3-9
U.S. OWNED COMPANIES' PRODUCTION IN AUSTRALIA, 
FRANCE, AND MEXICO RELATIVE TO THE GDP 
OF THESE COUNTRIES
U.S. Owned Production 
Relative to GDP Australia France Mexico
Year (%) (%) (%)
1957 4.3 1.2 4.1
1966 5.8 2.7 4.2
SOURCE: Derived from Business International Corporation, The
Effect of Foreign Investment on Selected Host Countries (New York: 
Business International Corporation, July 1979), p. 3.
the host countries in 1966; therefore, the growth of the foreign sector 
does not reflect the growth of the overall economy of a host nation.
MNCs' Experience in Yugoslavia 
Before WWII, foreign companies controlled over 50 percent of 
the non-farm industries in Yugoslavia. Consequently, Yugoslavia enjoyed 
the highest rate of industrial growth in the world. Domination of multi­
national companies in Yugoslavia began after WWI; multinational oil com­
panies in Yugoslavia are considered here. After a few years of competi­
tion, Standard Oil of the U.S. and Shell Oil of Britain formed a cartel 
with the two firms in Yugoslavia, despite the anti-cartel law. This 
cartel was extremely successful; by the end of the 1920s it was able to 
control almost 100 percent of output and trade of oil products. The oil
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cartel was able to eliminate or absorb local competition. By the end 
of the 1920s the oil companies in the cartel had repatriated all of 
their initial investments and 20 to 50 percent more to their home coun­
tries (Kafka, 84, p. 234). Bribery stopped government protest against 
illegal operations by cartel members. Soon after WWII, all foreign 
entrepreneurs left the country, and the artificial economic growth 
caused by cartel actions dropped substantially (Kafka, 84, pp. 211-239). 
Kafka's position was influenced by the failure of foreign direct invest­
ment to help Yugoslavia. His paper on policy implications of foreign 
direct investment concludes that "The import of equity capital is 
neither desirable nor necessary" (Kafka, 84, p. 234).
It can be concluded that diffusion of technology through for­
eign direct investment is effective if it generates operations in new 
fields and induces the expansion of existing local enterprises through 
backward and forward linkage effects, but not if it displaces the ex­
isting local enterprises.
Host Countries' Responses to MNCs 
Host-nation response to MNC domination has varied from country 
to country according to time and the nature of the dominant industry.
In some cases, host nations have been able to reduce the rate of MNCs' 
expansion if not stop their activities.
This part of this study examines the response of developed as 
well as underdeveloped countries. Section one reviews the responses of 
developed nations giving special consideration to England, France, and 
Germany. Since the role of multinational oil companies in the European 
Economic Community is a major concern of the empirical part of this
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study, section two examines the gradual increase in Europe's dependency 
on oil as a major source of energy, and section three explores European 
countries' restrictive policies against the multinational oil companies. 
Section four presents a brief examination of the experiences of multi­
national oil companies in a few less developed countries. Section five 
examines the recent responses of oil producing countries to multinational 
corporations.
Multinational Corporations 
and Developed Countries
This section examines the reactions of a few developed European 
countries to the inflow of capital by multinational corporations. After 
WWII, the attitudes of European countries toward foreign investors 
changed substantially, compared to their pre-war attitudes. The flow 
of American technology and investment into Europe as part of the post 
war recovery program paved the way for future U.S. multinational com­
panies. U.S. enterprises were initially welcomed, especially during the 
recovery period, but later they faced many restrictions and regulations, 
which, of course, varied from country to country. Belgium was entirely 
in favor of foreign investment. Italy wanted to attract investment in 
southern Italy and therefore, offered tax exemptions and other conces­
sions to companies that contributed to the development of southern Italy. 
Germany and Britain placed limited restrictions on the multinationals; 
France applied a more complex policy toward foreign investors than other 
European countries.
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Investment in England
The United Kingdom, like most other European countries, was 
seriously concerned about keeping key industries under the control of 
British companies; consequently, England applied more restrictive poli­
cies against foreign take-over of these industries than of the less 
important industries. The most effective tool against foreign take-over 
applied by the United Kingdom was the "Exchange Control Regulations, 
which derived from the Exchange Control Act passed in 1947. This Act 
gives the treasury substantial power to ensure that foreign investment 
is financed by foreign capital (which increases foreign exchange 
reserves), rather than by the local market. This regulatory power pro­
tects the national interest of the United Kingdom by preventing domina­
tion of United Kingdom industries by foreign investors. The national 
objectives described above and a continuous policy of strengthening the 
balance of payment was the top priority in Parliamentary debate during
2
several cases where a foreign company tried to buy the local industries.
Replacement of the Conservative Party (1952-1965) by the Labor 
Party (1965-1969) strengthened the position of the government against 
foreign investors by imposing more limitations on the activities of those 
investors. Both the Conservative Party and the Labor Party approved of 
foreign direct investment or the acquisition of local industry by foreign
For detailed discussion of this policy, refer to Fritz Machlup, 
W. S. Salant, and L. Tarshis, International Mobility and Movement of 
Capital, National Bureau of Economic Research (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1972), pp. 399-403.
2
Some of these cases are: The Texas Oil Company's purchase of
Trinidad Oil Company (1956), the American Ford Company's purchase of the 
minority equity in British Ford held by residents of the United Kingdom 
(1960) and the case of Chrysler Corporation and British Rootes Motors.
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investors when: first, it resulted in improved balance-of-payments;
second, the fear existed that foreign investment might be transferred 
to other European competitors; and, third, protection of British invest­
ment in foreign countries from retaliatory restrictive policies was 
necessary.
Other legislative acts in favor of national monopoly and 
against foreign mergers and take-overs were the Monopolies and Mergers 
Act of 1965 and the Industrial Reorganization Corporation Act of 1966. 
Under the 1965 act, the take-over of the Pressed Steel Company by British 
Motors Corporation was approved to prevent a take-over by foreign firms.
Another labor-government effort to protect local industries was 
the establishment of the Industrial Reorganization Corporation (IRC), 
whose goal was to avoid further take-overs by strengthening the struc­
ture of domestic industry through the creation of larger and more effi­
cient British-owned industries.^
The problems encountered by U.S. enterprise in Britain resulted 
not only from the government restrictive regulations but also from the 
British labor union, which made its own regulatory demands on the U.S. 
companies. For example, the American Textile had to close down the 
Robert-Arundel textile machinery plant after one year of resistance 
staged by Britain's most reactionary trade union— the Amalgamated Engi­
neering Union (87, p. 80).
Priority for IRC assistance was given to large and productive 
industries vital to national interest, such as the automotive and petro­
leum industries.
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Investment in France
Despite several bilateral and multilateral treaties^ between 
France and other developed countries which were intended to facilitate 
the freedom of capital movement, France did impose restrictions upon 
foreign investors to control their activities within the French economy.
From the end of WWII to 1962, the French policy toward foreign 
investment was moderate; control over foreign investment was accomplished 
through the "Exchange Control Regulation." However, early in 1962 the 
situation in France became difficult, because of the intense anti-foreign 
sentiment of the French economy. Two main events caused the French gov­
ernment to become more hostile toward foreign investors. First, a union 
representing industrialists throughout the European Common Market com­
plained that American entrepreneurs were bidding up the price of input 
and lowering the price of output. Since the American oligopolistic firms 
had access to cheaper sources of industries' inputs (capital, energy, and 
other raw materials) the rise in input prices and fall in end-product 
prices prevented European firms from successfully competing with the 
American companies. Second, the American layoff of French employees in 
two American-owned plants, the GM-Frigidaire plant and Remington Rand 
plant, led to serious criticism of American companies.
These events resulted in more restriction policies against the 
U.S. multinational companies and the substitution of domestic products
Some of those treaties are the Treaty between France and the 
United States ensuring the right of establishment to each other's 
national (1959); the Code for Liberalization of Capital Movements of 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (1960); and 
Article 52, 58, and 64 of the Treaty of Rome (1958).
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or products imported from other EEC members for the products that were 
being manufactured by U.S. firms.
In his New Year's message for 1965, President De Gaulle warned 
European countries of being "colonized by foreign participations, in­
ventions, and capabilities," (Kindleberger, 87, p. 78). Pressure on 
the legislature authority resulted in passage of legislation under which 
foreign firms were required to get permission to operate in France.
The opposition to approval of foreign capital inflow was expressed in 
excessive screenings of applications, delay in processing applications, 
and rejections.
France's first concern was to keep "key industries" under 
French control. However, since the electronics industry (including the 
computer industry) was considered a key industry, and since it required 
a level of technology unavailable to France, the government had to 
change its policy on "key industries" in order to accommodate the trade­
off between political and economic independency and the necessary acqui­
sition of new technology. During the late 1960s France was forced to 
moderate its policies toward foreign investors on a selective basis.
French resistance to foreign direct investment was based in 
part on infant industry argument, national prestige and political 
nationalism, and national and local concern about the ineffectiveness 
of fiscal and monetary policies because of interference from U.S. multi­
national corporations.
The period 1965 to 1970 was a transition period, during which 
protection of local industries was ensured by the government. The aim 
of this policy was to distinguish between foreign take-overs of French
95
industries and foreign investment which increased local productive 
capacity and helped to develop the technology vital to the French 
economy. With time, France intended to restrict the former but en­
courage the latter. In any case, the French government was cautious 
about the balance of payments and aware of the fact that foreign inves­
tors might shift their investments to other European countries.
In summary, the French policy on foreign investment was selec­
tive, restricting foreign take-over of key industries and endorsing for­
eign investment in a way to strengthen its balance of payments. Policy 
makers were always cautious of the fact that the advantage of investment 
might be lost to France if too many restrictions were placed on foreign 
investors.
Investment in Germany
The German policy toward foreign capital movement was liberal 
relative to the policies of France and Britain. German law did not ex­
plicitly restrict foreign investment except by the oil industry. The 
German government was very concerned that domestic firms kept control 
of this important industry.
Another complaint of the Germans against foreign direct invest­
ment was on a macrolevel, rather than directed at special industries. 
Germany accused American investors of causing inflation by bidding up 
prices of raw material, labor, plants and equipment. Since the German 
economy was in a state of equilibrium with full employment, any transfer 
process of foreign direct investment generated inflation in the economy.
One reason that Germany chose an open market strategy with re­
gard to foreign investment may have been that German industries were
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compatible in the world economy. Therefore, no reason existed to 
restrict foreign industries or to fear foreign take-over of local 
industries.
Table 3-10 indicates U.S. direct foreign investment in Europe, 
EEC(6), Germany and U.K. U.S. direct investment in Britain was con­
siderable. The U.K., with 47 percent of all American investment in 
Europe in 1958 and 35 percent in 1968, dominates the European market. 
Table 3-10 also is helpful in analyzing the quantitative transfer of 
capital from the U.S. to EEC(6), Germany and France.
The Gradual Growth in European Dependency 
on Oil as a Major Source of Energy
Before WWII, Europe relied heavily on coal as its main source
of energy. During the war many coal mines around Europe were badly 
damaged or destroyed. Therefore, when the reconstruction of Europe be­
gan after the war, the demand was high for alternative sources of energy. 
The best immediate solution to the problem was importing Middle Eastern 
oil which was controlled mostly by American companies. The post-war 
emphasis by European governments on expansion of refineries in Europe 
encouraged a rapid growth in Europe's demand for oil. Despite this 
demand, in 1955, coal was still considered the dominant source of energy. 
By the late 1950s and during the 1960s European consumption of coal 
changed drastically. Table 3-11 indicates that coal, which provided 
75 percent of the energy used by European countries in 1955, provided
only 23 percent of the energy used in 1972: petroleum represented 22
percent of European energy consumption in 1955, and 60 percent in 1972. 
Most important, in 1955, 22 percent of the energy needed was imported
TABLE 3-10
A. AMERICAN DIRECT INVESTMENT ABROAD, INCLUDING NET CAPITAL OUTFLOW 
AND UNDISTRIBUTED EARNINGS OF SUBSIDIARIES
1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968
Europe 428 750 1,325 1,057
(millions of dollars) 
1,161 1,443 1,776 1,867 2,244 1,749 1,437
EEC 219 283 436 406 566 733 907 854 1,243 893 526
France 76 77 101 104 157 204 191 184 143 142 -1
Germany 81 130 209 168 290 279 294 317 631 420 285
U.K. 172 330 749 318 261 343 373 559 576 434 583
France as a % of EEC 35 27 23 26 28
(percentages)
28 21 22 12 16 0
Germany as a % of EEC 37 46 48 41 51 38 32 37 51 47 54
U.K. as a % of EEC 79 117 172 78 46 47 41 65 46 49 111
U.K. as a % of Europe 40 44 57 30 22 24 21 30 26 25 41
EEC as a % of Europe 51 38 33 38 49 51 51 46 55 51 37
VO
Soukce: Survey o f  Current liusiness, Scplember, 1967; October, 1968; and October, 1969.
Reproduced from: Fritz Machlup, W. S. Salant, and L. Tarshis, International Mobility
and Movement of Capital. National Bureau of Economic Research (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1972).
TABLE 3-10 (Continued)
B. BOOK VALUE OF AMERICAN DIRECT INVESTMENTS ABROAD
1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1 9 6 8 '
E u ro pe 4 ,151 4 ,5 7 3 5 ,3 2 3 6 ,6 8 1 7 ,7 1 3
(m illio n s  o f  d o lla rs )  
8 ,9 3 0  1 0 ,3 4 0  1 2 ,109 1 3 ,985 16 ,209 1 7 ,8 8 2 1 9 ,3 8 6
E E C 1 ,680 1 ,908 2 ,2 0 8 2 ,6 4 4 3 ,0 8 7 3 ,7 2 2 4 ,4 8 0 5 ,4 2 6 6 ,3 0 4 7 ,5 8 4 8 ,4 0 5 8 ,9 9 2
F ran c e 4 6 4 5 4 6 6 4 0 741 8 5 7 1 ,0 3 0 1 ,240 1 ,446 1 ,6 0 9 1 ,758 1 ,904 1 ,910
G e rm a n y 581 6 6 6 7 9 6 1 ,006 1 ,177 1 ,4 7 6 1 ,7 8 0 2 ,0 8 2 2 ,431 3 ,0 7 7 3 ,4 8 7 3 .7 7 4
U .K . 1 ,974 2 ,1 4 7 2 ,4 7 7 3 ,231 3 ,5 4 2 3 ,8 2 4 4 ,1 7 2 4 ,5 4 7 5 .1 2 3 5 ,6 5 7 6 ,1 0 1 6 ,7 0 3
F ran c e  as a  %  o f  E E C 28 . 2 9 2 9 28 2 8
(percentages) 
28  28 27 2 6 23 23 21
G e rm a n y  as a %  o f  E E C 35 35 36 38 38 4 0 4 0 38 39 41 42 4 2
U .K .  as a  %  o f  E E C 118 113 112 122 115 103 93 84 81 75 73 75
U .K .  as a  %  o f  E u ro p e 48 47 47 4 8 45 43 4 0 38 37 35 34 35
E E C  as a  %  o f  E u ro p e 4 0 42 41 4 0 4 0 42 43 45 45 47 4 7 4 6
VO
00
So U K cn: S u n c y  o f  C u rre n t U u s iiie s i,  S c p le m b e r. 1 9 6 6 ; S e p le iiib e r, 1965. p. 2 4 ; A u y u s l. 1964 , p . 10; A u b u s I. 1 9 6 3 , p, 18; 
S eptem b er, 193 8; A u g u s t, 1957 , 1961 , 196 2 , and 195 9; S e p te m b er, I9 6 0 .
'  P re lim in a ry  d a ta .
Reproduced from: Fritz Machlup, W. S. Salant, and L. Tarshis, International Mobility
and Movement of Capital, National Bureau of Economic Research (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1972).
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TABLE 3-11
PRIMARY SOURCES OF ENERGY IN WESTERN EUROPE, 
1955 AND 1972
1955
(%)
1972
(%)
Use:
Coal 75 23
Petroleum 22 60
Natural Gas 1 9
Other 2 8
Produced in Europe 78 35
Imported from non-Europe, Net 22 65
SOURCE: Raymond Vernon, The Oil Crisis, (Eds.) W. W. Norton
and Company, Inc., New York, 1976, p. 92.
from other countries, while by 1972 foreign imports accounted for 65 per­
cent of the total European consumption. The European Economic Community 
and Britain both faced this problem. The data on Tables 3-12 and 3-13 
present the primary sources of energy and the domestic share of pro­
duction for the European Economic Community (6) and for Britain In ’ 
1972. Among the alternative sources of energy, petroleum was the most 
important and, at the same time, the least domestically supplied item.
From WWII to the mid-1950s. Western Europe governments continued 
to subsidize the coal industry to meet energy demands. By 1958, the 
demand for coal was decreasing, and the policy of the Western European 
countries was to protect the coal industry by maintaining a certain
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TABLE 3-12 
PRIMARY SOURCES OF ENERGY IN SELECTED
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 
(In Percent)
, 1973
Country Petroleum Natural Gas Coal Others
Belgium-Luxembourg 62,1 13.8 23.7 0.4
France 71.5 8,1 16.1 3.2
Germany 58.6 10.1 30.1 1.3
Great Britain Î2 .I 13.2 33.6 1.2
Italy 78.6 10.0 8.1 3.2
Netherlands 74.2 42.3 3.4 0.1
•Including nuclear, hydroelectric, and geothermic energy
Source: British Petroieum. Statistical Review of the WorlJ O il Industry, 197}
Reproduced from: Raymond Vernon, The Oil Crisis, (Eds.)
on and Company, Inc. , New York, 1976, p. 95.
TABLE 3-13
DOMESTIC PRODUCTION AS PROPORTION OF DOMESTIC
CONSUMPTION, BY ENERGY SOURCES, SELECTED
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES , 1972
Petro- Natural Hydro­
Country Coal leum Gas elect. Nuclear TOTAL
Belgium 65 - - 2 — 16
Denmark — - - — — -
France 69 1 74 30 9 23
Germany 115 7 64 7 3 70
Great Britain 98 2 97 2 11 71
Italy J 1 93 33 3 17
Luxembourg — — — 42 — 2
Netherlands 63 6 171 — 1 70
Source: O E C D , Long-Term Energy Assessment. Preliminary Draft Report, Paris. September 11, 19T4
Reproduced from: Raymond Vernon, The Oil Crisis, (Eds.) W. W.
Norton and Company, Inc., New York, 1976, p. 95.
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level of production through subsidy provided by the imposition of tax 
on oil.
After the formation of the European Economic Community, an 
overall European energy policy was proposed, but disagreement between 
those members who had vast coal reserves and were obligated to protect 
the coal industry and those members who had little or no coal reserves 
prevented such a policy from being formed. The energy policy remained 
an unresolved problem in European economic integration.
The 1973 oil crisis caused European countries to look for 
other sources of energy besides oil. The British had already found a 
potential source of natural gas in the North Sea, and by 1975 Britain 
produced the energy equivalent of nearly 40 million tons of oil a year 
in the form of North Sea gas. Other western European countries expanded 
their local production of gas or increased imports of gas from the mas­
sive fields of Algeria, Libya, and the U.S.S.R. via pipeline or lique­
fied natural gas tankers.
The oil crisis of 1973 and a sharp increase in price of im­
ported oil provided the opportunity to return to the prewar main source 
of energy— coal— and to promote intensive expansion of this industry.
European Restrictions and Regulations 
on Foreign Oil Companies
U.S. oil companies were confronted with many restrictions and 
regulations from European governments and European multinational oil com­
panies, ranging from import quotas, exchange restrictions, price fixing 
regulations, new taxation, and restriction on repatriation of profit to 
compulsory participation in national cartels.
102
The ultimate goal for each European country was to achieve 
"self-sufficiency." The first means to obtain this goal was the pro­
motion of exploration for new oil by oil companies; consequently, U.S. 
oil companies started searching for new oil in Austria, Denmark, France, 
Britain, Italy and other European countries. The second method was to 
save oil by searching for alternative sources of energy. A third policy 
was the imposition of strong pressure by the European governments on the 
multinational oil companies to build refineries in their countries. The 
implementation of this policy did not rely on the old methods of imposing 
tariffs on oil refineries but instead new strategies were chosen such as 
restricting foreign exchange, requiring licenses for importing refined 
oil, and establishing refineries and government participation in refin­
eries. And, finally, many European countries tried to establish their 
own cartel and to force the U.S. oil companies, directly or indirectly, 
to aid the national cartels. Until 1934, the Italian government used 
tariffs to encourage refineries at home, but, in 1934, the Italian gov­
ernment gave special privileges to those oil companies that had refin­
eries and forced others to establish one. Socony-Vacuum went along with 
government wishes and built a refinery, but Jersey Standard, which did 
not expand its refinery, had to reduce its activity substantially.
In Germany, where regulation had been less than in other Euro­
pean countries, the oil companies were suddenly ordered in 1934 to keep 
large oil reserves in storage. Also, currency convertability in Germany 
was gradually reduced until converting marks into other currencies was 
totally blocked.
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Less Developed Countries' Responses to MNCs, Special 
Case: A Few Latin American Countries' Responses
to Multinational Oil Companies
According to Wilkins (168, p. 225), during the 1930s, animosity 
against multinational companies in general and the oil companies in par­
ticular was very prevalent in Latin America. People in the street or in 
political authority believed that their vast natural oil reserves were 
being exploited by American enterprise, leaving little or nothing for 
the host nations. Verbal criticism soon translated into action, which, 
in many cases, threatened the interest of oil companies. A few examples 
are described below.
In Chile, the government took complete control over oil produc­
tion and distribution away from the U.S. companies, as the result of a 
law passed in 1932.
The Brazilian government passed a law in 1938 that put a refin­
ing company wholly owned by Jersey Standard out of business.
In Uruguay, a law passed in 1931 gave exclusive authority to 
the Uruguayan government to import crude oil and refined petroleum 
products; the Americans were later forced to cooperate under the law.
In Argentina, the government gained control in 1935, for the 
first time, over exploration for and import of refined oil, which put 
the American oil companies in an extremely difficult position.
In 1937, for the first time in Latin America, the Bolivian gov­
ernment confiscated the property of oil companies and accused them of 
commiting "fraud" and "smuggling" oil out of the country.
The oil companies' problems in Mexico were not less than in 
other Latin American countries. In 1936, the Mexican Petroleum Workers
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Union, backed by the government, obtained substantial concession from 
the oil companies. In 1937, the official Mexican commission accused 
the oil companies of (Wilkins, 168, p. 226)
1) having "earned enormous profits in the exploitation of the 
subsoil . . . .
2) "Influencing" national as well as international political 
events.
3) paying lower "real wages" than those earned by the workers 
in other industries.
4) charging higher prices for oil in Mexico than they charged 
for oil they exported (in order to pay less taxes).
5) making higher profits in Mexico than in the United States.
The commission suggested new policies for improving the living 
conditions of the Mexican workers in the oil industry and proposed that 
other concessions be granted to the government by oil enterprises. The 
dispute between the union and the companies was taken to the Mexican 
Supreme Court, which voted against the companies. Rejection of the 
Supreme Court decision by the oil companies led to a strong speech by
the Mexican President against the oil companies;^ consequently, the
government expropriated most of the foreign oil companies in 1938.
In his speech, the Mexican President, Lazaro Cardenas, 
addressed some of the current social and economic problems of Mexico, 
but the question of who should be blamed for those problems is political. 
In his speech he asked:
In how many of the villages bordering on the oil fields is there 
a hospital, or school, or social center or a sanitary water supply 
or an athletic field, or even an electric plant . . .  ? Who is 
not aware of the irritating discrimination governing construction 
of the camps? Comfort for the foreign personnel; misery, drab­
ness, and insalubriety for the Mexicans. Refrigeration and pro­
tection against tropical insects for the former; indifference and 
neglect, medical service and supplies always grudgingly provided 
for the later; lower wages and harder, more exhausting labor for 
our people . . . .  (Wilkins, 168, pp. 227-228)
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Oil Producing Countries and 
Multinational Oil Companies
The most effective action taken by oil producing countries 
against the multinational oil companies was the formation in 1960 of 
the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, which aimed to sta­
bilize the oil prices.
In 1969, the government of Algeria nationalized the oil indus­
try, but this did not draw a serious response from the oil companies or 
the State Department, apparently because, at the time, another company 
was negotiating over import of natural gas from Algeria to the United 
States. Following the events in Algeria, the new Libyan government, 
after long negotiation with the oil companies during which it asked for 
higher prices and more concessions to the government, expropriated the 
property of major oil companies. During 1972 and 1973 the U.S. and 
British governments tried to block the sale of Libyan oil but they 
failed to do so because of the shortage of oil in the market and because 
of purchases by the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Rumania, the Brazilian State 
Oil Company, and the Italian State Oil Company.
During the 1960s, the oil companies were victimized by the 
anti-American and anti-British feeling in the Middle EAst. After the 
Arab-Israel War, American and British pipelines and other properties 
were continuously attacked and sabotaged. Many pipelines were damaged 
and destroyed in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iraq.
By 1970, Middle Eastern oil supplies, which were considered as 
a major source of energy for the United States and other industrial 
countries, created new negotiating power for the oil producing countries.
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Therefore, in 1972 when companies were asked to "participate" in equity 
ownership of the existing oil-producing ventures by the Middle Eastern 
oil producing countries, companies had no choice but to accept the re­
quest. In December of 1972, the oil companies agreed to a 25 percent 
ownership of Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Abu Dhabi, which could be raised 
to 50 percent by 1982.
Continuation of U.S. support for Israel during the 1973 war 
caused, at first, a substantial increase in the price of oil and then, 
the OPEC oil embargo. The OPEC oil embargo created a drastic oil short­
age in the world oil market, and the immediate consequences of the 
embargo were 1) another large increase in the price of oil; 2) a sub­
stantial amount of money for the oil producers; 3) a potential windfall 
profit for the oil companies; 4) a drastic deficit on the balance of 
payments of industrial countries, especially the European countries.
CHAPTER IV 
THEORIES OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
The purpose of this chapter is to present an overview of 
previously developed theories of foreign direct investment and a mathe­
matical model developed by this author. The first section provides a 
general introduction to the questions and areas to be covered in the 
remaining sections of the chapter. In the second section a micro- 
economic approach to the theory of foreign direct investment is intro­
duced which includes the "Business Administration," "Industrial Organi­
zation," and "Product Cycle" approaches. In section 3, a macro-economic 
approach to the problem of foreign investment is presented. This ap­
proach includes: the Hecksher-Ohlin theorem, Mundell's substitutability
theorem, the MacDougall-Kemp theorem, the author's alternative model, 
Batra and Ramachandra's model, and finally Batra's model for less 
developed countries. Section 4 is an overview of trade barriers and 
optimum tariff and taxation policies.
Introduction
The emergence of foreign direct investment (capital mobility) 
into international trade theory has been demonstrated by several authors 
including Batra (12, 13, 15), Batra and Seth (16), Gehrels (52), Caves 
(26, 27), Jones (81), Kemp (86), MacDougall (101) and Horst (65, 66) 
among many others.
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The multinational firm transfers capital, technology and man­
agers know-how through direct foreign investment from a country in which 
they are abundant (home country) to a country in which they are scarce 
(host country).
The flow of direct investment conducted by multinational enter­
prise gives rise to several interesting questions concerning: (1) the
logical interpretation of the growth of the firm, which leads to invest­
ment by a firm in countries other than the home country; (2) the welfare 
effect of such an investment on each individual trade partner and on the 
world as a whole: and (3) the effect of the restrictions imposed on for­
eign direct investment by home and/or host country from the efficiency 
or pareto optimality point of view.
There is controversy among different international trade econo­
mists concerning the real cause of the international expansion of a 
firm. First, there are economists who believe foreign direct invest­
ment occurs mostly in industries that are oligopolistically structured. 
This is the "Industrial Organization Approach" and is adhered to by 
Hymer (72), Caves (71), Vernon (161) and Knickerbocker (90). Second, 
there are those who address foreign direct investment as the natural 
consequence of the growth of the firm. This is termed the "Business 
Administration Approach" and is supported by Fayerweather (44), Robinson 
(126) and Penrose (118). Third, some economists assume the three-stage 
theory of innovation— growth, maturing of the firm, and expansion of 
research and development (R&D)— to be the central cause for international 
capital movement. This has been labeled the "Product Cycle Approach." 
Vernon (159), Hafbauer (69), and a number of others sponsor this view.
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Finally, there are others who have introduced the foreign direct invest­
ment into the standard H-0 trade model and expanded the model in a way 
to include different aspects of the theory of foreign direct investment. 
This group includes Mundell (110), Nadel (111), Rakowski (123), Batra 
(14), MacDougall (101), Jones (81), Kemp (85), and others.
The effect of foreign direct investment on the level of employ­
ment, terms of trade, balance of payments and the overall social welfare 
of the home and host countries has been analyzed by economists in both 
international trade and economic development.
The transfer of capital-intensive technology to a less devel­
oped labor-rich country may be regarded as inappropriate by the host 
country, since emergence of capital-intensive technology substitutes 
capital for labor and results in substantial loss of jobs. Many em­
ployed people, therefore, join the masses of unemployed while the few 
capital owners benefit. On the other hand, emergence of multinational 
investment in a fairly developed country may be considered suitable for 
both the host and investing countries.
The degree of transfer of research and development to a host 
country depends on factors such as the negotiation power of the host 
government or private trade partners, the degree of monopolistic or 
oligopolistic strength of the investing firm relative to the domestic 
competitors, the stage of development of the host country, and its 
political stability among other factors.
The question of welfare and efficiency cannot be explored un­
less there is clear knowledge of the distribution of the benefits be­
tween home and host country as well as among the interested groups
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within each country. MNCs with superior knowledge and higher levels of 
technology and marketing skill relative to domestic producers are eco­
nomically more efficient, but if such gain of efficiency is reinvested 
in foreign countries and not repatriated to the home country, then in 
short run home country would suffer a net loss. This loss would be 
equivalent to the actual outflow of direct investment and the cost 
embodied in the transferred knowledge plus other possible side effects. 
Repatriation of MNCs' gain to the home country may reduce the social 
welfare of the host country.^  In addition any change in distribution 
of profits between labor and capital within each individual country 
may increase the level of well-being of one group at the expense of 
the others.
Foreign direct investment is considered as a loss to the bal­
ance of payments of the home country in the short-run and of the host 
country in the long-run, assuming that profits earned by MNCs are re­
turned to the home country. The initial outflow of capital reduces the 
balance of payment position of the home country but future returns on 
the outflow improve the balance of payments of the home country at the 
expense of the host country.
A long-run deficit or serious problems with the balance of pay­
ments may force both creditors and the debtors to impose mandatory con­
trol over the flow of foreign investment. The U.S. initiated a Volun­
tary Credit Restraint program in February 1965, in an attempt to improve
^The conditions under which the social welfare of a host coun­
try diminishes will be explored later.
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its balance of payments position. This program was made mandatory in 
January 1968.^
The host country may impose policies to restrict the repatria­
tion of multinational's profit through inducement measures such as tax 
exemptions or compulsory control of foreign exchange.
A Micro-Economic Approach to the Theory 
of Foreign Direct Investment
Business Administration Approach
In the business administration approach it is assumed that 
foreign direct investment is the natural consequence of the growth of 
a firm. As a firm gains strength in its domestic market, it tries to 
expand its activities in foreign countries by first exporting commodi­
ties, by establishing an independent international business section, 
by forming new subsidiaries and finally, by controlling subsidiaries 
all over the world.
In this approach what is most emphasized is the type of manage­
ment which best administers the problems confronting a firm in inter­
national business activities. The business administration strategy is 
a guideline to international management rather than a theory of foreign 
direct investment. It gives positive guidance to international managers 
for analysis of their individual strategies in marketing, production, 
technology, finance, investment, etc.; problems concerning their rela­
tions and responsibilities with one another and, finally, problems related 
to the political, economic and socio-cultural systems of the host country.
^The effectiveness of the U.S. Voluntary and Mandatory Control 
Program are tested in the empirical part of this study.
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Industrial Organization Approach
The second approach explaining MNCs' growth is the Industrial 
Organization Approach. In Stephen Hymer's view (72) a policy of direct 
foreign investment is rooted in the nature of oligopolistic firms that 
are superior to other firms. Hymer focuses on "giantism," "performance" 
and the natural counteraction of U.S. multinational corporations against 
the threat posed by other international institutions and multinational 
corporations such as the European and Japanese multinational corpora­
tions. "Giantism" is a characteristic of the U.S. multinational cor­
porations. This phenomenon is illustrated by the 500 largest corpora­
tions reported in Fortune magazine. In 1967, U.S. industrial production 
accounted for half of the industrial production of Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and, in the same year, the 
sale of the top ten U.S. corporations was two and a half times that of 
non-U.S. corporations. In Hymer's view, the large size of U.S. corpora­
tions, along with their huge home market, gives them a unique opportunity 
to capture a substantial portion of the European market. Their large 
size also provides them with greater financial facilities in the inter­
national market. This financial advantage of big corporations over 
smaller corporations has been reduced to some extent because of expan­
sion of international banks and other financial institutions in recent 
decades.
Horst (65) believes that company size is the only important 
determinant of multinational production by U.S. firms, as is shown in 
the following statement:
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The conclusion I have come to after an exhaustive examination 
of data is that once interindustry differences are worked out, 
the only influence of any separate significance is firm size.
That is to say, once industry and size are taken into account, 
there are no consistent differences among the multinational 
firms, the Canadian investors, and the total sample of 1,191 
manufacturing firms in the extent of vertical integration, 
labor or capital intensity, advantage or research effort, prod­
uct diversity, or any other characteristics I could observe 
(Horst, 65, p. 261).
Hymer, contrary to Horst, considers "performance," beside 
giantism, to be an important determinant of multinational production.
He observed that during one decade after formation of EEC (1957-1967), 
the U.S. industrial corporation was challenged rather than was chal­
lenging. In fact, from 1957 to 1962, U.S. corporations had a lower 
growth rate than other corporations.
A firm's growth is not necessarily a positive function of firm 
size, as is found by Rowthorn's (129, p. 40) empirical research. He 
concluded that growth of a firm is not an increasing function of size; 
big firms did not grow faster than small firms. On the contrary, during 
1962-1967, firms that were small by international standard grew faster 
than giants.
The last point made in Hymer's analysis of the oligopolistic 
organization and its foreign direct investment policy concerns the 
threat posed by its rivals— European and Japanese multinational corpora­
tions. Foreign direct investment takes place to maintain status quo 
strategy or to combat the future threat of other MNCs. Generally speak­
ing, industrial organizations are very well suited for the game theory. 
For each strategy taken by an individual firm, a counter strategy by 
other firms can be expected. Therefore, the question is not who is 
challenging whom, but as Hymer (73, p. 194) says, ". . . a firm can be
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challenging and challenged at the same time, just as a military 
strategy can be both offensive and defensive." Experimental work by 
Knickerbocker (90) on gamesmanship suggests that the oligopoly's strat­
egy is to block the possibility of one rival gaining significant advan­
tage over the others. Assuming the oligopolistic organization of the 
international market, if a firm fails to choose an appropriate strategy 
at the appropriate time, it will be eliminated from the market or become 
a follower of a dominant firm. On a broader scale, if a country is 
incapable of creating a countervailing power against the expansion and 
penetration of global enterprise, that country will be colonized, not 
only in the economic sphere but also in the political, social and cul­
tural spheres.
According to Richard Caves (26) foreign direct investment is 
made by multinational firms for different purposes: first, a firm may
produce abroad in the same line of production as at home. This is 
called "horizontal" investment. "Horizontal" investment is usually 
made by an oligopoly with product differentiation. Second, an industry 
may invest abroad to provide raw material and primary products for pro­
duction at home. This kind of direct investment (made by an oligopoly, 
but not necessarily differentiated) is called "vertical" investment. 
Finally, an oligopolist may invest because of a combination of the two 
factors above. In all cases, the domestic market is the key factor in 
the initiation and expansion of direct investment abroad. The huge 
U.S. market has given U.S. entrepreneurs a unique opportunity to use 
the domestic market as a laboratory for testing their products, allow­
ing them to expand their production in foreign countries with greater
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confidence. In the case of horizontal foreign investment, the product 
must have some character of public goods, meaning that the marginal 
cost of knowledge embodied in that product must be very low or non­
existent. Also, the product must be known and preferable to other 
products present in the host country. Low cost patented inventions 
and superior knowledge or some other advantages are necessary conditions 
for a foreign firm to offset the market information available to the 
domestic rivals. The two most important requirements for horizontal 
extension of products are: 1) product differentiation and 2) trans­
ferability of knowledge. Products that are differentiated by brand 
name, style, package, form and size give greater rent-yielding to the 
producers and are harder to imitate. Advertising, research and develop­
ment and marketing skills are undoubtedly helpful in making a product 
successful in a new market. Product differentiation alone does not 
produce a successful market abroad. For example, if managerial skill 
is the key for extension of a good or service abroad, product differen­
tiation will not affect the foreign direct investment, therefore the 
transfer of knowledge about how to serve a market may be an essential 
factor in rent-yielding in the foreign market. Sometimes, the cost of 
securing the knowledge about a special product is high or can easily be 
transmitted to the competitor. In such cases, licensing, which fully 
captures the expected rent generated through transferred knowledge is 
recommended.
Expansion of the industrial sector also requires development 
of primary products. Consequently, foreign direct investment in the 
search for raw materials is essential for an oligopolist firm, not only
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to secure input requirements for the production process, but also—  
according to Caves— to avoid uncertainty about the oligopolistic struc­
ture of the primary and secondary market and to bar the entry of new 
rivals. Caves believes that foreign direct investment may not happen 
in the primary sector if that sector operates under perfectly competi­
tive conditions. When a few large firms control the production and 
distribution of a vital input to the industry, there is uncertainty 
about the price and supply of that product. A vertical integration of 
the two stages of production reduces much of the uncertainty.
Product Cycle Approach 
Vernon's product cycle theory (159) relies on the three-stage 
theory of innovation, growth, and maturing of a new product and the 
research and development (R&D) factor theory. He does not emphasize 
the comparative cost theory, especially when he talks about the unique­
ness of the United States market. To him, other forces, external econo­
mies, make the U.S. a plausible location for the production of special 
commodities. The uniqueness of the U.S. market lies in two factors:
1) U.S. customers enjoy a higher level of income than European customers;
2) the average unit labor cost in the United States is above the average 
unit cost in almost all other markets. The high cost of labor encour­
ages new technology and innovation that allows for substitution of capi­
tal for labor, and new products sell well in the U.S. market because of 
the high standard of living. Therefore, the external economy unique to 
the U.S. market is so powerful that it overcomes factor cost and trans­
portation cost in the choice of the location of industry.
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Early stage of the product
At the early stage of production, producers confront many 
problems. The new products may not be standardized; product diversi­
fication dominates the market, rivals may enter the market easily, and 
the price elasticity of the demand may be low because of monopoly at 
early stage or product differentiation; therefore, choice of industry 
location is very flexible and cannot be decided only on the basis of 
factor cost analysis.
The maturing product
Expansion of demand for a product increases the degree of stan­
dardization for that product, and the need for flexibility of location 
declines. Increase in demand will also provide the advantage of econo­
mies of scale which makes the consumer less concerned about the produc­
tion cost and more concerned about the quality and characteristic of 
the product. The U.S. capital intensive products may find market in 
countries with high levels of income such as western Europe. Once the 
market expands in foreign countries, the producer may decide to open a 
new subsidiary in that country, if the marginal cost plus the transpor­
tation cost in the host country is less than that of the home country 
(assuming zero cost for uncertainty and other risks attached to produc­
tion in the host nation).
Theoretically, upon the establishment of new facilities in a 
foreign country by a U.S. firm and full utilization of economies of 
scale, the only difference that may remain between the U.S. and host 
nations is the labor cost. If that labor cost is sufficiently low to
118
offset the transportation cost, that product might be exported to the 
U.S. But comparison on the basis of factor cost alone is not suffi­
cient for deciding to establish a new subsidiary in foreign land or to 
export the commodity to the home country. The problem is a complex one; 
social, political and governmental restrictions by both countries in­
volved may affect the decision. Another point worth mentioning here is 
the threat of rival competition. Once investment is made by a firm in 
a foreign country, other firms will follow in fear of losing their share 
of the market or of upsetting the status quo.
The standardized product
The last stage in the product cycle theory is when a product 
is fairly well standardized and involves very low degree of uncertainty. 
Investors at this stage are looking for the lowest cost source of sup­
ply, such as the low cost of labor in less developed countries. A firm 
will be attracted by low wages if the production process requires a sig­
nificant amount of labor and if the product has a high price elasticity 
of demand. Industries which rely heavily on external economies, skilled 
labor, R & D ,  and complex technology will remain close to developed 
areas with an industrial environment. Products with standard specifica­
tions produced in less developed countries might be exported to the 
United States if cost of input is so low that it offsets the transpor­
tation and other related costs. In Vernon's view, export of a relatively 
capital intensive product from a less developed country to the United 
States is contrary to the basic principle of Hecksher-Ohlin theorem, but 
explains the Leontief paradox. Figure 4-1 provides more insight into 
the three stages of product cycle theory.
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SOURCE: Raymond Vernon, "International Investment and Inter­
national Trade in the Product Cycle," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
30, May 1966, p. 199.
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A Macro-Economic Approach to the Problem 
of Foreign Direct Investment
The Hecksher-Ohlin Theorem 
and Capital Mobility
Consider two countries A and B producing two commodities cotton 
(X) and steel (Y) using only two factors of productions capital (K) and 
labor (L) in autarkic equilibrium. The pattern of the trade between 
the two countries can be predicted by the Hecksher-Ohlin theorem (H-0) 
if certain characteristics of the autarkic equilibrium is assumed to be 
known; H-0 states that a country exports those commodities that inten­
sively use the country's relatively abundant factors and imports those 
goods that intensively use its scarce factor under very rigid assump­
tions as follows: I) both countries produce the same two commodities, 
using the same two factors and using a process defined by the same pro­
duction function.
X = X (K, L) Y = Y (K, L)
2) Both factors are indispensible in production functions which are 
characterized by being homogeneous, convex and constant return to scale.
X (0, L) = X (K, 0) = 0 
XX = X(XK, XL) X > 0
3) Factor intensities are non-reversible.
4) Prefect competition exists in all markets, as does full employment 
of resources.
5) No transportation cost, tariff or other trade barriers exist.
6) The relative endowment of the two factors vary from country (A) to 
country (B).
7) Consumers' preferences are identical in both countries.
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8) Factors are perfectly mobile between the sectors within the coun­
tries immobile across the countries.
Mundell's Substitutability Theorem
H-0 theorem was constructed under the assumption of immobility 
of capital, but in 1957 Robert Mundell (110) demonstrated the factor 
version of H-0 theorem. He proved that under conditions of factor price 
equilization, the same international equilibrium, in terms of equilib­
rium price ratio, factor rewards and consumption can be achieved by 
either free trade or the unimpeded mobility of capital.
Substitutability of factors and commodities under tariffs and 
taxes is the main discussion of Ernest Nadel (111, p. 368). He states 
that ". . .we demonstrate that substitutability between these two ave­
nues of exchange [goods and factors] continue to hold even under condi­
tions of tariff and taxes." Perfect substitutability of capital and 
free trade is questioned by Rakowski (123). He elaborates on the main 
difficulties with capital mobility becoming a perfect substitute for 
commodities in the international market.
A simple explanation of Mundell's substitutability theorem can 
be given as follows. The mobility of capital in international equilib­
rium market requires:
MPK., = MPK.„, where i = X and Y. (1)
xA xB
If the marginal product of capital in country A in production 
of either of the two commodities is greater than that of country B, then 
capital starts to flow from country B to country A until equilibrium is 
achieved. Now, country A imposes a tariff (t^ ) on the import of good Y.
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As a result, the price of commodity Y, goes up. Let us assume that 
the return on capital in production of the first commodity (X) remains 
the same in both countries. Therefore,
MPK^ - (2)
Exchanging the first good for its equivalent value of the second good 
yield.
^'SCA = "A ^ ^ A  ^
Py
where P^ = P(l+t^), P^ = (— )^ is the domestic price ratio in country
X and P is the terms of trade.
Comparing (3) and (2) results in (4) P^ MPK^^ = P MPICyg.
Since P^ is greater than P, relation (4) holds if MPK^^ is less than 
MPK^g, which violates relation (1). This means any restriction on trade 
must lead to no trade, in the presence of capital mobility. This is the 
case with complete substitutability of capital mobility and free trade 
of goods.
We now turn to a geometric presentation of Mundell's substitut­
ability. In Figure 4-2 TT is the production possibility curve for coun­
try A. Country A tends to produce more cotton, because it is relatively 
labor abundant, and cotton is assumed to be labor intensive. In the 
presence of free trade, production is at point P and consumption at 
point C with indicating the level of social welfare.
The trade triangle PQC shows that country A in a free trade 
situation exports PQ of X and imports QC of Y, which confirms the H-0 
theorem with assumption of capital immobility. Equilization of the 
marginal productivity of capital between the two countries causes a
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A GEOMETRIC PRESENTATION OF MUNDELL'S
SUBSTITUTABILITY THEOREM
SOURCE: Robert A. Mundell, " International Trade and Factor
Mobility," American Economic Review, June 1957, 47, p. 103.
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disincentive for mobility of capital from one country to another, even 
if there is no restriction on movement of capital.
A prohibitive tariff imposed by country A on the import of 
commodity Y (capital intensive) results in an initial increase in the 
price of commodity Y and a set back, in production of X and consumption 
of Y, to the self-sufficiency point(s). Consequently, resources ini­
tially employed in production of X move toward the production of Y.
This would lead to a shortage of capital and surplus of labor. There­
fore, marginal productivity of capital goes up and marginal productivity 
of labor goes down. Assuming labor immobility, only capital will move 
from country B to country A until the marginal productivity of capital 
becomes equal in two nations. The new production possibility curve will 
be T'T^, production point F' and consumption point will remain at point 
C, the income level of the country A will not change, and extra produc­
tion of X, P^C, will return to country B as an earning on capital. 
Therefore, the same equilibrium results are obtained through mobility 
of capital and through free trade.
MacDougall-Kemp Model
Another approach to the problem of foreign direct investment 
was initially presented by MacDougall (101) and further developed by 
Kemp (85). The main theme of this theory is that capital mobility be­
tween countries results in: 1) equalization of marginal productivity
of capital internationally; 2) improvement in the use of world resources;
3) an increase in world output, and 4) a higher level of social welfare 
for all individual countries.
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Let us assume that the world contains only two countries, A 
and B, with the same specification given in the previous section (H-0 
theorem).
In Figure 4-3 BE" and AA^ are marginal products of capital in 
country B and country A, respectively. In the absence of international 
capital movement, country A produces Oj^ M'MB by applying of capi­
tal with a certain amount of labor and setting the marginal product of 
capital at the MM' level. In country A when capital is relatively 
scarce, the marginal product of capital is higher indicated by M'N. 
Before capital mobility is allowed between the two countries, A produces 
OgM'NA using OgM' of capital with some amount of labor. If all restric­
tions on mobility of capital are lifted, capital flows from country A 
to country B until marginal productivity of capital equalized in the 
two countries. EE' represents the international equilibrium price level 
of the capital; E'M' is the amount of capital flow from B to A; and 
E'M'PE is the value of earning on transferred capital repatriated to 
country B. Comparing BMM'O^ with O^M'PEB results in the following:
The investing country gains PEM as a result of transfer of capital, and 
following the same procedure, the host country also gains by the amount 
of triangle NPE. The world's gain from the mobility of capital is the 
individual sum of the two triangles MPE and NPE, which is indicated by 
MEN. Therefore, all four of MacDougall's expected conditions have been 
verified through international mobility of capital.
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A GEOMETRIC PRESENTATION OF MACDOUGALL-KEMP MODEL
Source: Kioshi Kojima, Direct Foreign Investment: A Japanese
Model of Multinational Business Operations. Praeger Publishers Paper 
Special Studies, New York, 1978, p. 68.
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The Welfare Effect of International Capital 
Movement in the Presence of Unemployment
The purpose of this section is to develop a model^ that repre­
sents an alternative to the theory of foreign direct investment which
addresses international transaction of commodities and mobility of
2
capital in the presence of unemployment. In addition the welfare 
effect of international capital mobility on the trade position of the 
two trading partners is considered.
Assumptions and the model
In the standard pure theory of international trade, factor 
immobility between countries and full utilization of factors are con­
sidered essential assumptions. We partially relax these assumptions 
so that labor is still immobile between countries but capital is free 
to flow among countries unless otherwise specified. Also, the wage rate 
is rigid resulting in unemployment of labor. Other assumptions are:
1) Two countries, "home" and "foreign," producing the same two 
commodities and using two factors of production, 
capital (K) and labor (L);
2) Profit maximization on the part of producer;
3) Perfect competition in all markets, except in the labor 
market;
4) Concave production function;
5) Full employment of capital, but not of labor
^Considerable attention is paid to two articles written by 
Jones (81) and Batra and Seth (16) for development of the model.
2
The assumption of unemployment is relaxed later and its conse­
quent effect on the welfare position of the home and host country is 
explored.
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A. Supply Side of the Model
(Kj, L^, ip (1)
Xg = Xg (Kg, Lg, Ig) (2)
where I^(i = 1,2) is capital inflow or outflow depending on whether the
home country is a debtor or an investor. The total capital inflows or
2
outflow is indicated by I, where I = Z  I..
i=l ^
All marginal products are positive but diminishing:
X,. = 8X./3L. > 0  K -  = 3X./3K, > 0
i j l .  1  I  K l  X  1
>^K1 ■ “ ’SCL ■ ' »
Assumption number four, the concavity of production function 
requires that X^. X^Li " 4li " °
The factor reward conditions under assumptions (2) and (3) are: 
"i ■
“ 2  ■ ^ > ^ 2 « 2 > 4 >  <“ >
'1 ■ <=>
'2  = '■ W i ' >
P2
where = Wg = W, r^  ^= rg = r, P = p—, is the price ratio and is 
assumed to be equal one.
Employment conditions of factors of production
+ Kg = K (7)
+ Lg = L C L (8)
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B. Demand Side of the Model.
Assuming an index of social welfare, U, to be dependent on 
consumption of only two goods:
U = U (D^, Dg) (9)
Let the first good be importable and the second good be export­
able for the home country.
Di = Xf + (10)
Dg = - Eg (11)
where E^  and Eg represent import and export for the home country, 
respectively.
Suppose the home country is a net investor in the foreign coun­
try with (I) amount of investment and (a/) rate of return on investment. 
The balance of payments equation will be given by:
E^ = P Eg + a'l (12)
In equation (12) the commodity price ratio P, is not equal to 
the marginal rate of transformation in the presence of unemployment.
In fact, unemployment creates distortion in production which causes the 
production possibility curve to shrink inwardly. In Figure 4-4 HNH" 
and HMH are production possibility curves with and without unemployment, 
respectively. The slope of MM', in absolute value, denotes the marginal 
rate of transformation at point M which is equal to the commodity price 
ratio.
i
dX^ P
130
H
PIGUTŒ 4-4 
SHRUNKEN PRODUCTION POSSIBILITY CURVE
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The marginal rate of transformation in the presence of unem­
ployment can be derived by differentiating equation (1) and (2), using 
3, 4, 5, 6 and 8 as follows:
dXi = dK^ + ciL^
dXg = dKg + X^gdL^
dK^ + dK^ = dK = 0
dL^ + dig = dL
dXi - X^^ dK^ + X^i dL^
f2 X^/p(-dKi) + X^ i/p(dL - dLj)
'^ l " S^ci »^ 1^ + ^
dX» - j
dx[ = - P (^-\ldïT) (13)
In equation (13), since dX^/dX^ is negative or zero,
b = X^^(^^) be less than one. If we relax the assumption of unem­
ployment of labor, dL = 0, equation (13) leads to usual equality of 
marginal rate of transformation and the commodity price ratio.
An important result given by Batra and Seth (16, p. 299) states 
that dL/dXj^  can be shown to be positive if X^ is labor intensive relative 
to Xg. In other words expansion of X^  due to capital inflow (or any 
other reason) induces the employment of labor if X^ is labor intensive.
If X^ is capital intensive, the sign of dL/dX^ is indeterminate.
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Analysis of the social utility of 
the home and host country
Social utility is assumed to be index for real income of the
two countries. Determination of change in real income of the foreign
country is as follows:
Let X' and X' stand for production of the only two commodities
produced by the foreign country with production function given by^
(1) XJ = XJ (K;, LJ, Ip
(2) X' = X' (K', L', Ip
where return on capital invested in foreign country 
a-I = axpdl + P' axpdi
2
and a' is the rate of return on invested capital.
The foreign country's social welfare function is given by:
(9)" U' = U"(Dp Dp
Total differentiation of (9)' and division of both sides by
gives:
(9)"^ = d D; + ^  d Dg
where UT(i = 1,2) is the marginal utility of commodity i and Ug/U^ is
the marginal rate of substitution, which equals to foreign price ratio,
P'.
^Foreign country notations are indicated by in order to 
distinguish them from home country notations.
2
In this model, the home country is assumed to be the net 
creditor and the foreign country, the net debtor.
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The budget constraint that indicates a relation between the 
value of consumption and the value of production with the adjustment of 
return on capital invested by home country is:
DJ + P'D' = X' + P' X' - a'l (14)
Keeping in mind that X' and X' are exportable and importable
goods, respectively, for the foreign country, equations (10)', (11)',
and (12)' change to:
(10)' D' = XJ - EJ
(11)' D' = X' - E'
(12)' P'E' = EJ - ct'I
Total differentiation of (14) results in:
d D' + P' d D' + D' dP' = d X' + P' d X' + X'dP' 
- (o' dl + I da')
Rewriting (13) for the foreign country as: 
dX^ 1
or
dX' = - P' dXg + b'dX 
Substituting dX' in (15) and using (11)' gives:
(15)
dD' + P'dD' + DgdP' = - P'dX' + b'dX' + P'dX'
+ (D' - E')dP' - (a'di + Ida') 
which results in:
dD' + P'dD' = b dX' - E'dP' - a'dI - Ida' (16)
Rewriting equation (9) and defining dU/U^ as change in real 
income of the foreign country, gives:
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 dDj + P'dD' (17)
Comparing equation (16) and (17) gives the final equation 
which indicates the changes in real income of the foreign country under 
conditions of unemployment of labor and capital mobility.
^  = b' dX' - Eg dP' - {a'di + Ida'} (18)
From equation (13)', we can see that b' which is equal to 
X£l(^^), has to be less than unity in order to hold the negative sign
of dXg/dXj. The sign of b' depends on the relative factor intensity of 
commodity XJ and the conditions behind production function. When pro­
duction functions are homogeneous of degree less than one (diminishing 
return to scale), b' follows the same sign as it has been explained in 
the section on the home country.
The first term in equation (18) can be reduced to 
b'Xj = X£^dL' = W'dL'
which reflects the welfare effect of the wage rigidity. If the foreign 
country is a developing country, transfer of capital intensive technology 
has a negative effect on its total employment dL' < 1.^
The next term indicates that changes in real income of the 
foreign country depend on its trading position with the home country 
(Eg) and change in terms of trade (dP').
One example indicating the negative effect of capital intensive 
technology on employment of less developed countries is the case of Indo­
nesia reported in the Wall Street Journal. October 27, 1979, "Report on 
Economics of Indonesia and the Role of MNC in Developing Countries,"
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If trade results in deterioration of terms of trade, as may be 
the case for countries where export is primarily focused on raw materials 
and primary products, the social welfare of the foreign country is re­
duced by the amount of the change in terms of trade times the volume of 
host's import from the home country.^
The last term in equation (18) denotes the effect of change in 
direct foreign investment and its rate of change on the social welfare 
of the host country. Repatriation of earning on capital and a positive 
change in rate of return on capital are two factors which lead to deteri­
oration of the social welfare of the host nation. In contrast, reinvest­
ment of earning on capital and a decreasing rate in its rate of return 
improves the social welfare of that country.
In order to derive the home country's welfare equation which 
indicates the changes in real income, we may follow Kemp's procedures 
in using the market-clearing equation for goods.
^  = dD^ + dD^ = {dX^ + PdXg} - {dE" + PdEp (19)
The idea of deterioration in terms of trade of underdeveloped 
countries began with a report given by the UN Economic and Employment 
Commission about the ineffectiveness of foreign money on development of 
less developed countries and was emphasized by another study on the 
"relative price of export and imports of underdeveloped countries," pub­
lished by the U.N. Department of Economic Affairs, New York, December 
1949. This report indicates a declining trend in price ratio of primary 
products to manufacturing commodities for the period 1876-1880. Also, a 
declining trend has been observed in the relative price of British imports 
"mostly raw materials" to the price of British exports "mostly manufac­
tured products."
The notion of the tendency for a long-run deterioration of 
terms of trade in raw material producing countries had gained support 
from Raul Prebisch and Hans Singer in their famous "Prebisch-Singer 
Thesis."
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substituting equation (13) into (19) and a simple change in the second 
term yields:
(19)' ^  = C-PdXg + bdXj + PdXg) - {dE' + P'dE'}
+ {-PdEj + P'dEp
The second term in (19)' can be transformed into: 
dE' + P'dE' = (dD' + P'dD') - (dXj + P'dxp
Using (18) and (13), it follows that:
dEJ + P'dE' = ^
= b'dXj^ ’-  E'dP' - a'di - Ida' - b'dX'
= -EgdP' - (a'dI + Ida')
The final results of the changes in the real income of the home country 
in the presence of unemployment and adjustment for the return on capital 
invested abroad is as follows:
^  = bdX^ + E'dP' + (a'di + Ida') + (P' - P)dE' (20)
The first term which is equal to WdL, demonstrates the welfare 
effect of wage rigidity in the investing country. The second term in­
cludes two factors: a) the relative price of commodities and b) the
change in exports of the home country. Favorable change in both factors 
improves the real income of the home country. The third term represents 
a favorable alteration in the real income of the investing country as a 
result of the change in the amount of investment and the rate of return 
on investment abroad. The last term is again in the real income of the 
host country due to changes in international shipment of goods. Note
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that relaxing the assumption of unemployments cancels the first term. 
Also, comparing equation (20) and (18) shows that the next terms appear 
in both equations, but positive alteration of these factors is a gain 
for the home country at the expense of the foreign country.
Batra and Ramachandran's Model 
Another version of the macro-economic approach to the interna­
tional trade and foreign direct investment theory is developed by Batra 
and Ramachandran (15). Their main contribution is the addition of the 
role of the "specific factor" to the expanded Hecksher-Ohlin theorem 
developed by Kemp (86) and Jones (81) in the context of the general 
equilibrium model of international trade and investment. Specific fac­
tors refer to ownership of patents and special managerial knowledge and 
marketing skills that enable multinational corporations to compete with 
local firms in foreign countries.
Hufbauer (68) calls these factors— unique knowledge of produc­
tion and distribution techniques that cannot be easily bought or sold 
in the free market— technological rent. These factors give enterprise 
monopolistic or oligopolistic power over rivals as long as the knowledge 
is kept secret. Leibenstein (99) calls such factors "X-efficiency"; this 
term includes "motivation efficiency," "incentive efficiency" and psy­
chological factors important in productivity, but is distinguished from 
allocative efficiency, the main focus in macro-economic theory.
The initial cost of the development of such specific factors 
may be high, but as the development of a specific factor reaches a cer­
tain level of saturation, the cost of transforming such knowledge becomes
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almost zero. Therefore, return on organizational techniques, marketing 
skills and other knowledge of this type is pure profit to the firm. ^
In this section we do not intend to present the full picture 
of the Batra and Ramachandran Model; only those parts most important 
to this study are emphasized.
All assumptions and specifications of a two-by-two Hecksher- 
Ohlin Model are maintained. In addition, labor remains immobile between 
countries, but capital that is specific to the firm can flow between 
trading countries without restriction. The multinational production 
function includes a specific factor beside the usual two factors of 
production, capital and labor.
The following points are particularly pertinent in looking at 
the process of maximizing multinational enterprise profits:
1) Commodities produced by a multinational enterprise in a 
host country are importable goods, therefore, they must be subject to 
tariffs imposed by the host nation.
2) The basis for evaluating the corporate income tax levied by 
the host country is the total value of the products minus the cost of 
the labor. In this model it is assumed that foreign investment is 
financed only by the investor from the parent country.
3) The home country provides a certain amount of credit for 
taxes paid by investors to the host nation.
Batra and Ramachandran (15) regard specific factors (s) as 
public goods with a zero marginal cost. A certain limit is placed on s, 
0 < s < s' where "s is the level of maturation. These specifications are 
assumed to hold in development of the statistical model in the next 
chapter.
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The marginal conditions for profit maximization provide a set 
of equations through which the optimum allocation of the factors of 
production (capital and labor) is determined. The following conclusion 
can be deduced from the equation representing the optimum allocation of 
resources :
I. An increase in corporate income tax results in:
1) A decline in the amount of employment of labor by MNC 
in the host country.
2) A lower level of foreign direct investment in the host 
country.
3) A lessening of labor's purchasing power in the host 
country.
4) A loss in the rate of return or capital in both the 
home and the host country.
5) A rise in the government income of the host country if 
it initially had a zero or small tax rate. However, a 
continuing increase in the tax rate may draw all the 
foreign direct investment back from the host to the 
investing country, leaving the host country with zero 
increase in national income. Therefore, there must be 
an optimum tax rate at which the national income of the 
host country is at its maximum level.
II. A rise in the tariff rate imposed by the host country
produces^
^It is assumed that the MNC produces the importable goods in 
the host country.
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1) An increase in the amount of employment of labor by the 
MNC in the host country.
2) A rise in the transfer of capital from the investing 
country to the host country. In fact, a tariff imposed 
by the host country protects the import competing indus­
tries as well as attracting a flow of foreign capital to 
the country.
3) An increase in the real wage rate of the host country 
(but a decline in real wage rate in the home country).
4) A delay in the real reward of the capital in the host 
country and a decrease in the rental on capital in the 
home country.
Batra's Model; Multinational Corporations 
in Less Developed Countries and the 
Role of the Specific Factor
The role of multinational corporations in less developed coun­
tries had undoubtedly been different from the role of MNCs in developed 
countries. Some of these differences are stated by Batra (12) and are 
important to this discussion.
Multinational enterprises transfer more efficient technology, 
better managerial knowledge, and a higher level of capital to developed 
countries than less developed countries because of presence of a more 
powerful economic and political force in developed nations. Also, due 
to the political stability of industrial nations, MNCs consider the in­
vestment to be less risky and therefore a lower portion of profit earned 
in developed countries would be repatriated. In contrast, MNCs transfer 
less capital to LDCs and carry short-term projects for immediate profit.
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MNCs are said to have more control over the economy of LDCs than DCs 
and enjoy a low interest rate in an imperfect capital market presence 
in LDCs.
The main feature of this model is still the introduction of 
"specific factor" with assumptions and procedures similar to those used 
in the development of the model described in the Batra and Ramachandran 
Model (15).
Some of the important results obtained by Batra are as follows:
1) Operation of MNC in an underdeveloped country (characterized 
by a high unemployment and scarce source of capital) results in a trans­
fer of capital from local industries to the multinational investors and 
an increase in the employment of the multinational sector at the expense 
of the local sectors.
2) If the multinational sector concentrates on a relatively 
capital-intensive production process, the total unemployment of the 
labor-surplus host country will go up.
3) The multinational corporation creates a decline in real in­
come of the underdeveloped host country.
4) A tax imposed by the host country on non-wage income earned 
generates a rise in the employment of the capital and labor at the ex­
pense of the multinational sector, but this does not serve the overall 
optimum allocation of resources.
Trade Barriers and Optimum Tariff and Tax
Tariffs are often imposed to protect infant domestic industries 
and replace import by domestically produced commodities. While imports 
might be reduced or even eliminated by a high tariff, expansion of
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domestic production is by no means guaranteed. A high tariff leads to 
a higher price for domestic consumers which in turn provides a protected 
market for both the MNCs who have already had subsidiaries in the host 
countries and for the new MNCs attracted to the market. The expansion 
of subsidiaries may endanger the survival of domestic industries. 
Therefore, the host nations might resort to other restrictive policies 
such as a discriminative tax policy to protect the domestic producers.
The question is what levels of tariff and tax would be optimum 
for the host country? These levels depend on the country's trading 
power and its degree of commodity specialization. The major conclusion 
of Batra's Model (12, pp. 325-332) for analyzing the optimum tariff and 
tax are as follows:
1) For a small and completely specialized country, with little 
trading power, free trade or zero tariff rate is optimum policy, even in 
the presence of foreign direct investment.
2) For a large, incompletely specialized country, the optimum 
tariff rate may be either positive or negative, even if the country in 
question has monopoly power in international trade.
3) For any country regardless of size, the tax rate on foreign 
direct investment must be zero in order to achieve the maximum welfare 
for that nation.
The above conclusions are based on the assumption that no inter­
dependence exists between the volume of imports and the level of inter­
national investment. However, this assumption becomes less valid for a 
large country.
CHAPTER V
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE DETERMINANTS 
OF U.S. FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN 
THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY
Introduction
U.S. direct investment abroad has great influence on the U.S. 
economy, its trade relations with other countries, and the economy of 
the host nations. The decision to invest abroad is subject to socio­
economic and political factors which simultaneously determine the behav­
ior of foreign direct investment in a host country. Most of the statis­
tical models developed in this area have focused on just a few factors 
and/or addressed this problem from a macro point of view. The purpose 
of this chapter is to develop a statistical model which reflects the 
most important economic and political factors that motivate or deter 
foreign direct investment and to test the model for the U.S. foreign 
direct investment in the petroleum industry in the European Economic 
Community. A simple comparison of the statistical results obtained for 
the petroleum industry with the results obtained for manufacturing and 
"all industries" is also provided.
In the first section of this chapter a statistical model for 
determining the flow of direct foreign investment is developed. This 
model is based on the neoclassical theory of profit maximization behavior 
and cost of adjustment advanced by Jorgenson (82) and Kwack (96). The
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second section presents the problem with limitations of and sources of 
the data required for estimation of the statistical model. The third 
section explains the empirical results obtained on the estimation of 
the statistical model for the period 1950-1979. This section contains 
three main parts. The first part discusses the statistical estimation 
of equations related to U.S. foreign direct investment in the petroleum 
industry in the EEC(6) using simple linear regression techniques and 
the polynomial distributed lag model. A detailed explanation of both 
techniques and their application for estimation of the equations is also 
provided in this part. The second part examines the structural changes 
in the trend of U.S. foreign direct investment in the EEC(6) that oc­
curred as a result of the formation of the EEC in 1958 and the imposi­
tion of voluntary (1965) and mandatory (1968) control programs by the 
U.S. government. And, finally, part three compares the statistical 
results obtained for the petroleum industry with the results obtained 
for manufacturing and "all industries." The statistical results ob­
tained in this study are then compared with empirical results previously 
obtained by other economists in this area. Section four includes tables 
of statistical results and definitions of variables.
Statistical Model 
Let us assume that the objective of the U.S. multinational in­
vestors is to maximize profit earned in foreign countries, conditioned 
profit of MNCs at home. The profit maximization is subject to, first, 
technological constraints imposed by the form of the production function 
and, second, the balance sheet identity. Since foreign countries include 
both EEC countries and non-EEC countries, the total profit, which is
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simply the summation of profits in two groups of nations, must be maxi­
mized. Of course, it is assumed that the domestic investment decisions 
by U.S. investors are separated from their decisions to invest abroad 
because of the non-homogeneity of the two markets. Although the two 
markets are related by the interest rate factor, which is different in 
the U.S. and in the EEC,^ this relationship has been accounted for in 
the model.
•k
Let X and X indicate the production function in EEC and non- 
EEC, respectively.
X = X(K,L,T,S) (1)
*  A *  *  *  *
X = X (K , L , T , S ) (2)
where K stands for services of capital, L for labor, T for intermediate 
2
products, and S for the specific factor exclusively available to global 
firms which make them competitive in the world market, and the star 
represents the variables in the non-EEC.
The production functions are assumed to be linearly homogenous 
and concave, which satisfies the following properties:
The U.S. investor's choice of investment depends not only on 
the interest rate in the U.S. and EEC, but also on interest rate in non- 
EEC. This factor has not been explicitly taken into account in the 
model, but there are ways by which it can be justified. First, the 
interest rate is not the only factor that determines the flow of foreign 
direct investment from the U.S. Second, in the long run, the presence 
of international arbitrage activities narrows the significant differ­
ences in interest rates among different countries. Third, instead of 
the U.S. rate of interest, a properly weighted average of the rate of 
interest in the U.S. and non-EEC can be applied in the model.
2
In the case of the petroleum industry, T is considered to be 
crude oil and other related intermediate products.
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X.>0, X..<0, X..>0 1 11 1]
* * * 
X.>0, X_^<0, X_>0
(i,j = K,L,T,S; i^ j)
Also, the second order condition for concavity of production functions 
are assumed to be satisfied.
Where X^ is marginal product of the ith factor (i.e., 3X/3K=X^) 
and X^^ changes in marginal product with respect to its own factor input
(i.e., 3X^(3K=X^) and X^  ^ is the change in marginal product of the ith
factor as a result of change in input factors other than that of its 
own input (i.e., 3X^/3X^= X^^).
The balance sheet identify is composed of two parts:
a) the financial balance sheet identify between the U.S.
and EEC.
\  + Ag (3)
b) the financial balance sheet identify between the U. S. 
and non-EEC.
* * * *
q K = Ajj + Ag (4)
where
q = price of capital goods;
K = stock of fixed and current assets in EEC;
Ay = the value of U.S. direct investment in EEC;
Ag = the net worth of liabilities owed to non-U.S. investors.
The total foreign profit, 11^, after corporate income tax is given 
by:
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where:
“ (l“tg)[PX-WL-TP^ -F-(rg-gg)Ag-(i|j-gy)ay-âqK] +
_ * * * * * * *  p
(l-y[P X -W L -T P^-F -(r^-gpAg (5)
p * * * *_
P^ = P^*(l + T)
tg = the corporate profit tax rate levied by EEC
t = the corporate profit tax rate levied by the rest of the
world
X = level of output
P = price of output
q = price of capital goods
W = price of labor services
P^ = price of intermediate products
6 = depreciation rate of fixed and current capital
r^ = interest rate in the United States^
r^ = interest rate in European Economic Community
r^ = interest rate in the rest of the world
gg = expected rate of price changes of foreign capital goods
gy = expected rate of price changes of U.S. fixed and current
capital goods
T = tariff rate on import of intermediate products
F = fixed cost of specific factors, which is considered to 
be negligible.
^For an empirical case, the rate of return of petroleum in the
U.S. might be substituted.
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Substituting (I) into (5), the first order condition for profit 
maximization with respect to labor, L, and intermediate products, T, can 
be given as:
* *
3X W 3X W
3L* P*
(6)
P * P*
3X _ T 3X T
Substituting from (3) into (5), the marginal condition with 
1
respect to K yields:
H  = q[(ru-gu)+6]/P (7)
Substituting from (3) into (5) gives:
If = q[(rg-gg)+i5]/P (8)
Assuming production functions belong to the CES class (being homogenous 
of degree one and having constant elasticity of substitution), the pro­
duction function can be written as:
X = A[a^K"^+a2L"'^ +a^ T"'^ +n^ s"'^ ] ^  (9)
where marginal productivity of capital is given by
—  -I
^Since the objective is to derive the desired capital in the 
EEC, only the marginal condition for capital in EEC is derived.
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(10)
where is input elasticity of capital and p is a constant term which 
must be estimated.
Comparing equation (7) with (10) results in the following:
=q[(ru-gu)+iS]/P (11)
For the sake of simplicity, let us assume that p = 0. Then, the desired 
level of fixed and current capital will be shown as:
qK® = o^XP/[(r^-g®)+5] (12)
In case the U.S. direct investment is not financed by non-U.S. 
funds, the desired value of direct foreign investment is the same as 
qK^. But if U.S. direct foreign investment is financed by non-U.S. 
funds, then the variability of foreign exchange rates must be taken 
into account either through a model that considers foreign exchange 
rate under uncertainty or by minimizing the financial risk.
The latter option is applied in this work. Therefore, one can 
minimize the rental cost of fund subject to balance sheet identity.
Considering the equality of expected rental cost in the U.S.
and the EEC (equations (7) and (8)), the variance of the rental cost
2 1 around the equilibrium, a , is given by:
VAR(Ay/qK®U, A®/qK®E) = VAR(A^/qK®U)+VAR(A®/qK^E)+
COV(A^/qK®U, Ag/qK^E)
^Kwack (64) has assumed A^ and A^ to be independent in deriving 
the variance of the rental cost of capital.
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(13) 
iqK ) 
2
Minimizing the variance of the rental cost, a , with respect 
to the balance sheet identity is represented by:
(qK )
(14)
(l-A®/qK®-A^/qK®)
Taking partial differential of Z with respect to A and A leads to:
3Z/3aJ = 2aJ(A^/qK®)(^)-ayagA®/(qK®)^-X^(l/qK®) = 0 (15)
qK
3Z/3A® = 20g(Ag/qK^)(l/qK^)-0^0g A ^ / ( q K ^ ) (1/qK^) = 0 (16)
Multiplying both sides of equations (15) and (16) by qK^ and comparing 
the two relations results in:
2<,= (A5/qK^)-o„O^A|/,K* -
Substituting A^ from relation (3) into the above relations and simplify­
ing the result leads to:
2 e 2
:*E(— — ° qK qK
A^/qK»(2o5+2o2+2q„q^) - »„q^+2»=
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The final relation is given by:
A^/qK® = - --f  --- (17)
If the two variances are independent, the desired level of foreign 
direct investment can be reduced to:
Substituting qK® from (12) into (18) gives:
aJ = a[PX/(r^-g®+6)] (19)
where
2 2 2 
a = aOg/(Og+Oy) and 0<a<l
The relative variance of the rental cost of capital is assumed 
to remain constant in the empirical part of the study. A distributed 
lag model is applied, instead of a constant lag structure. The direct 
investment flow at time t, 1^^, can be approximated by one form of the 
Koych adjustment model. Let the following relations represent the Koych 
adjustment for 1^^ :
(20)
where
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Y.  ^ = factors other than those included in the modeli.t-j
A^ . , = direct investment stock at the beginning of the
’ period
C = corporation retained profits and capital accumulation
’ allowances with a lag of K period.
Substituting for A® from (19) into (20) yields:
^U,t ^2KS,t-K
(21)
The expected signs of the coefficients are:
> 0 a^^ > 0  a^ > 0
Other independent variables and their expected signs are as
follows :
1) size of the market with a positive expected sign;
2) growth of the market with a positive expected sign;
3) tariff discrimination with a negative expected sign;
4) wage differential with a positive expected sign;
5) other policy variables include a dummy variable for the 
formation of the European Economic Community (6 members) in 1958, a 
Dummy Variable for the "Voluntary Restraining Program" 1965 and a Dummy 
Variable for the Mandatory Control program in 1968, the expected signs 
are positive, negative, and negative, respectively.
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Equation (21) is the final equation employed for estimation 
purposes. In this equation, the depreciation rate, 6, is assumed to 
be constant and negligible. Also, presence of and (the two
explanatory variables in the equation) may create multicollinearity. 
Therefore, A^ is transformed to the right hand side of the equation. 
In other words, the stock— rather than the flow— of foreign direct 
investment is regressed on the explanatory variables. The equation, 
before transformation for the U.S. foreign direct investment in the 
EEC(6)^ petroleum industry, is as follows:
(22)
where :^
IEC6P = Uq + Qj SPEC6D + REEC6P + FDTl
n I
+ I Z a. . Y _  . + U 
i=l j=o
IEC6P = The flow and retained earnings of U.S. foreign direct 
investment in the EEC(6) for the petroleum industry, 
replaced for I in equation (21) (unit-millions of 
1972 dollars)."'"^
SPEC6D = Total sales by majority owned foreign affiliates of
U.S. companies in the EEC(6) for the petroleum indus­
try, deflated. SPEC6D is defined as: SPEC6D = SPEC/
(RU-GUE) where RU is long term U.S. government bond 
yields and CUE is the change in the U.S. GNP price 
deflator. SPEC6D is substituted for
[PX/(r^-gy+ô)] in equation (21) (unit-millions of 1972
dollars).
REEC6P = U.S. nonfinaneial corporations' retained earning in 
the EEC(6) for the petroleum industry. REEC6P is
EEC(6): the European Economic Community formed in 1958 with
six initial members (Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, and 
Netherlands).
2 ."Complete definitions of all dependent and independent variables 
are given on Table 5-9.
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applied in place of C„ .  ^in equation (20) (unit-U, C—Jx
millions of 1972 dollars).
FDTl = Stock of foreign direct investment in the EEC(6) for 
the petroleum industry with one period lag (replacing 
Ay in equation (21) (unit-millions of 1972 dollars),
Y.  ^ . includes: 
i.C-J
1) A polynomial distributed lag model for the size of 
the market. The proxy variable selected for the 
size of the market is: The Dollar value of the 
Gross Domestic product of the six members of the 
European Economic Community in 1972 prices, labeled 
as GDPEC6 (Unit-billions of 1972 dollars).
2) Growth of the market. Two proxy variables are 
chosen for the growth of the market:
a) Annual change in GDPEC6, defined as:
AGEC6 = GDPEC6 - GDPEC6(-1)
b) Percentage change in GDPEC6 defined as:
GEC6 = [GDPEC6 - GDPEC6(-1)]/GDPEC6
3) Tariff discrimination hypothesis. Three proxy 
variables are selected to replace tariff discrimina­
tion:
a) TDV: the ratio of U.S. export to EEC(6) export 
over export of EEC(6) to other EEC(6), defined as:
TDV = (USEEC6/EC6TEC6)
b) TDVC: change in tariff discrimination rate 
defined as:
TDVC = TDV - TDV(-l)
c) DUMTD: proxy variable indicating tariff discrimi­
nation after the formation of the EEC(6), defined 
as DUMTD = TDV*DUM58, where DUM58 takes the value 
of zero for the (1950-1957) period and the value 
of one for the (1958-1979) period.
4) WD6: wage differential between the U.S. and the
EEC(6), defined as:
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WD6 = [WUS - WEEC(6)]/WEEC(6)
where WUS and WEEC(6) are the average gross hourly 
earnings in private nonagricultural industries in 
the U.S. and the EEC(6), respectively (unit-1972 
dollar).
5) DUM58: Dummy variable for the formation of the
European Economic Community (6 members) in 1958.
6) D5872: Dummy variable to identify the impact of the
formation of the EEC(6) on foreign direct investment 
for the 1958-1972 period.
7) DUM65: Dummy variable to describe the effect of the
"Voluntary Restraint Program" on direct foreign in­
vestment which takes the value of zero for 1950-1964 
and the 1970-1979 periods and the value of one for 
the 1965-1969 period.
8) DUM68: Dummy variable reflecting the impact of the
Mandatory Control Program on the flow of foreign 
direct investment which takes the value of zero for 
1950-1967 and the 1970-1979 periods and the value 
of one for the 1968-1969 period.
9) GUS: Proxy variable indicating the impact of the 
"home" country's growth on the outflow of foreign 
direct investment.
Sources and Limitations of Data 
The purpose of this section is to discuss the sources and limi­
tations of the data used in this study. The discussion of data limita­
tions follows:
The data series for most of the variables in the model were 
limited to the 1950-1979 period, on an annual basis. This constraint on 
the data leaves a limited degree of freedom for estimation purposes, 
which, in turn limits the number of independent variables (economic and 
political) that can be included in the model. Also, a limited time- 
series data creates constraints on the inclusion of a long time lag
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expected to exist between a MNC's decision to invest in a host country 
and growth of the host market. Lagging independent variables or using 
the polynomial distributed lag model reduces the degree of freedom in a 
time-series with a limited number of observations and thus reduces the 
stability of the parameter estimates.
A second problem is related to the accuracy of the data. Data 
related to the operations of multinational corporations in host nations 
may be manipulated for transfer pricing purposes or it may be kept 
secret for confidential purposes.
A third problem is that, in some cases, the reported data is not 
disaggregated by country and by industry, as required by the model. In 
such cases, the data is disaggregated through proper proxy variables.
The time-series data was collected for 30 years, the 1950-1979 period. 
Prior to 1950, data for most of the variables either are not available 
or are in aggregated form, and thus impossible to use.
The main concern of this study was the collection of data 
related to the determinants of U.S. foreign direct investment in the 
petroleum industry in the European Economic Community of 6 members (West 
Germany, Italy, France, Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg), EEC of 9 
members (EEC(6) and Denmark, Ireland and United Kingdom), and non-EEC 
countries. The data for manufacturing and "all industries" were also 
obtained to compare the determinants of foreign direct investment in 
petroleum to that in manufacturing and all industries. The main sources 
of data for different variables were as follows :
1) Historical data for U.S. foreign direct investment in dif­
ferent countries and for different industries required for this study
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was obtained from various monthly issues of Survey of Current Business. 
published by the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the U.S. Department of 
Commerce, Washington, D.C. 20230.
2) The flow of foreign direct investment plus retained earning 
was acquired by subtracting the U.S. direct investment position at time 
(t) from its position at time (t-1).
3) U.S. nonfinaneial corporations' retained earning in different 
countries and for different industries was obtained from the Survey of 
Current Business, various issues.
The historical data for long-term U.S. government bond yields 
were from two main sources. Standard and Poor's Statistical Service 
Security Price Index Record, Standard and Poor's Corp., and monthly 
issues of Federal Reserve Bulletin, Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System, Washington, D.C. 20551
4) Total sales by majority-owned foreign affiliates of U.S. 
companies by major industries (petroleum, manufacturing, and others) 
and countries were obtained from various issues of the Survey of Current
T, ■ 1Business.
5) The implicit price deflator of the U.S. GNP was obtained 
from the Economic Report of the President, transmitted to the Congress, 
1980, United States Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1980.
6) The main source of data on the Gross Domestic Product for 
the European Economic Community was the Statistical Yearbook of the
The available data for the 1956-1960 period were in aggregated 
form. Therefore, they were disaggregated by using proper proxy variables. 
Also, total sales data for 1950-1955 period were estimated by first re­
gressing the 1956-1979 data on time, and then estimating the 1950-1955 
data from the estimated regression.
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United Nations, various volumes. The historical data for the gross 
domestic product was only available in the purchaser's value, at cur­
rent prices and in different countries' currency units, which had to be 
converted into dollar value at constant prices. Therefore, the data 
for each country was first converted into dollar amounts by their re­
spective historical average yearly exchange rate and then the results 
were transformed into constant dollars using the consumer price indexes 
(1972 = 100), for the countries used in this study, and finally the GDPs 
of the six EEC members (France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, 
and Luxembourg) were added in order to get the dollar value of the GDP 
of the EEC(6) in constant prices. The GDP for the EEC(9) was obtained 
by adding the dollar value of the GDPs of Denmark, Ireland, and United 
Kingdom to the GDP for EEC(6).^
7) The historical data for the U.S. gross national product in 
1972 dollars were obtained from the Economic Report of the President, 
transmitted to the Congress, 1980.
8) U.S. export to the EEC (both 6 and 9 members) and, EEC(6 
and 9) export to other EEC countries was obtained from the Yearbook of 
International Trade Statistics, 1947-1979, United Nations, various 
volumes.
9) Historical data on annual hourly earning in private non­
agricultural industries in the United States was acquired from Statis­
tical Abstract of the United States, U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau 
of the Census, various issues.
Historical data for the annual average exchange rate and con­
sumer price index for the EEC countries are reported in the Statistical 
Yearbook of the United Nations, various issues.
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10) Historical data on the average gross hourly earning in 
private nonagricultural industries in the EEC were obtained from the 
Statistical Yearbook of the United Nations. The available data were 
in current prices and in terms of currency unit of the respective coun­
tries in the EEC. This data had to be converted into 1972 dollars.
The procedure for this conversion is the same as the one followed for 
the conversion of the GDP of the EEC into constant dollar.
Statistical Results
The purpose of this section is first, to identify (and test the 
accuracy of the identification of) the determinants of the U.S. foreign 
direct investment in the European Economic Community for the petroleum 
industry. Second, to identify the structural changes in the trend of 
U.S. foreign direct investment in the EEC(6) that resulted from the 
formation of the EEC and the imposition of voluntary and mandatory con­
trol programs; and third, to compare the empirical results obtained for 
the petroleum industry in the EEC(6) to the statistical outcome of U.S. 
foreign direct investment in: 1) manufacturing industry in the EEC(6).;
2) "all industries" in the EEC(6); 3) petroleum industry in the EEC(9);
4) manufacturing industry in the EEC(9); and 5) "all industries" in the 
EEC(9).
Equation (22) can be estimated for the petroleum industry in 
the EEC(6) by using ordinary least squares, OLSQ. If the error term 
satisfies the standard assumptions of OLSQ, the estimated a's will be 
the best linear unbiased estimates. Since data constraints leave a 
limited degree of freedom for estimation purposes, equation (22): 1)
includes three main variables SPEC6D, REEC6P, and GDPEC6, using ordinary
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least squares estimation; 2) uses a polynomial distributed lag model 
for GDPEC6 in (I); 3) includes "other variables," labeled as in 
equation (22), one by one in (1) and (2).
1) A first attempt at model estimation using SPEC6D, REEC6P, 
and GDPEC2 (GDPEC6 lagged 2 years) yields the following regression 
results;
FIEC6P = -1016.66 + 0.199644 SPEC6D + 1.04455 REEC6P 
(-7.38) (2.25) (6.18)
(23)
+ 7.01164 GDPEC2 
(11.04)
= 0.9929 F(3,24) = 1256.09 N = 28
DW = 1.0821
Note: t-statistics appear in parentheses below the coefficients.
The reason for using GDP with a two year lag period in equation 
(23) is that, there is not a priori knowledge or past experience indi­
cating the exact time of the lag appropriate for this equation. Also, 
theoretically, there are grounds for assuming the existence of lag be­
tween the change in the market size (GDP) and decision to invest. There­
fore, in a search procedure various lag structures for GDP were tested 
and the one which had the best explanatory power was chosen. The term
"best" here is defined as the theoretically expected sign for coeffi- 
— 2
cients, a high R , and t-statistics significantly different from zero.
Equation (23) meets the criteria of high R-squared (adjusted)^ 
value and represents the theoretically expected signs for the explanatory
The adjusted R-squareds are computed using the following
—2 2 2 formula: R = R - (K-l/n-K) (1-R ) where K is the number of regressors
and n is the number of observations.
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variables. Also, the estimated parameters of equation (23) have 
t-statistics significantly different from zero at 5 percent level of 
significance. The low value of Durbin-Watson statistics (DW) in equation 
(23) indicates the presence of a positive first-order serial correlation. 
For this reason the method applied to remove the autocorrelation is the 
Cochrane-Orcutt iterative process (CORC). Applying (CORC) to equation 
(22) results in equation (24) which is reported in Table 5-1. The dif­
ference between equation (23) and (24) is that, in equation (24) DW 
shows no autocorrelation and the coefficient of SPEC6D has a t-statistics 
which is significantly different from zero at one percent level of sig­
nificance, but the constant term becomes insignificant.
2) In a second estimation attempt of equation (22), FIEC6P is 
regressed on SPEC6D, REEC6P and GDPEC6 using a polynomial distributed 
lag formulation. The model is:
FIECôP^ = a + SPEC6D^ + Yg REEC6P^ + 6q GDPEC6^
+ g, GDPECe^ , + g. GDPECe^ _ + g_ GDPECe^ _ (25)i t-1 z t-Z j t—o
+ g, GDPECe^ . + gg GDPEC6  ^, +4 t-4 5 t-3 t
Before presenting the estimated form of equation (25) it is 
necessary to mention some important points for the estimation of a poly­
nomial distributed lag model (PDLM). A PDLM assumes that the lag weights 
can be specified by a continuous function, such as:
g^ = + a^i + a^i^ + a^i^ (26)
for (i=0, . . . . , 5). The lag weight in (26) is specified with a 
third-degree polynomial and a six period lag. Substituting for i in
(26) obtains the following form for the gs.
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^0 = ^0
6l = Hq + ai + 32 + a.
Gg = + 2a^ + 4a^ + Sa^
Gg - &Q+ 3a^ + 9a^ + 27a^
G^ = + 4a^ + IGag + 64ag
Gg = a^ + 5a^ + 253^ + 1253^
(27)
In (27), the 6s (unknowns) are expressed in terms of as 
(unknown). Substituting (27) in (23) gives:
a + Yj SPEC6D^ + Yg REEC6P^
+ a„(GDPEC6 + GDPEC6  ^ , + . . .U L— i , + GDPEC6 .)
(
+ a,(GDPECe^ , + 2GDPEC6^ „ + , 1 t-i t-z . . + 5GDPEC6t-.
+ a„(GDPEC6  ^ , + 4GDPEC6^ „ + , 
I t-i t-z . . + 25GDPEC6^
+ a-(GDPEC6  ^ , + 8GDPEC6  ^. + . 3 t-i t-2 . . + 125GDPEC6
28)
t-5'
In equation (28), a, Gs, and as can be estimated using ordinary
least squares. Gs can be estimated by substituting the estimated value
of as from (28) into (27).
The above procedure for the estimation of Gs is based on the
assumption of no end point restriction. In our example, neither G_j^
(head restriction) nor G, (tail restriction) is assumed to be zero.o
If we assume, for example, head restriction for equation (25) the 
formula for the estimation of the Gs can be derived as follows:
Rewriting (26) as:
k=5 2 3
G. = Z (a^ + a^i + a_i + a_i ) (29)
1 i=0
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Substituting for i = k+1 = 0 in (26) gives:
= Sg + a^(k+l) + a^(k+l)^ + a^Ck+l)^ = 0 
or (30)
3q = -a^(k+l) - a2(k+l)^ - a2(k+l)^
Substituting (30) in (29) and rewriting the formula yields
k=5 „ . , -
6 . = Z {-aJ(k+l)-i] - a [(k+1) -1 ] - a [(k+D^-i'’]} (31)
1 i=0  ^ ^
In the estimation of equation (25) an exhaustive search was 
made to find an appropriate degree of polynomial, a proper lag period, 
and an end point restriction which best meet the model's criteria. The 
expected criteria for the model are defined as theoretically expected 
signs for the estimated coefficients with a reasonable size; an inverted 
(U) shape for the weights of the lag coefficients; and high R-squared 
(adjusted) values, and t-statistics indicating that the estimated co­
efficients are significantly different from zero. In the process of 
estimating equation (25), it was found that a GDP with a third-degree 
polynomial with a five period lag and a tail restriction with the lag 
structure starting from (t-1) had the highest explanatory power. The 
estimate of equation (25) with the above specification takes the 
following form:
FIEC6P = -1200.81 + 0.156120 SPEC6D + 0.448474 REEC6P 
(12.16) (2.48) (3.39)
+ 28.0412 GDPEC6_ + 34.04841 GDPEC6 ..
( 3 .4 2 )  (4 .2 8 )
+ 37.37806 GDPEC6 _ + 28.99908 GDPEC6 ,^
( 5 .1 4 )  (6 .0 4 )  " - 4 )
= .9978  F (5 ,2 0 )  =  2 35 3 .80  N = 26 DW = 2 .0 6
164
The coefficients of GDPEC6 in equation (32) were estimated by 
substituting the value of as which were directly estimated using ordi­
nary least squares, and k, which took the value of 3 in equation (31). 
Rewriting equation (31) as:
2 3
6. = E {-4.42555(4-1) - 3.10193(16-1^) + 1.49022(64-1^^)}
1=0 (6.96) (5.58) (-3.03)
Substituting for (1=0, . . ., 3) gives:
8q = 28.0412 3^  = 34.04841 gg = 37.37806 g^  = 28.99908
The t-statistics for the coefficients of the GDPEC6 in equation
(32) were estimated using the following procedure:
The variance of g^  in equation (31) can be written as:
k.~5
V(g.) = Z {V(a )[-(k+l) + i]^ + V(a )C-(k+l)^ + i^]^
1=0
+ v(a^)[-(k+l)^ + i^]^ + cov(a^,a2)[(k+l)-i][(k+l)^-i^]
+ Cov(a^,a3)[(k+l) - i][(k+l)^-i^] (^ 3)
+ Cov(a2,a3)[(k+l)^ - i^][(k+l^)-i^]}
Substituting k=3 in equation (33) results in:
V(g.) = Z {V(a,)(i-4)^ + v(a,)(1^-16)^ + V(a)(1^-64)^
^ 1=0
+ Cov(apa2) (4-i) (16-i^) + Cov(a^ .a^ ) (4-i) (64-i^)
2 3 (34)
+ Cov(a2.a3)(16-r)(64-i )} ^
Substituting for 1=0, . . .  3 and the value of variances and 
covariances of the as in (34) gives:
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V(Bq) = .404(16) + .309(256) + .0242(4906) + (-.260)(4)(16) 
+ (-0.0656) (4)(64) + (-0.0825)(16)(64)
= 66.8864
V(8i) = 63. 2499
vxêg) = 52. 976
9X83) = 23.,06
The standard errors for the gs are:
S = 8.1784 = 7.2785
So P2
= 7.9530 = 4.8021
6l 63
^2 37.37806 . ,,
%  = S:-----772785-=
4 82
3 83
The t-statistics for the rest of the equations can be obtained 
in the same procedure as described for equation (32).^
^This study does not provide the t-statistics for the rest of 
the equations, because it was very time consuming to estimate them.
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Equation (32) has a high adjusted R-squared and the theoreti­
cally expected signs for the explanatory variables. The t-statistics 
indicate that the estimated coefficients for both regular and polynomial 
distributed lag parameters are significantly different from zero. The 
Durbin-Watson statistics (DW = 2.06) show no sign of first-order auto­
correlation, which is considered an improvement over the simple ordinary 
least-squared estimation represented by equation (23).
The coefficients of equation (32) can be interpreted as follows; 
An increase of $1 million in the total sales of U.S. companies in the 
EEC(6) in the petroleum industry results in an increase in the foreign 
direct investment stock in the EEC(6) for the petroleum industry by 
$156,120 yearly, assuming other variables remain constant. Also, the 
positive relation between SPEC6D and FIEC6P indicates that an increase 
in the U.S. interest rate generates a reduction in the stock of foreign 
direct investment in the host nations, other factors remaining equal.
The results obtained from the relation between the foreign direct invest­
ment and both total sales and the U.S. interest rate tend to support 
those of Kwack (96).^ The proxy variable for the dollar value of output 
chosen by Kwack was the GNP of Canada, the United Kingdom, Japan, and 
West Germany and the export of developed countries, which may not be an 
appropriate proxy variable for the dollar value of output produced by 
foreign affiliates of the U.S. companies. Therefore, his result cannot
Kwack's model (96) considers U.S. direct foreign investment by 
all industries in all of the world, while this study presents the deter­
minants of U.S. foreign direct investment by industry by a specific 
group of countries. In this section the determinants of U.S. foreign 
direct investment in petroleum industry in the EEC(6) is examined.
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be compared to the result of this study. In fact, his choice of GNP 
as a proxy variable for the dollar value of output by U.S. investors 
in foreign countries is more suitable for representing the size of the 
market as discussed later.
In equation (32) a one billion dollar increase in the retained 
earnings by foreign affiliates of U.S. companies in the EEC(6) in the 
petroleum industry, if all other variables remain constant, adds 
$448,474 to the stock of foreign direct investment in the petroleum 
industry in the EEC(6). The estimated result of the coefficient of 
REEC6P provided in the present study is comparable with the one obtained 
by Kwack (96, p. 382, equation (16)). He found that an increase of $1 
billion in retained earnings by foreign affiliates of the U.S. companies 
in all industries results in a $135,000 increase in the flow of U.S. 
foreign direct investment for all industries.
A low estimated coefficient for the retained earnings may be 
explained as follows: foreign direct investment is a function of profit,
interest rates, wage differentials, size of the market, availability of 
local capital, and many other variables, while retained earning, which 
is directly related to foreign investment, constitutes only a small 
portion of the stock of foreign direct investment.
With regard to the coefficients of the lags, an increase of $1 
billion in the gross domestic product of the European Economic Community 
(6) in 1979, for example, results in an increase in the stock of foreign 
direct investment in EEC(6) in petroleum industry of approximately $28 
million in 1980, $34 million in 1981, $37 million in 1982 and $29 million
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in 1983, other things remain unchanged. The form of the weights is 
presented in Figure 5-1.
VOo
■CO-
FIGURE 5-1
THE GEOMETRIC PRESENTATION OF LAG WEIGHTS OF g
According to this model, the gross domestic product of the host 
countries which represent the size of the market have a positive rela­
tion with the stock of foreign direct investment in the petroleum indus­
try. The change in the stock of foreign direct investment comes into 
effect one year after a change in the gross domestic product of the host 
nations, reaches its peak point three years later, and disappears after 
five years.
The size-of-market is considered to be one of the most important 
determinants of foreign direct investment. Theoretically, the size-of- 
market hypothesis is relied on the assumption that adequate market size
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provides the advantages of economies of scale for the investors and 
attracts more technology and new investment. Also, as discussed in the 
theoretical part of this study, some theories of foreign direct invest­
ment, hypothesize that foreign direct investment occurs in a host coun­
try only when the market is sufficiently large. Scaperlanda and Mauer 
(142, 1969) in an empirical test on the effect of the size of the market, 
growth of the market and tariff discrimination on the flow of U.S. for­
eign direct investment in the EEC(6), conclude that the size-of-market 
is the sole determinant of U.S. foreign direct investment in the EEC(6) 
regardless of specification of the model and the time period. Lunn (100) 
in his empirical work on "Determinants of U.S. Direct Investment in the 
EEC(6)," and Schmitz and Bieri (144, 1972) in "EEC Tariffs and U.S.
Direct Investment" support the importance and statistical significance 
of the size of the market as one of the factors affecting U.S. foreign 
direct investment, but maintain that it is not the only factor.
Tariff discrimination is also important in determining the flow 
of foreign direct investment in host countries. The tariff discrimina­
tion hypothesis is based on the assumption that an increase in tariffs 
raises the price of the products in the host country, making it diffi­
cult to export goods to that country and increasing production within 
the country. Therefore, foreign investors invest in— rather than export 
to— countries that have imposed restrictions on trade.
Among three alternative proxy variables for tariff discrimina­
tion, only TDV, which is the ratio of U.S. export to the EEC(6) to the 
export of EEC countries to each other, gives the theoretically expected 
sign and t-statistics greater than one, indicating that the tariff
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discrimination variable adds to the explanatory power of the overall 
equation, but is not statistically significant. The result for equation
(32) including TDV is reported in Table 5-2, equation (33). Equation
(33) is corrected for serial correlation using the Cochrane-Orcutt 
iterative process. Imposition of tariffs by the members of European 
Economic Community presumably reduces U.S. export to the EEC and in­
creases export within the EEC. In both cases, this leads to a negative 
relation between the changes in the stock of foreign direct investment 
in the EEC and changes in TDV, provided by equation (33) in Table 5-2. 
Adding a tariff discrimination variable to the simple ordinary least 
square estimation of the model, equation (23), results in equation (34). 
Equation (34) has a t-statistics which equals 2.18 for the coefficient 
of TDV, indicating that the estimated value of the coefficient of TDV
is significantly different from zero at 5 percent level of significance, 
but DW gives an inconclusive result about the presence of autocorrelation 
in the model.
The results obtained in this study on tariff discrimination 
hypothesis support the empirical finding of Scaperlanda and Mauer (142) 
on a micro-data or on an industry level. Scaperlanda and Mauer found 
no significant relation between the tariff discrimination variable and 
the aggregated form of U.S. direct foreign investment in the EEC. The 
results obtained by Lunn (100) and Schmitz and Bieri (144) prove the 
contrary; however, the definition of the tariff discrimination variable 
for this study and the definitions used by Scaperlanda and Mauer differ 
from the definition applied by Lunn and Schmitz and Bieri.
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Another explanatory variable tested in this model is the wage 
differential (WD6), which is specifically linked to the profitability 
of direct investment. The wage differential hypothesis is based on 
the assumption that the presence of a low wage rate in a host nation 
reduces the cost of production and leads to a higher profit for the 
foreign investors. A low cost of labor, if accompanied by availability 
of raw materials and/or other basic factors of production in a host 
nation, may encourage foreign companies to invest in that country and 
save transportation costs and take the advantage of low cost of labor 
and availability of raw materials. The wage differential hypothesis 
can explain the inducement of foreign direct investment in developing 
host nations better than in developed host countries. The effect of 
wage differential on U.S. foreign direct investment in the petroleum 
industry in the European Economic Community is tested, in this method, 
and the results are shown in equations (35) and (36) and reported in 
Tables 5-2 and 5-1, respectively. Both equations have a high R-squared 
(adjusted) value and the theoretically expected sign for the coefficient 
of WD6. In both equations, the t-statistics related to WD6 indicate 
that the estimated coefficient of WD6 is significantly different from 
zero.
The wage differential variable if included in the equation with 
the polynomial distributed lag, equation (35), produces unsatisfactory 
results for the coefficients of the lag value of GDPEC(6). The substan­
tial change in the coefficients of the lag value of GDPEC(6) which re­
sults from adding WD6, signifies the presence of a high degree of multi- 
collinearity in the equation. Adding WD6 to equation (23), in which
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variables are estimated using simply ordinary least squares estimation, 
results in equation (36). Correcting this equation for the first order 
serial correlation gives equation (37) which is chosen as the best equa­
tion for explaining the effect of wage differential on foreign direct 
investment. The negative sign of the coefficient of WD6 indicates that 
a rise in the percentage change in the wage differential between the 
U.S. and the EEC(6) reduces U.S. foreign direct investment in the petro­
leum industry in the common market.
Empirical works concerning the determinants of foreign direct 
investment on a macro-level have found no statistically significant 
relation between wage differentials and U.S. foreign direct investment.
The result on the effect of wage differentials obtained in this 
study do not agree with the empirical works of Scaperlanda and Mauer 
(142). (Note: This study has tested the U.S. foreign direct investment
on the macro-level.)
Growth of the host market is considered to be another factor 
affecting foreign direct investment. This hypothesis is based on the 
relation between the aggregate demand and stock of capital necessary to 
satisfy this demand. A rise in aggregate demand requires more capital; 
therefore, theoretically, a positive relation is expected between the 
growth of the market and the stock of capital.
Two proxy variables were selected to represent the growth of 
the European Economic Community: the first is the annual growth of the
GDP of the EEC(6) and AGEC6, and the second is the percentage rate of 
change in the GDP of the EEC(6) and GEC6. Equations (38) and (39), 
reported in Table 5-2, represent the estimation of growth of the host
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market. Both equations have high R-squared (adjusted) values and the 
theoretically expected signs for all coefficients, including the coef­
ficients for AGEC6 and GEC6. The t-statistics for the coefficients of 
AGEC6 and GEC6 indicate that the estimated growth variable is signifi­
cantly different from zero. Equations (38) and (39) are corrected for 
first order autocorrelation.
The estimated results for the growth of the host market pro­
vided in this study support the findings of Lunn (100), Schmitz and 
Bieri (144), but not the findings of Scaperlanda and Mauer (142).
In 1958, Belgium, West Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, and 
Netherlands formed the European Economic Community. The EEC implementa­
tion of a common market, external tariff, and internal free trade should 
have initiated a decrease in U.S. export to EEC and an increase in U.S. 
foreign direct investment in the EEC.
In this study two proxy variables, DUM58 and D5872, were 
selected to represent the impact of the formation of the EEC(6) on U.S. 
foreign direct investment in the EEC. The statistical results obtained 
are indicated by equations (40), (42), reported in Table 5-1 and (41), 
reported in Table 5-2. These equations present statistically insignifi­
cant estimations for the coefficients of DUM58 and D5872. These findings 
confirm the results obtained by Scaperlanda (135, 1967) and (136, 1968). 
Wallis (163) and Schmitz (143), on the other hand, claim that the forma­
tion of the EEC had a statistically significant effect on U.S. foreign 
direct investment in the EEC.
During the 1950s and early 1960s, the U.S. balance of payments 
changed from surplus to continuous deficit, and the U.S. was forced to
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make policy changes to try to restore equilibrium in the balance of pay­
ments. For this reason, in 1965 the "Voluntary Balance of Payments" 
program was announced by Lyndon B. Johnson. This policy seemed to be 
ineffective. Therefore, in 1968 a "Mandatory Control Program" was 
imposed to restrict the outflow of U.S. direct investment. The effec­
tiveness of these programs was tested using DUM65 and DUM68 as proxy 
variables representing the voluntary and mandatory control programs, 
respectively. The statistical results for the estimation of coefficients 
for DUM65 and DUM68 are given by equations (43) and (45), reported in 
Table 5-1, and equation (44), reported in Table 5-2. All equations give 
the expected signs for the coefficients of DUM65 and DUM68, but the t- 
statistics was very low indicating that the estimated coefficients were 
not significantly different from zero.
An alternative method was applied to examine the effectiveness 
of the control programs on the U.S. outflow of foreign direct investment. 
In the second method, the ratio of the stock of U.S. direct foreign in­
vestment in the EEC(6) for the petroleum industry (FIEC6P) over the 
stock of U.S. foreign investment in the petroleum industry in the rest 
of the world (FDIPR) was regressed on time variable. The results are 
shown in equations (46) and (47), reported in Table 5-3. These equations 
still resulted in a statistically insignificant relation between the 
stock of foreign investment and the restrictive policies. The t-statis­
tics for both equations are greater than one, indicating that the two 
variables add to the explanatory power of the overall equations. The 
sign of the estimated coefficient for DUM65 is positive signifying an 
increase in the flow of U.S. direct investment to the EEC as a result
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of the voluntary restraint program. This inverse effect of the volun­
tary restriction policy may have been caused by an immediate reaction 
by some investors who anticipated additional future restrictions on 
the outflow of the capital.
Equations (48), (49) and (50) represent the structural change 
in the U.S. foreign direct investment for all industries in the EEC(6) 
as a result of restrictive policies. The t-statistics for the coeffi­
cient of DUM68 are greater than one, indicating that this variable has 
some explanatory power but it was not significantly different from zero. 
The t-statistics for the coefficient of DUM65 in equation (49) indicate 
that the estimated parameter is significantly different from zero at 5 
percent level of significance. The positive sign of the coefficient of 
DUM65 again shows the reverse effect of voluntary control program (per­
suading, instead of discouraging U.S. investors to invest in foreign 
countries).
The results obtained on the effect of voluntary control program 
support the finding of Kwack (96), who found a positive relation between 
the flow of U.S. direct investment and the dummy variable representing 
the voluntary control program. Scaperlanda (137) concluded that the 
voluntary program had less effect than the mandatory program on the out­
flow of U.S. direct investment. Willett (170) found that control pro­
grams were very effective. His findings do not agree with the results 
of this study, but his procedure was different from the one applied 
here. Willett tested the effect of the control program on the level of 
plant and equipment expenditures in Europe. He claims that in 1968 the
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total expenditure on plant and equipment was up to 20 percent less than 
the expected total.
Most empirical studies in this area have taken a macro-economic 
approach (i.e., U.S. foreign direct investment in all industries) to the 
problem of foreign direct investment. The present study is concerned 
primarily with the micro-economic approach (i.e., U.S. foreign direct 
investment in the petroleum industry in the EEC(6)). Nonetheless, com­
parisons of the results obtained for U.S. foreign direct investment in 
the petroleum industry in EEC(6) with the results obtained for U.S. for­
eign direct investment in manufacturing and all industries in the EEC(6) 
and the EEC(9) benefit the study.
Additional detailed analysis of the kind already performed for
U.S. foreign direct investment in the petroleum industry in the EEC(6)
would be extremely time consuming if applied for the other types of in­
vestment. The scope and limitation of this study does not justify such 
analysis; therefore, only simple linear regression techniques are applied 
for estimation of the remaining equations.
The statistical results for manufacturing industries in the 
EEC(6), all industries in the EEC(6), the petroleum industry in the 
EEC(9), manufacturing industry in the EEC(9), and all industries in the 
EEC(9) are reported in Tables 5-4 to 5-8 and equations 54 through 85.
All equations meet the criteria of R-squared (adjusted) values
and have the theoretically expected signs for the three basic explanatory 
variables (the dollar value of output, retained earning, and the size of 
the market). The estimated coefficients of these three variables in all 
equations have t-statistics which indicate that they differ significantly
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from zero. The results obtained for these three variables are in agree­
ment with the results previously reported for the petroleum industry in 
the EEC(6), except that a different lag structure emerged for the size 
of the market in some of the new equations.
With regard to the tariff discrimination hypothesis and the 
wage differential hypothesis, in both sets of equations for manufactur­
ing and all industries in the EEC(6), the t-statistics indicate that 
the estimated parameters are significantly different from zero, while 
the estimated results for these two variables in the EEC(9) for manu­
facturing and all industries provide t-statistics indicating that the 
estimated parameters are not significantly different from zero. The 
reason for this inconsistency may be due to improper form of the lag 
and high multicollinearity present among the variables.
The estimated coefficients for the rest of the variables were 
not significantly different from zero, according to their t-statistics. 
Further research might be necessary to find appropriate lag structures 
and/or different forms of equations which would best fit the model.
In conclusion, the empirical results of the present study indi­
cate that the statistical model based on profit maximization advanced 
in this chapter can identify the determinants of the U.S. direct invest­
ment. The results of estimation of this model are summarized below:
First, U.S. direct investment in the petroleum industry in the 
EEC(6) was found to depend on the level of output produced by the affili­
ates of U.S. companies in the EEC(6), the U.S. interest rate, retained 
earning by affiliates of the U.S. companies, and the size of the host 
market.
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Second, among many variables tested in this model, tariff 
discrimination, wage differential, and growth of the host market were 
found important in determining U.S. foreign direct investment in the 
petroleum industry in the EEC(6). Although, policy variables such as 
the formation of the European Economic Community, voluntary and manda­
tory control programs, and growth of the home market turned out to be 
statistically insignificant, all those variables added to the explana­
tory power of the overall equations.
Third, it has been shown that if voluntary and mandatory con­
trol programs had any effect on restraining the flow of U.S. direct 
investment to EEC, the mandatory control program had greater effect.
Fourth, change in the size of the host market was found to 
affect U.S. foreign direct investment with lag structure. This effect 
was not completed within one time period, but was distributed over 
several time periods.
Fifth, a similar test which used a simple linear regression 
technique only on the manufacturing and "all industries" indicated the 
importance of variables such as total output produced by the affiliates 
of the U.S. companies in the EEC, the U.S. interest rate, the retained 
earning by the affiliates of U.S. companies in the EEC and the size of 
the host countries in determination of U.S. direct investment in manu­
facturing and "all industries in EEC." More extensive research and 
perhaps more time series data are required to find better estimation 
technique for more satisfactory results for manufacturing industry and 
all industries.
TABLE 5-1
U.S. Foreign Direct Investment in Petroleum Industry in the EEC (6)
Equa­
tion Method
Dependent
Variables
Constant
Terms SPEC6D REEC6P GDPEC2 TDV DUMTD , .
23 OLSQ FIEC6P -1016.66
(-7.38)
0.199644
(2.25)
1.04455
(6.18)
7.01164
(11.04)
24 CORC FIEC6P 179.268 
( 0.26)
0.479654
(4.38)
1.33437
(9.38)
3.55887 
( 3.73)
34 OLSQ FIEC6P -349.904
(-1.06)
0.272175
(3.09)
1.13088
(7.03)
5.91440 
( 7.71)
-1232.04
(-2.18)
53 OLSQ FIEC6P -968.193 
(-7.07)
0.181712 
(2.09)
1.02009
(6.20)
7.13717
(11.44)
-404.193
(-1.49)
36 OLSQ FIEC6P 662.951 
( 2.52)
0.149517
(2.82)
1.06062
(10.63)
6.10861 
(15.34)
37 CORC FIEC6P 575.008 
( 2.65)
0.128224
(3.10)
1.03046
(10.94)
6.32530
(19.22)
40 CORC FIEC6P -1.31069
(-0.0020)
0.483250
(4.35)
1.32924
(9.11)
3.66990 
( 3.77)
42 OLSQ FIEC6P -1014.26
(-7.48)
0.145777
(1.48)
1.00552
(5.95)
7.34148
(10.69)
43 OLSQ FIEC6P -1030.37
(-7.22)
0.181823
(1.88)
1.03397
(6.03)
7.13513
(10.31)
45 OLSQ FIEC6P -1039.35
(-7.17)
0.178652
(1.85)
1.03737
(6.09)
7.16088
(10.33)
52 OLSQ FIEC6P -954.011
(-6.42)
0.212730
(2.40)
1.02873
(6.11)
6.92997
(10.93)
V D
TABLE 5-1 (continued)
Equa­
tion WD6 DUM58 D5872 DUM65 DUM68 eus DW F N
23 1.0821 0.992 (3,24)
1256.09
28
24 2.21 0.995 (3,23)
1830.14
27
34 1.19 0.993 (4,23)
1101.95
28
53 1.32 0.993 (4,23)
1000.85
28
36 -919.288
(-6.70)
2.55 0.997 (4,23)
2703.49
28
37 -896.742
(-8.26)
2.04 0.998 (4,22)
2900.75
27
40 48.8421
(0.31)
2.16 0,994 (4,22)
1316.84
27
42 -96.6457
(-1.23)
1.32 0.993 (4,23)
972.611
28
43 7.13513
(-0.56)
1.13 0.992 (4,23)
924.331
28
45 -88.98
(-0.64)
1.16 0.992 (4,23)
928.344
28
52 -1493.72
(-1.02)
0.98 0.993 (4,23)
953.34
28
00o
TABLE 5-2
U.S. Foreign Direct Investment in Petroleum Industry in the EEC (6) 
Polynomial Distributed Lag Model
Equa­
tion Method
Dependent
Variables
Constant
Terms
SPEC6D REEC6P GDPEC6
(t-1)
GDPEC6
(t-2)
GDPEC6 
(t-3) .
32 PDL
(4,4,2)
FIEC6P -1200.81
(-12.16)
0.156120
(2.48)
0.448474
(3.39)
28.0412
(3.42)
34.04841
(4.28)
37.37806
(5.14)
33 PDLCORC
(4,4,2)
FIEC6P -829.163
(-3.04)
0.222341
(2.98)
0.480689
(3.49)
51.81528 57.24498 57.7424
35 PDLCORC
(4,4,2)
FIEC6P -265.978
(-0.96)
0.130193
(3.02)
0.653439
(5.0)
-4.521312 0.9294 7.321392
41 PDL
(4,4,2)
FIEC6P -1210.04
(-11.98)
0.123200
(1.54)
0.447556
(3.33)
16.15764 22.36254 26.91254
44 PDL
(4,4,2)
FIEC6P -1235.26
(-11.0156)
0.128219 
(1.69)
0.460502
(3.40)
17.82112 24.00843 28.45128
38 PDLCORC
(4,4.2)
FIEC6P -1214.96
(-19.83)
0.154182
(3.94)
0.2746
(2.23)
85.70232 99.4581 89.65692
39 PDLCORC
(4,4,2)
FIEC6P -1274.52
(-19.38)
0.157383
(3.86)
0.346084
(2.87)
66.44808 72.43455 72.31808
51 PDL
(4,5,2)
FIEC6P -1305.42
(-15.11)
0.088568
(1.64)
0.608232
(4.86)
61.897 67.61952 70.9914
TABLE 5-2 (Continued)
Equa­
tion
GDPEC6
(t-4)
GDPEC6
(t-5) TDV WD6 D5872 DUM68 AGEC6 GEC6 r2 F DW N
32 28.99908
(6.04)
0.997 (5,20)
2353.80
2.06 26
33 42.3224 -605.714
(-1.57)
0.997 (6,18)
2002.95
2.04 25
35 8.922354 -488.843
(-3.60)
0.998 (6,18)
2986.21
1.88 25
41 22.04568 -37.4557
(-0.68)
0.997 (6,19)
1909.17
2.01 26
44 23.12377 -57.5033
(-0.68)
0.997 (6,19)
1909.06
2.06 26
38 64.33938 1.89186
(3.28)
0.997 (6,18)
2458.69
2.01 25
39 52.65459 1112.20
(3.14)
0.997 (6,18)
2481.76
2.07 25
51 65.31232 43.88232 0.997 (5,20)
2884.21
1.74 26
00
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TABLE 5-3
Structural Change in Trend of U.S. Foreign Direct Investment in the EEC (6)
Equa­
tion Method
Dependent
Variables
Constant
Term TIME TIME2 DUM58 DUM65 DUM68 R2 N .
46 OLSQ RFDJP 0.063888
(8.55)
0.000214
(12.47)
0.01332
(1.05)
0.85 30
47 CORC RFDJP -0.098879
(-1.82)
0.19209 
(3.57)
-0.000258
(-2.03)
-0.00734
(-1.31)
-0.00734
(-1.31)
0.99 29
48 CORC RFDI 0.14451
(2.75)
0.000130
(2.58)
-0.001119
(-0.125)
0.985 29
49 OLSQ RFDI 0.037251
(4.41)
0.0047423
(3.51)
0.000098
(2.35)
0.013178
(1.74)
0.965 30
50 CORC RFDI -0.098872
(-1.82)
0.019209
(3.5)
-0.000258
(-2.03)
-0.007339
(-1.30)
0.989 29
00
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TABLE 5-3 (Continued)
Equa­
tion F DW
46 (2,27)
78.6
0.76
47 (3,25)
842.10
1.74
48 (2,26)
941.885
1.45
49 (3,26)
248.4
0.47
50 (3,25)
842.095
1.75
*
TABLE 5-4 ,
U.S. Foreign Direct Investment in Manufacturing in the EEC (6)
Equa­
tion Method
Dependent
Variables
Constant
Terms SMEC6D REEC6M GCPEC2 GDPEC3 TDV WD6
54 CORC FIEC6M -2359.02
(-3.25)
0.751516
(4.56)
2.19458
(5.81)
11.3953
(3.63)
55 CORC FIEC6M -2922.43
(-4.68)
0.503341
(3.01)
2.68343
(8.91)
15.3998
(5.03)
56 CORC FIEC6M -1336.76
(-1.10)
0.735523
(4.58)
2.33818
(6.25)
10.3596
(3.19)
-2208.51
(-1.06)
57 CORC FIEC6M -163.515
(-0.123)
0.283493
(1.61)
2.67959
(9.74)
16.6819
(6.06)
-1798.19 
(-2.26)
58 CORC FIEC6M -2370.86
(-3.15)
0.757704
(4.43)
2.20273
(5.59)
11.2172
(3.33)
59 CORC FIEC6M -2437.15
(-3.20)
0.828445
(4.62)
2.25539
(5.69)
10.3203
(3.08)
60 CORC FIEC6M -2277.24
(-3.05)
0.775317
(4.21)
2.26844
(5.86)
10.8265
(3.12)
61 CORC FIEC6M -3074.44
(-4.46)
0.454813
(2.40)
2,67937
(8.74)
16.30
(4.68)
62 CORC FIEC6M -2883.65
(-3.46)
0.622211
(3.29)
2.01466
(4.59)
13.7196
(3.79)
63 CORC FIEC6M -2789.67
(-3.36)
0.661561
(3.78)
2.14360
(5.35)
13.0190
(3.83)
00
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TABLE 5-4 (Continued)
Equa­
tion DUM58 D5872 DUM65 DUM68 AGEC6 GEC6 R: F DW N
54 0.994 (3,23)
1616.11
1.81 27
55 0.995 (3,23)
1897.72
1.93 27
56 0.994 (4,22)
1212.80
1.83 27
57 0.995 (4,22)
1665.87
2.05 27
58 72.36
(0.16)
0.994 (4,22)
1660.76
1.81 27
59 346.877
(0.97)
0.994 (4,22)
1207.71
1.80 27
60 182.010
(0.48)
0.994 (4,22)
1169.31
1.82 27
61 -250.197
(-0.59)
0.995 (4,22)
1382.69
1.93 27
62 3.57532
(0.99)
0.994 (4,22)
1203.51
1.97 27
63 1788.36
(0.78)
0.994 (4,22)
1179.98
1.94 27
TABLE 5-5
U.S. Foreign Direct Investment in "All Industries" in the EEC (6)
Equa­
tion Method
Dependent
Variables
Constant
Term STEC6D REEC6 GDPEC2 TDV WD6 D5872
64 CORC FIEC6 -4260.55
(-3.79)
0.811842
(5.88)
1.52724
(5.19)
18.9070
(4.39)
65 CORC FIEC6 -1940.25
(-1.14)
0.759324
(6.03)
1.65638
(5.96)
17.7092
(4.22)
-5635.79
(-1.86)
66 CORC FIEC6 142.066 
( 0.056)
0.662518
(4.83)
1.56161
(5.74)
19.4303
(5.02)
-2652.57
(-1.97)
67 CORC F1EC6 -4527.69
(-3.80)
0.837176
(5.87)
1.56165
(5.17)
18.4832
(4.20)
381.29
(0.71)
68 CORC FIEC6 -4310.07
(-4.11)
0.816073
(5.53)
1.53846
(5.14)
18.8429
(4.16)
69 CORC FIEC6 -4919.57
(-4.65)
0.689684
(4.25)
1.48205
(5.01)
22.3657
(4.76)
00
TABLE 5-5 (Continued)
Equa­
tion DUM65 AGEC6 N DW F
64 27 2.06 (3,23)
2056.70
0.995
65 27 2.09 (4,22)
1658.06
0.995
66 27 2.03 (4,22)
1722.52
0.995
67 27 2.09 (4,22)
1509.40
0.995
68 237.647
(0.43)
27 2.11 (4,22)
1485.50
0.995
69 3.22473
(0.70)
27 2.21 (4,22)
1486.65
0.995
00
CO
TABLE 5-6
U.S. Foreign Direct Investment in Petroleum Industry in the EEC (9)
Equa­
tion
Dependent 
Method Variables
Constant
Terms SPEC9D REEC9P GDPE92 GDPE93 TDV9 WD9
70 CORC FIEC9P -2068.73 0.748739 1.55764 8.30589
(-5.88) (7.88) (12.32) (7.82)
71 CORC FIEC9P -496.127 0.841331 1.55916 6.19167
(-0.59) (8.40) (13.18) (4.30)
72 CORC FIEC9P -492.872 0.688281 1.59655 7.75640
(-0.79) (10.02) (13.91) (9.37)
73 CORC FIEC9P -2063.69 0.738410 1.55690 8.31944
(-5.72) (6.93) (12.01) (7.69)
74 CORC FIEC9P -2303.56 0.662782 1.60079 9.22175
(-7.18) (7.06) (12.61) (8.98)
75 CORC FIEC9P -2203.41 0.705360 1.57272 8.78690
(-5.85) (6.66) (12.22) (7.44)
76 CORC FIEC9P -1881.95 0.845862 1.23254 7.10309
(-6.28) (12.37) (16.39) (9.26)
-2628.60
(-2.03)
-850.411
(-3.00)
00
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TABLE 5-6 (Continued)
Equa­
tion DUM73 DUM65 DUM68 AG9 N DW F R2
70 26 2.07 (3,22)
2100.03
0.995
71 26 2.01 (4,21)
1799.98
0.996
72 26 2.10 (4,21)
2011.62
0.996
73 58.8557
(0.21)
26 2.06 (4,21)
1506.43
0.995
74 -195.650
(-1.35)
26 2.11 (4,21)
1605.45
0.995
75 -169.158
(-0.73)
26 2.09 (4,21)
1540.63
0.995
76 1.02948
(1.32)
27 2.01 (4,22)
4677.17
0.997
VO
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TABLE 5-7
U.S. Foreign Direct Investment in Manufacturing Industry in the EEC (9)
Equa­
tion Method
Dependent
Variables
Constant
Terms SMEC9D REEC9M GDPE93 TDV9 DUM65 AG9
77 CORC FIEC9M -5988.47
(-4.81)
0.456663
(2.29)
3.27441
(10.39)
21.9545
(5.00)
78 CORC FIEC9M -1569.01
(-0.52)
0.828515
(4.06)
2.93545
(7.34)
11.0932
(2.18)
-5452.84
(-1.11)
79 CORC FIEC9M -4081.89
(-2.53)
0.880719
(3.74)
2.86748
(7.11)
13.2191
(2.43)
451.350
(0.66)
80 CORC FIEC9M -5935.59
(-3.88)
0.594273
(2.81)
2.58173
(5.95)
19.6673
(4.05)
7.92033
(1.40)
TABLE 5-7 (Continued)
Equa­
tion N DW F
77 26 1.86 (3.22)
1276.76
0.993
78 26 1.80 (4,21)
753.98
0.992
79 26 1.81 (4,21)
727.418
0.991
80 26 1.96 (4,21)
758.163
0.992
TABLE 5-8
U.S. Foreign Direct Investment in "All Industries" in the EEC (9)
Equa­
tion Method
Dependent
Variables
Constant
Terms STEC9D REEC9 GDPE92 GDPE93 TDV9 WD9
81 CORC FIEC9 -9944.30
(-5.39)
0.694916
(4.03)
3.00702
(12.95)
33.3294
(5.18)
82 CORC FIEC9 -990.349
(-0.22)
1.19150
(6.08)
2.74227
(8.08)
11.2621
(1.33)
-9429.33
(-1.22)
83 CORC FIEC9 -5487.87
(-1.30)
0.592899
(3.37)
3.01493
(13.18)
33.4277
(5.42)
-2566.12
(-1.21)
84 CORC FIEC9 -9824.07
(-4.97)
0.711670
(3.59)
3.0193
(12.71)
32.6578
(4.42)
85 CORC FIEC9 -10211.0
(-4.98)
0.664482
(3.34)
3.00195
(12.66)
34.5087
(4.64)
VO
TABLE 5-8 (Continued)
Equa­
tion DUM65 DUM68 N DW F r2
81 26 1.86 (3.22) 
996.10
0.995
82 27 1.76 (4.22)
1049.03
0.993
83 26 1.87 (4.21)
1442.43
0.995
84 240.404
(0.27)
26 1.88 (4.21)
1355.58
0.995
85 -451.629
(-0.40)
26 1.87 (4.21)
1361.76
0.995
VOw
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TABLE (5-9)
DEFINITION OF VARIABLES FOR ALL EQUATIONS
Dependent Variable Definition
IEC6P
FIEC6P
FIEC9P
FIEC6M
FIEC6
FIEC9M
FIEC9
FDIPR
FDIMR
RFDI
RFDIM
RFDIP
Flow and retained earning of foreign (U.S.) direct 
investment in the EEC(6) for the petroleum 
industry
Stock of foreign direct investment in the EEC(6) 
for the petroleum industry
Stock of foreign direct investment in the EEC(9) 
for the petroleum industry
Stock of foreign direct investment in the EEC(6) 
for manufacturing industry
Stock of foreign direct investment in the EEC(6) 
for all industries
Stock of foreign direct investment in the EEC(9) 
in manufacturing industry
Stock of foreign direct investment in the EEC(9) 
for all industries
Stock of U.S. foreign direct investment in the 
petroleum industry in the rest of the world, 
defined as;
FDIRP = FDIP - FIEC6P 
where FDIP is the stock of U.S. foreign direct 
investment in all countries in the petroleum 
industry.
Stock of U.S. foreign direct investment in manu­
facturing industry in the rest of the world, 
defined as:
FDIMR = FDIM - FIEC6M 
where FDIM is the stock of U.S. foreign direct 
investment in all countries in manufacturing 
industry
RFDI = FIEC6/FDIR 
RFDIM = FIEC6M/FDIMR 
RFDIP = FIEC6P/FDIPR
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TABLE (5-9)— (Continued)
Independent
Variable Definition
FDTl
GU
GUI
GUE
REEC6P
RU
SPEC6
SPEC6D
GDPEC6
GEC6
AGEC6
GUS
AGUS
USEEC6
EC6TEC6
Stock of foreign direct investment in the EEC(6) 
for the petroleum industry with one period lag
Implicit price deflator for the U.S. GNP 
(1972 = 100)
Implicit price deflator for the U.S. GNP 
(1972 = 100) with one period lag
Change in the U.S. GNP price deflator, defined as 
GUE = (GU-GUD/GU
U.S. nonfinancial corporations' retained earning 
in the EEC(6) for the petroleum industry
Long term U.S. government bond yields
Total sales by majority owned foreign affiliates 
of U.S. companies in the EEC(6) for the petroleum 
industry
SPECS deflated, difined as:
SPEC6D = SPECS/(RU-GUE)
Dollar value of the Gross Domestic Product of the 
six members of the European Economic Community in 
1972 prices
Percentage change in the GDP of the EEC(S), 
defined as:
GECS = [GDPECS - GDPECS(-l)1/GDPEC6
Annual change in GDPECS, defined as:
AGECS = GDPECS - GDPECS(-1)
Percentage change in the U.S. GNP, defined as:
GUS = [GNPUS - GNPUS(-1)]/GNPUS
Annual growth of the U.S. GNP, defined as:
AGUS = (GNPUS - GNPUSl)
U.S. export to the EEC(S)
Export of EEC(6) members to other EEC(S) members
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TABLE (5-9)--(Continued)
Independent
Variable Definition
TDV
TDVC
DUM58
DUMTD
T
T2
REEC9M
REEC9
REEC9P
REEC6M
REEC6
SMEC6
STEC6
Proxy variable for the tariff discrimination rate 
defined as:
TDV = (USEEC6/EC6TEC6)
Change in the Tariff discrimination rate, defined 
as:
TDVC = TDV - TDV(-l)
Dummy variable to identify the impact of the 
formation of the EEC(6) on the flow of foreign 
direct investment to the EEC(6), which takes the 
value of zero for the (1950-1957) period and the 
value of one for the (1958-1979) period
Effect of tariff discrimination on the flow of 
foreign direct investment after the formation of 
the EEC(6), defined as:
DUMTD = DUM58 * TDV
Time
Time square
U.S. nonfinancial corporations' retained earning 
in the EEC(9) for manufacturing industry
U.S. nonfinancial corporations' retained earning 
in the EEC(9) for all industries.
U.S. nonfinancial corporations' retained earning 
in the EEC(9) for the petroleum industry
U.S. nonfinancial corporations' retained earning 
in the EEC(6) for manufacturing industry
U.S. nonfinancial corporations retained earning 
in the EEC(6) for all industries
Total sales by majority owned foreign affiliates 
of U.S. companies in the EEC(6) for manufacturing 
industries
Total sales by majority owned foreign affiliates 
of U.S. companies in the EEC(6) for all industries
197
TABLE (5-9)— (Continued)
Independent
Variable Definition
STEC6D
SPEC9
SPEC9D
SMEC9
SMEC9D
STEC9
STEC9D
USEEC9
EC9TEC9
TDV9
GDPEC9
DUM73
STEC6 deflated, defined as:
STEC6D = STEC6/(RU-GUE)
Total sales by majority owned foreign affiliates 
of U.S. companies in the EEC(9) for the petroleum 
industry
SPEC9 deflated, defined as:
SPEC9D = SPEC9/(RU-GUE)
Total sales by majority owned foreign affiliates 
of U.S. companies in the EEC(9.) for manufacturing 
industry
SMEC9 deflated, defined as:
SMEC9D = SMEC9/(RU-GUE)
Total sales by majority owned foreign affiliates 
of U.S. companies in the EEC(9) for all industries
STEC9 deflated, defined as:
STEC9D = STEC9/(RU-GUE)
U.S. export to the EEC(9.)
Export of EEC(9) members to other EEC(9) members
Tariff discrimination rate for the EEC9, defined 
as:
TDV9 = (USEEC9/EC9TEC9)
The dollar value of the GDP for the EEC(9) in 
1972 prices
Dummy variable indicating the impact of the 
formation of the EEC(9) on the flow of foreign 
direct investment to the EEC(9), which takes the 
value of zero for the 1950-1972 period and the 
value of one for the 1973-1979.
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TABLE (5-9)— (Continued)
Independent 
Variable , Definition
DUMTD9 The tariff discrimination rate, indicating the 
impact of tariff on the flow of direct foreign 
investment after 1973 in the EEC(9), defined as: 
DUMTD9 = DÜM73 * TDV9
D5872 Dummy variable to identify the impact of the 
formation of the EEC(6) on foreign direct invest­
ment for the 1958-1972 period
DUM65 Dummy variable to describe the effect of the 
"Voluntary Restraint Program" on direct foreign 
investment,which takes the value of zero for the 
1950-1964 and 1970-1979 periods and the value of 
one for the 1965-1969 period.
DUM68 Dummy variable reflecting the impact of the 
"Mandatory Control Program" on the flow of foreign 
direct investment, which takes the value of zero 
for the 1950-1967 and 1970-1979 periods and the 
value of one for the 1968-1969 period
G9 Percentage change in the GPD of the EEC(9), 
defined as:
G9 = [GDPEC9 - GDPEC9(-1)1/GDPEC9
AG9 Annual change in GDPEC9, defined as:
AG9 = [GDPEC9 - GDPEC9(-1)]
WUS Average gross hourly earnings in private non- 
agricultural industries in the U.S.
WEEC(6) Average gross hourly earning in private non- 
agricultural industries in the EEC(6) converted 
into 1972 dollars
WD6 The ratio of the differences between WUS and 
WEEC(6) divided by WEEC(6), defined as:
WD6 = [WUS - WEEC(6)]/WEEC(6)
CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This study has provided historical and statistical evidence 
that many quantitative and non-quantitative socio-economic and political 
factors are responsible for the flow and structure of foreign direct 
investment. In addition, this study addressed the questions of MNCs' 
efficiency and their role in the economic development of home and host 
nations.
Multinational Corporations and International 
Capital Movements
Historical Background 
A historical review of capital movements before WWI has shown 
that during that time the flow of capital was mostly from colonial 
powers to their overseas territories. There is little historical data 
on the nature and motivation of capital movements; however, the avail­
able information indicates that the basic objectives were extraction of 
raw materials and primary products from colonized countries. The United 
Kingdom was considered a dominant power in the international market 
during the 19th century and early 20th century. The Great Depression, 
which altered the position of the United Kingdom in the world market, 
may be regarded as the most important factor in causing structural 
change in capital movement during the first half of the century.
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Major Sources of Capital Movement 
The major sources of international capital movement have been 
international institutions (multilateral), aid from developed nations 
to less developed countries (bilateral), multinational corporations 
(private) and, more recently, the governments of the rich oil producing 
countries (OPEC).
The Motive for Direct Foreign Investment 
Under perfect competition, a single factor— such as a differ­
ence in the cost of capital, cheap raw materials, etc.,— may not neces­
sarily justify direct foreign investment abroad. However, many factors 
in an imperfect market simultaneously determine the flow of direct for­
eign investment. Some economists classify the motivating factors 
created in an imperfect market as "defensive/aggressive."
The diversification and spread of foreign direct investment 
may be attributed to the MNCs' risk minimization strategy. A multi­
national corporation's strategy may change from aggressive to defensive 
when it reaches a certain level of growth.
The Emergence of U.S. Multinational Corporations 
Before WWI, the U.S. share of foreign direct investment in the 
international market was relatively low compared to the European share 
of the market. U.S. foreign direct investment was mostly concentrated 
in neighboring Canada and Mexico. At that time, transportation and 
communication facilities were the major determinants of U.S. investment 
abroad. Another important factor was the stage of development of the 
host nations. U.S. investment in less developed countries was generally
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resource oriented, while investment in developed nations was market 
oriented.
During this early stage of MNCs' development, the young and 
unexperienced multinational enterprises were uncertain about new markets 
and needed sufficient technology and capital to cope with their rival 
competitors in host nations. Therefore, a large number of joint ven­
tures were established among U.S. corporations and foreign corporations 
to reduce the risk involved and to help transfer knowledge and technology.
Although the number of multinational corporations expanded 
rapidly during this period, events such as the war, anti-trust law, the 
Great Depression, the expropriation of U.S. properties, and increases 
in regulations against U.S. affiliates in host countries caused a set 
back for some of the U.S. industries. During 1929 and the 1930s, U.S. 
investors experienced great losses due to poor economic conditions at 
home and abroad.
After WWII, a great number of international organizations and 
private institutions, mostly supported by the U.S. government, were 
established. These institutions— plus the European Recovery Program, 
which was intended to combat Soviet aggression, help developing coun­
tries, and help fulfill U.S. long-term economic objectives— persuaded 
U.S. investors to take a greater role in the international markets.
The U.S. government policy of promoting U.S. private investment, 
initially intended to support investment in European countries, was ex­
panded to include support of investment to the less developed countries 
in the early 1950s. This policy and the new wave of multinational cor­
porations, during the early 1950s, may have been partly caused by the
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economic boom at home and a continuous surplus in the U.S. balance of 
payments.
The Korean War caused the U.S. to concentrate its economic aid 
in military projects, which expanded U.S. direct investment in petro­
leum and mining industries around the world.
During the late 1950s and early 1960s, the U.S. balance of 
payments turned from surplus to deficit. Therefore, the Voluntary and 
Mandatory Control programs of 1965 and 1968 were imposed by the U.S. 
government to reduce the flow of U.S. direct foreign investment and to 
improve the balance of payments.
The Historical Perspective of 
Multinational Oil Companies
The first recorded direct foreign investment in the petroleum
industry was made by Standard Oil of Ohio in 1879. From the beginning
oil companies operated under monopoly or oligopoly conditions. The
Standard Oil Trust was formally established in 1882. As a result of
antitrust law, its dissolution was ordered in 1911, but this move by
the government did not create competition among the Standard Oil com-
j
panies. Some of the important factors which influenced foreign direct 
investment in the petroleum industry in the early stage of development 
of multinational oil companies included: a high demand for U.S. refined
products and cheap crude oil; competition with the Russian oil industry; 
and the special attention given by the U.S. government to the petroleum 
industry.
After WWI, the world wide search for oil intensified. The U.S. 
oil companies— despite the anti-trust law— obtained monopolistic
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concession, from the U.S. government for their operation at home and 
abroad. In many cases, the U.S. government helped the oil companies 
obtain concessions from foreign governments, especially in China and 
the Middle Eastern countries, for exploration for crude oil or for the 
establishment of refineries.
A few multinational oil enterprises were able to gain control 
over a substantial portion of the world oil market by using strategies 
such as vertical integration, a market share approach, and geographical 
and resource diversification.
The damages to the oil companies from WWII, especially in 
Eastern Europe were substantial, but the companies were able to offset 
their losses and expand their activities. U.S. government assistance, 
a high demand for oil during and after the war, and the fear of Russian 
expansion were the most important factors for causing expansion of 
foreign direct investment in the petroleum industry after WWII.
Two major events which markedly affected the structure of U.S. 
foreign direct investment in the petroleum industry were the establish­
ment of Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), and the 
OPEC oil embargo.
Economic Impact of Foreign 
Direct Investment
Direct foreign investment can contribute to the growth and 
economic development of the host countries under proper conditions. 
These conditions include: 1) proper absorption capacity by the host
country— the recipient country must have an adequate banking system, 
sufficient technical knowledge, an appropriate quantity and quality of
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labor force, and a benevolent government. Otherwise, the imported 
capital may be wasted, misplaced, or repatriated to the donor country.
2) Proper labor conditions in the host nation— a country with an abun­
dant labor force and scarce capital requires "labor intensive" technology 
in order to avoid the problem of mass unemployment; a relatively capital 
abundant country needs "capital intensive" technology and skilled labor 
to utilize its resources efficiently. 3) Sufficient local capital and 
competitive local entrepreneur— the imported capital should motivate 
local savings and investments; the host government should incorporate 
economic policies under which the domestic industries can compete with 
the advanced imported industries. 4) The use of capital for import 
substitution or export development purposes— if imported capital is 
used in import substitution industries, its spread effect or economic 
advantage is greater to the host nations that if used in export devel­
opment of primary industries.
MNCs' Performance and Policies
Efficiency of Multinational 
Corporations
Multinational corporations are said to contribute to an optimal 
allocation of resources because of their large size. However, many 
economists have questioned the efficiency of multinational enterprises 
because of the deviation of these companies' performance from perfect 
competition. Large size has been proved by some economists to be 
insufficient proof of efficiency.
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Competition versus Monopoly; the 
Special Case of Oil Companies
Multinational oil companies throughout history have tried to 
suppress competition and maintain their superiority through creating 
oligopolistic market conditions in the interhational market. Some of 
the strategies they have used to accomplish this are: 1) diversifica­
tion in alternative sources of energy, which gives the companies poten­
tial monopolistic power over different sources of energy, even during 
a shortage in one source of energy; 2) vertical integration through 
which control over production, processing, transportation, and marketing 
are provided; 3) mergers and acquisitions which allow sharing the burden 
of providing the knowledge and finances necessary to beat the competi­
tion in the home and host countries; 4) interrelations and partnerships 
which harmonize the domestic and international activities of different 
companies; 5) geographical diversification, which avoids the risk of 
shortage in production as a result of political instability in one coun­
try or reduction in production in one area, and 6) finally, the market 
share approach, which eliminates unnecessary competition among different 
companies.
Intra-Company Transfer Pricing 
Intra-company transfer pricing is usually applied by multi­
national corporations to pay less taxes to the home and to the host 
countries, or it may be used to transfer extra-legal funds from one 
subsidiary to another. It is more possible for oil companies to use 
transfer pricing than for other industries, because oil companies are 
more vertically integrated. The beneficiaries of transfer pricing are
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usually the "tax haven" countries. Two methods have been recommended 
for eliminating transfer pricing: first, to impose lump sum tariffs
and taxes, and second, to use the arm's length standard or a checking 
system which monitors prices. It has been shown that each method has 
its own weakness and limitations.
Foreign Direct Investment and Diffusion 
of Technology in LDCs
It has been demonstrated that the performance and policies of 
MNCs in less developed countries are different than the performance and 
policies in developed nations. Due to the existence of excessive un­
skilled labor force and other economic and political factors, less 
developed countries require large amounts of capital and labor intensive 
technology to induce economic development. The study presented some of 
the socio-economic and political factors that discourage multinational 
corporations from investing in the LDCs.
A Comparative Analysis of Foreign 
Direct Investment in Australia,
France and Mexico
It will be remembered that an empirical study by the Business 
International Corporation which compared the performance of foreign 
owned companies in Australia, France, and Mexico to the performance of 
local companies in those countries concluded that the U.S. owned affili­
ates outperformed the local companies in export, Research and Develop­
ment (R&D), productivity, rate of profit, etc. It was concluded that 
in advanced countries, as compared to the LDCs, the rate of growth in 
export was higher, foreign investments were mostly market oriented 
(rather than resource oriented), the rate of R&D was higher, the
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increase in foreign assets was higher, projects were mostly long-run, 
and the rate of profit was lower. U.S. multinational corporation pro­
duction constituted only a small portion of the GDP of these countries 
and the growth of foreign sector was not indicative of growth in the 
overall economy of the host nations.
MNCs' Experience in Yugoslavia 
Observation of the role of multinational corporations in 
Yugoslavia indicates that even when foreign sectors constituted a great 
portion of the country's economy, the resulting growth of the foreign 
sectors failed to generate a sustained economic growth and development 
for Yugoslavia.
Host Countries' Responses to MNCs 
MNCs and Developed Nations 
The European response to the operation of U.S. multinational 
enterprises differed from country to country. Belgium was entirely in 
favor of foreign investment; Italy's policy was moderate; Germany and 
Great Britain applied limited restrictions; and France applied more 
complex policies toward foreign investors. Countries that applied 
moderate or restrictive policies were mostly concerned that the key 
industries remain in the control of local enterprises. These countries 
applied policies such as foreign exchange control, endorsement of local 
companies, and other restrictive policies to maintain control over for­
eign enterpreneurs.
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The Gradual Dependence of Europe on Oil
Before WWII and during the early post-war period, European 
countries relied heavily on coal as the main source of energy. WWII 
initiated a gradual change in the consumption of coal as countries 
changed to a cheaper source of energy— oil. European countries used 
various policies to try to save their coal industries in order to avoid 
dependence on foreign oil, but were not successful. After 1955, oil 
became the primary source of energy for the European nations.
The European countries that failed to remain independent of 
oil— foreign oil— resorted to other means to minimize their dependency. 
These means ranged from import quotas, exchange restrictions, price 
regulations, taxation, restrictions on the repatriation of the profits 
of the multinational oil companies to compulsory participation by for­
eign companies in national cartels.
Less Developed Countries'
Responses to MNCs
It has been shown that the reaction of less developed countries 
to multinational oil companies has generally been harsh and has ranged 
from take-over of foreign companies and restrictive regulations to 
nationalization of the property of foreign oil companies. Among devel­
oping countries, the response of oil exporting countries to multinational 
companies has varied from the nationalization of the oil industry by 
individual countries to the more effective collective policies applied 
by the Organization of Oil Exporting Countries (OPEC).
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Theories of Foreign Direct Investment
The study discussed the theoretical background of the motiva­
tions for foreign direct investment and the advantages and disadvantages 
of foreign direct investment to the economy of the home and host nations. 
It also evaluated the efficiency of foreign direct investment under dif­
ferent trade barriers from a Pareto optimality point of view.
A Micro-Economic Approach to the Theories 
of Foreign Direct Investment
Micro-economic theories on the theory of foreign direct invest­
ment included the following: 1) the "Business Administration Approach"
which claims that the natural growth of the firm is a major cause of 
foreign direct investment; 2) the "Industrial Organization Approach" 
which assumes that the oligopolistic nature of the firm is the prime 
motive for foreign direct investment. This approach emphasizes the 
"giantism" and "performance" of the multinational corporations; 3) the 
"Product Cycle Approach" which relies on the three-stage theory of 
innovation, growth, and maturing of the new product and of R&D. It 
will be remembered that this approach hypothesizes that economic exter­
nalities initiate the growth of the firm, which leads to flow of direct
investment abroad.
A Macro-Economic Approach to the Problem 
of Foreign Direct Investment
The macro-economic theories on foreign direct investment that 
were discussed in this study relied on an expanded version of the 
Hecksher-Ohlin trade theorem. The Mundell substitutability theorem 
provided evidence on the substitutability of factors (capital) for
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commodities in a free trade condition, and Nadel proved that this sub­
stitutability is possible even under taxes and tariffs. The MacDougall- 
Kemp Model claimed that capital mobility between countries results in:
1) equalization of the marginal productivity of capital internationally;
2) improvement in the use of world resources; 3) an increase in world 
output; and 4) a higher level of social welfare for all individual 
countries involved in trade.
Using the macro-economic approach to the problem of foreign 
direct investment, this study developed a mathematical model indicating 
the welfare effect of international capital movement in the presence of 
unemployment. This model concludes that under certain conditions: 
transfer of capital intensive technology to a less developed country 
has a negative effect on its total employment; change in the real in­
come of the host country as a result of inflow of capital depends on 
the trading position of that country with the home country and change 
in terms of trade; repatriation of earnings on imported capital and a 
positive change in the rate of return on imported capital lead to dete­
rioration of social welfare of the host country; favorable change in 
prices and the amount of commodities exported to the host countries 
improve the real income of the home country; and an increase in the 
amount of investment and the rate of return on investment abroad result 
in improvement of the real income of the home country.
The main contribution of Batra and Ramachandran's model to the 
theory of foreign direct investment is the addition of the role of the 
"specific factor" to the expanded Hecksher-Ohlin theorem. This model, 
under the condition of profit maximization and optimum allocation of
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resources, has given us the following conclusions: 1) an increase in
corporate income tax results in a decline in the amount of employment 
of labor by MNCs in the host country, a reduction in the level of for­
eign direct investment in the host country, a reduction in purchasing 
power of the host country, a loss in the rate of return on capital in 
the home and the host country, and a rise in the national income of the 
host nation (up to a certain point); 2) a rise in the tariff rate im­
posed by the host country produces an increase in the amount of unemploy­
ment of labor by the MNCs in the host nations, a rise in the transfer of 
capital from the investing country to the host nation, an increase in 
the real wage of the host country, and a decline in the cost of capital 
in the host country.
Batra's model presents the main differences in the transfer of 
capital to developed and developing countries. The main feature of his 
model is still the role of the specific factor. The main conclusions 
of the model include: 1) operation of MNCs in an underdeveloped country
results in transfer of capital from local industries to the foreign sec­
tor; 2) if the MNCs rely on capital intensive technology, the total un­
employment in the host country goes up; 3) MNCs generate a reduction in 
the real income of the developing host nations; and 4) an increase in 
the tax rate by the host country on non-wage income generates a rise in 
the employment of capital and labor in the local sector.
The imposition of tariffs by the host country may reduce or 
even eliminate imports, but may not guarantee the expansion of domestic 
industries. Therefore, if host nations aim to protect infant industries 
they may resort to restrictive policies other than tariffs.
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Statistical Analysis of the Determinants 
of U.S. Foreign Direct Investment in the 
European Economic Community
The empirical part of this study was presented in four sec­
tions: section one provided the development of a statistical model for
estimating the factors that affect the flow of direct foreign invest­
ment, which was based on the neoclassical theory of profit maximization 
behavior and cost of adjustment. Section two discussed the problems 
and limitations on sources of data used in the estimation of the statis­
tical model. The data series is limited to the 1950-1979 period on a 
yearly basis. In this section problems such as the accuracy of reported 
data, the difficulty in collection and disaggregation of data were also 
explained. Section three contained the empirical results of the esti­
mation of equations related to the U.S. foreign direct investment in the 
petroleum industry in the EEC(6); the structural change in the trend of 
U.S. foreign direct investment in the petroleum industry in the EEC(6); 
the imposition of voluntary and mandatory control programs; and a com­
parison of the statistical results of the petroleum industry with the 
results for the manufacturing industry and "all industries." The results 
of the estimation of the statistical model can be summarized as follows:
1) U.S. direct investment in the petroleum industry in the EEC(6) de­
pended on the level of output produced by the affiliates of the U.S. 
companies in the EEC(6), the U.S. interest rate, retained earnings by 
the affiliates of the U.S. companies, and the size of the host market.
2) Among many variables tested in this model, tariff discrimination, 
wage differential and the growth of the host market were found to be 
important in determining the amount of U.S. foreign direct investment
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in the petroleum industry in the EEC(6). Although policy variables 
such as the formation of the European Economic Community, voluntary 
and mandatory control programs, and the growth of the home market turned 
out to be statistically insignificant, the t-statistics related to the 
estimation of these variables indicated that they add to the explana­
tory power of the overall equations. 3) Mandatory control programs 
had more effect than voluntary control programs on restraining the flow 
of U.S. direct investment to the EEC. 4) A change in the size of the 
host market affected U.S. foreign direct investment with the lag struc­
ture. This effect may be distributed over several time periods. 5) A 
similar test (with only a simple linear regression technique) on the 
manufacturing and "all industries" indicated the importance of variables 
such as total output produced by the affiliates of the U.S. companies in 
the EEC, the U.S. interest rate, the retained earnings by the affiliates 
of U.S. companies in the EEC and the size of the host nations in deter­
mining the amount of U.S. direct investment in manufacturing and all 
industries in the EEC.
It can be concluded, however, that more extensive research 
would be required to estimate additional socio-economic and political 
factors which affect the flow of direct investment in manufacturing and 
all industries and which this study did not investigate.
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